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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigated the relationship between organizational culture and 
public sector performance management. The research was based on a study of  
the promotion of good governance in the Thai public sector through the 
implementation of the performance agreement (PA) scheme, using Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). The scheme had faced numerous challenges, 
perceived to be influenced by organizational culture. It had been assumed that  
a transformational shift in the organizational culture of the civil service, in the 
direction of market-based or new public management (NPM) values, was required 
in order to secure improved performance. The research aimed to explore how 
organizational culture influences civil service performance and identify  
other organizational factors that may also influence civil service performance in 
the provincial administration of Thailand.  
 
The research used a mixed methods approach of questionnaire surveys and  
semi-structured interviews, based on the Competing Values Framework (CVF). 
Questionnaire surveys were carried out with 480 civil servants within 16 
provinces. Semi-structured interviews – in-depth and focus group – were 
conducted within four provinces. A distinction was made between the low and 
high KPI scoring provinces. 
  
The findings of the research suggest that there was no dominant type of culture in 
the low and high KPI scoring provinces. Instead, a strong culture was found to be 
important in gaining high KPI scores, supported by participative leadership and 
appropriate management. Leadership style appeared to influence whether  
the public services performed to a high level, which seemed to be achieved through 
a balance between task focussed and people focussed. Therefore, a 
transformational cultural shift may not be required, but instead more effective 
leadership and management.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research problem 
Public sector reform is closely associated with attempts to improve governance 
(Fukuyama, 2013). Since the early 1980s, the terms ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ 
have gained significant attention in development discourse (Weiss, 2000), particularly 
in public administration. The problems of poor governance such as  corruption, waste, 
abuse of power and the exploitation of public means for private ends (Jreisat 2004 cited 
in Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Leftwich, 1993; OECD, 2001) in aid recipient 
countries have been a concern for aid donors, particularly international organizations 
such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2001; UNDP, 1997; 
UNESCAP, 2009). Consequently, the concept of ‘good governance’ has become an 
initial aid condition and approach to reform programmes demanded by many donors 
(Arkadie, 2012; Smith, 2007), especially programmes related to performance 
measurement for delivering good governance. 
 
Several developing countries (e.g. Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand) and developed 
countries (e.g. the USA, Netherlands and the UK) have attempted to apply performance 
measurement programmes to public sector reform and introduce good governance 
(Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Hood, 2007; Painter, 2012). However, the 
implementation of public reform or good governance is not simple in practice. 
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Achieving public sector reform needs an understanding of organizational culture, such 
as which culture or values are important (Talbot, 2010). Increased understanding of 
public sector organizational culture may help to describe the outcomes of the reform 
process in terms of appropriateness and inappropriateness between organizational 
culture and the objectives of reform (Parker and Bradley, 2000). A number of scholars 
(e.g. Andrews, 2013; Grindle, 1997; Wiratchaniphawan, 2004) suggest that culture, 
such as values and attitudes, is an important determinant influencing public sector 
reform and good governance. For example, resistance to change appears to occur when 
change is not compatible with the strong values of organizations (Yukl, 2010). 
Organizational culture is considered an informal authority shaping the assumptions, 
values, attitudes and behaviour of an organization’s members (Andrews, 2013; Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004; Robbins, 2005; Schwartz and Davis, 1981), and an ‘invisible hand’ 
in public sector management (Rong and Hongwei, 2012, p. 47). Therefore, culture is 
perceived to be something that influences performance (Armstrong and Baron, 1998), 
enabling and inhibiting attempts to improve the performance of organizations, 
particularly the performance of public organizations – the results of an act such as 
efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness (Boyne et al., 2006). The implication is 
that organizational culture might influence the performance (management) of the civil 
service in the specific context of new public management and the promotion of good 
governance.  
 
There are a number of empirical studies that have investigated the relationship between 
organizational culture and public sector reform in several countries, for example in 
Qatar (Al-Kuwari, 2002), the USA (New York) (Moon, 2000), Ghana (Owusu, 2012), 
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India (Quirk, 2002), and Thailand (Jingjit, 2008). There has been relatively little 
examination of how organizational culture influences good governance and the 
performance of the civil service. Previous studies have tended to focus on organizational 
culture and on some components of good governance, such as effectiveness, but this 
study investigates a wider range of components of good governance and incorporates an 
element of management and leadership as well as culture, whereas previous studies have 
tended to ignore this distinction.  
 
Studying Thailand, the provincial administration in particular, brings out new evidence 
about the relationship between organizational culture and good governance. Thailand is 
an interesting case because the Thai public sector reform has promoted good governance 
through a performance measurement programme known as the performance agreement 
(PA). After a major reform of the Thai public sector in 2002, legislation and several 
plans were promulgated for encouraging good governance in the public sector, 
particularly the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 
2546 (2003). The Decree ordered that all government agencies must be committed to PA 
from the fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004) onwards. Regarding PA at the provincial 
administration level, 75 provinces1 in four regions have committed to PA. 
 
However, promoting good governance through the PA scheme with Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) in the Thai public sector has been no simple task. The promotion of 
this scheme has struggled with the existing embedded traditional culture of bureaucracy, 
                                                          
1 The study focuses on only 75 provinces into 18 provincial clusters in four regions that engaged PA 
between 2007 and 2011, while the 76th province established in 2011, Bueng Kan, is not included. 
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which could be an obstacle to driving good governance (Sirisamphan, 2009). This can 
apparently be observed through the promotion of the PA scheme from fiscal year B.E. 
2547 (2004) to date 2. Some scholars claim that there are various challenges for the PA 
scheme, particularly at a provincial level, with relevance to culture, such as values on 
rewards (Sathornkich, 2013), and a control system forcing implementation of the KPIs 
(Srimai, 2015). The government agencies at the provincial administration level, who 
have a close connection to the citizens in the area, appear to have a significant impact 
on improving citizens’ quality of life and responding to their needs (Sathornkich, 2010). 
Thus, the provincial level plays a significant part in the reform mechanism. There are 
some studies on the civil service’s culture at a similar level, such as Moon (2000), the 
city government agencies were studied about motivation and organizational 
commitment. However, there are not many studies on the civil service’s culture at the 
provincial level because research has tended to focus on other levels such as state, 
organizations, ministries, departments and projects (Al-Kuwari, 2002; Owusu, 2012; 
Parker and Bradley, 2000; Quirk, 2002). 
 
Many studies of the Thai public sector’s culture (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Jingjit and Fotaki, 
2010; Phookpan, 2012; Pimpa, 2012) focus on the central government agencies (e.g. 
ministries, departments, agencies) rather than provincial agencies. Although a few 
studies (e.g. Sathornkich, 2010; Srimai, 2015; Srimai, Damsaman and Bangchokdee, 
2011) examine, for instance, performance management system (PMS) and PA at the 
provincial level, they do not highlight the correlation between organizational culture and 
                                                          
2 The performance agreement (PA) has been promoted in the Thai civil service from fiscal year 2004 to 
the present. 
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good governance. Therefore, the current study examines the civil service’s culture at the 
provincial administration level in terms of the relationship between organizational 
culture and good governance, both whether and how organizational culture influences 
the attainment of good governance as measured by PMS in the Thai public sector.  
 
1.2 Why Thailand? 
There are many countries that have employed the concept of good governance in the 
public sector through performance measurement as stated in Section 1.1. Thailand may 
be one of the most interesting cases, particularly among developing countries. This is 
for three main reasons. Firstly, Thailand has a long experience of public sector reform 
and since 2002 the programme is recognized as the largest public sector reform in the 
history of Thailand. This is the initiative to promote good governance through PA. Since 
the fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004), the Thai civil service has been committed to PA; hence, 
many government officials have long experience of PA and can share information about 
performance measurement. 
 
Secondly, Thailand has a unique culture that is different from other countries, especially 
Southeast Asian countries in that Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that 
was never colonized by a European power (CountryWatch, 2016). Therefore, the 
country has a self-contained cultural uniqueness free from external pressure (Shor, 
1960). Moreover, the nation’s cultural uniqueness is derived from the influence of 
Buddhism and from a mixture of cultural influences from several countries such as 
India, China, and Cambodia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
2013).  
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Thirdly, the study of the Thai public sector presents an opportunity to explore the 
relationship between organizational culture (e.g. attitudes, values and assumptions) and 
the achievement of good governance in the civil service. In this respect, the case of 
Thailand may be a learning opportunity for other countries, particularly developing 
countries, in terms of raising awareness of the relationship between organizational 
culture and performance (good governance) in the public sector.  
 
1.3 Aims and objectives of the study 
Much literature and many studies on organizational culture and performance have 
suggested that organizational culture is an important factor inhibiting or enabling the 
performance of organizations, especially in the public sector. This research aims to 
investigate whether and how organizational culture influences the attainment of good 
governance as viewed through PMS in the Thai public sector. 
 
To achieve the research aims, there are three main objectives of the research: 
(1) Examine whether there is a relationship between organizational culture and good 
governance 
The relationship between organizational culture and good governance used in this 
research was considered through the four types of culture based on the CVF model  
and the nine key components of good governance in terms of how each type of culture 
influences performance and delivers each key component of good governance. 
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(2) Examine the organizational culture of the civil service at the level of provincial 
administration to ascertain any cultural differences between high and low KPI 
scoring provinces 
Organizational cultures of the low and high KPI scoring provinces were compared by 
developing organizational culture profiles based on the OCAI and statistical analysis 
acquired from the questionnaire survey. The qualitative data acquired form semi-
structured interviews were also compared between both provincial groups. The overall 
cultural differences between the provincial groups was considered, based on the 
comparison of the results from the questionnaire surveys and the semi-structured 
interviews.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
(3) Examine civil servants’ perceptions of their experience relating to the PA scheme, 
and give officials opportunities to voice their views. 
The interviews were carried out with the senior managers and practitioners. Participants 
were able to express their experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge (Patton, 1990) 
on the PA scheme. The use of semi-structured interviews enabled a flexible interview 
environment because participants could share their views without controlled orientation. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
To achieve the research objectives stated above, two main research questions are 
employed as follows: 
(1) How does organizational culture influence civil service performance?  
(2) What other organizational factors influence civil service performance? 
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1.5 Theoretical underpinnings 
Several studies have explored the relationship between organizational culture and a 
variety of other factors (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Different scholars have used 
different theoretical models to study organizational culture. However, this study used 
the Competing Values Framework (CVF), of which the Organizational Culture 
Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is the main instrument (Cameron and Quinn, 2011) – 
the CVF was originally developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983). The CVF has been 
used because of four main reasons. Firstly, the CVF allows the measurement of 
organizational culture in terms of different dimensions but has broad implications 
compared to other models because it can integrate most organizational culture 
dimensions, particularly value dimension related to effectiveness (Yu and Wu, 2009). 
This can facilitate a comparison of the four types of culture between the provincial cases 
such as between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, and between the senior 
managers and practitioners in each group.  
 
Secondly, the CVF provides empirical validity and reliability due to the standard 
questions in the OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 2011), which has been used by many 
empirical studies (e.g. Howard, 1998; Ralston et al., 2006). Thirdly, the CVF allows 
researchers to use multiple methods in a single study, which can be seen from many 
empirical studies (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Phookpan, 2012). This 
enables triangulation, where the weaknesses of one method are offset by the strengths 
of another method (Jick, 1979). Finally, the CVF is considered to be an appropriate 
model to explore the culture of the public sector and to study cross-cultural research. 
Jingjit and Fotaki (2010) emphasize that the CVF is appropriate to investigate the extent 
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of bureaucratic culture or hierarchy model. The CVF has been used to study cross-
cultural research in various countries, for instance Asian countries such as China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Thailand (Kwan and Walker, 2004; Yu and Wu, 2009). The 
CVF is, therefore, used to measure the Thai public sector with regards to which types 
of culture influence the performance of the civil service. The discussion of the 
advantages of the CVF can be found in Chapter Two (Section 2.4.3).  
 
1.6 Research method, design and methodology 
1.6.1 Research method 
This study employed mixed methods – quantitative methods (questionnaire survey) and 
qualitative methods (semi-structured interview). Using mixed methods not only helps 
to seek clarification of the research findings (Darlington and Scott, 2002; Hesse-Biber, 
2010), but also helps to overcome the misinterpretation of data from a single method in 
studying organizational culture. A quantitative method (questionnaire survey) was 
employed to examine the existing and preferred culture in the civil service. Its findings 
were also used as the basis for follow-up interviews. A qualitative method (semi-
structured interview) was used to elicit in-depth and detailed information about the 
officials’ perspectives on the PA scheme.      
  
1.6.2 Research design and methodology 
The study carried out a questionnaire survey of 16 provinces and semi-structured 
interviews based on the case studies of four provinces. There are a total of 75 provinces 
in Thailand (over the period 2007-2011) and 35 provincial agencies per province. Thus, 
the selection of cases was conducted through a combination of sampling techniques – 
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multi-stage, stratified and purposive samplings – which were employed for selecting the 
appropriate samples for the surveys and interviews. The case study design is discussed 
in detail in Chapter Four.  
 
The study also used a comparative study design for comparing organizational culture 
between the 16 provinces and between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. A 
comparative study allows the researcher to distinguish between two or more cases which 
reflects theories about contrasting findings (Bryman, 2012). In this study, it is not only 
employed to compare the similarities and differences of each finding – the survey and 
interview findings – but also used to compare between both sources of findings for 
seeking convergence and clarification of the overall result.  
 
1.7 Summary 
1.7.1 Key findings and implications 
The key findings and implications are illustrated based on the research questions:  
1) ‘How does organizational culture influence civil service performance?’ and 2) ‘What 
other organizational factors influence civil service performance?’  
 
The findings of this study were acquired from the questionnaire surveys with 307 
participants and from the semi-structured interviews with 33 participants. The findings 
suggest that strong culture is the key determinant influencing civil service performance 
and good governance rather than a particular type of culture. The quantitative data 
analysis revealed that with regard to the four types of culture (clan, market, hierarchy, 
and adhocracy) there were statistically significant differences between the low and high 
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KPI scoring provinces, although not in terms of the different types of culture but rather 
in terms of the strength of each type – higher performing cases were stronger on 
hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy cultures rather than being skewed towards one. 
The small difference between the four types of culture may derive from two reasons. 
Firstly, the officials had performed the KPIs under the same work environment (the PA 
scheme). Alvesson and Sveningsson (2016) state that organizational climate is one of 
the indicators affecting the management initiative or results and outcomes of 
organizations. Secondly, there was the deep rooted culture in the Thai public sector 
acquired from the national culture because national culture is a source of organizational 
culture (Brown, 1998). It is important to note that changing views of the ideal model of 
public organizations are that a new public management (NPM) perspective might have 
predicted a shift toward market culture on the part of the higher performing cases, while 
lower performing cases would be expected to be more hierarchical (see Parker and 
Bradley, 2000, p. 131). 
 
The qualitative data analysis appeared to confirm that differences in performance could 
be accounted for by strong culture (see the definition of strong culture in Chapter Two, 
section 2.4.2). There were different typical characteristics between the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces in order to generate a different degree of strong culture, including 
leadership, individuals’ characteristics, reward systems and others such as task and goal-
orientation, trust of the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office, and meetings with the 
executives (see typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces in 
Chapter Seven, section 7.4). In this respect, the existence of a strong culture matters for 
generating high performance – the ‘strong culture equals high performance’ equation 
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(Brown, 1998, p. 229) – and delivers on good governance, particularly effectiveness, 
participation, efficiency, accountability and responsiveness (see cross-cutting themes in 
Chapter Seven, section 7.3).  
 
Besides strong culture, there were other organizational factors influencing performance 
in the civil service, particularly leadership (strategies and style) and management 
arrangements. The role of the leaders was to introduce clear policies to staff members, 
generate commitment among individuals and encourage the officials to pursue goals in 
the same direction. These characteristics of participative leadership are important for 
the creation of stability of operation, job satisfaction and a flexible working environment 
in order to create efficiency and effectiveness of work, participation and accountability 
of the officials. Therefore, leadership plays a significant role in the development of 
effective culture and the effective management of the organizations, especially in the 
public sector (Kim, 2014; Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003), particularly a 
participative leadership style. The data also suggested that the leaders’ managerial ways 
in terms of task management, human resource management (HRM) and reward 
management played a crucial role in determining achievement in high scores of 
performance evaluation and good governance. Reward management seems to be one of 
the most important elements of concern to many officials, for which fairness and equity 
of reward allocation by leaders are anticipated for generating participation and 
accountability. Participative leadership could enable the staff to perceive fairness from 
their superiors (Huang et al., 2010).   
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The findings of previous studies (e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 
2000; Selaratana, 2009) have suggested that organizational culture is an important factor 
in either facilitating or hindering attempts to improve the performance or effectiveness 
of organizations, particularly in public organizations. However, the findings of this study 
suggest that there should be a distinction between culture types and strength of culture, 
and that leadership and management strategies (e.g. regarding task management, human 
resources and reward systems) explain such variations and that this may be a key factor 
in determining performance. This suggests that the style of leadership and management 
may be more important in securing reform objectives than a change from one type of 
culture to another – the public sector may remain hierarchical but hierarchy can be 
managed participatively.  
 
In addition, the findings of this study suggest that performance can be improved through 
immediate managerial or leadership actions and may not depend on underlying cultural 
characteristics that, by definition, can only be altered in the long term, if at all. Changing 
the way the civil service is managed may be more effective than seeking to change the 
civil service culture as a whole. This is consistent with the idea proposed by many 
scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Fernandez and Rainey, 2006; 
Kim, 2014; Lorsch, 1986; Nica, 2013; Schraeder, Tears and Jordan, 2005) who stated 
that organizational culture can be changed by leadership (top managers) and 
management (top management). Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) pointed out that 
organizational culture is very difficult to change, but it is possible to manage by top 
management (e.g. using sufficient skills and resources) and by senior managers’ actions 
(e.g. influencing some values and meanings under a certain environment). 
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1.7.2 Limitations 
A number of challenges were encountered regarding data reliability and validity, which 
can be viewed in three major dimensions: surveys, interviews and overall. The surveys 
face some challenges, such as using a five-point scale on the OCAI questionnaire may 
have led to a small range of scores for the researcher to compare between the four types 
of culture. However, the use of  the five-point scale on the Likert scales provides validity 
and reliability regarding the correlation between scale score in the same quadrant, 
obtaining information about attitudes and assumptions; and facilitating respondents for 
answering a simple scale rather than 100 points (Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991; 
Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009; De Vaus, 2002). The other challenge was the non-
completion of questionnaires. Some participants did not answer some of the questions in 
the questionnaire. This may derive from a difficulty in getting access to the senior 
managers due to sending the questionnaires by post. The researcher had no opportunity 
to provide an explanation of the questionnaires or to encourage completion. Another 
problem was the partial lack of attentiveness when answering the questionnaires by 
some respondents because they might not have recognized the benefits of the research. 
For example, some participants left a note on their questionnaire, saying that they did 
not see any results of research brought to adaptation in practice. 
 
The interview challenges consist of at least three aspects: retrospective data and 
translation problems. This study viewed good governance through the lens of the PA 
scheme, in which the participants were asked to look back on PA in previous years. 
Consequently, gathering data was viewed as a retrospective study. Culture is something 
that has been accumulated for a long time and it is difficult to change (Hofstede et al., 
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1990; Rong and Hongwei, 2012; Schein, 2004). In terms of the problem of translation, 
the interviews were conducted in the Thai language because the interviewees were 
Thais. Thus, it was time-consuming for translation from Thai to English.   
 
Regarding the overall limitations, the researcher is one of the officials of the Office of 
the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), which is the central agency 
responsible for the PA scheme. Some respondents may have been cautious by answering 
the questions in ways that would favour the interests of the OPDC, while they might 
conceal some genuine information. Contrary to this, the researcher could obtain access 
to the provincial agencies and secure cooperation from many provincial agencies.  
 
In addition, the other limitation is that this study was a piece of research on the 
relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the particular 
context of the Thai public sector. The findings are not representative of the relationship 
between organizational culture and good governance in the public sectors of other 
countries. This is because each country has a particular context. For example, the same 
management actions in the civil service of a neighbouring country to Thailand with a 
different civil service culture might attain different results.  
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1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This study consists of eight chapters, which are structured as follows: 
 
Chapter One provides an overview of the study. It includes eight sections: research 
problem; why Thailand; aims and objectives of the study; research questions; theoretical 
underpinnings; research method, design and methodology; summary and structure of 
the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two sets out the conceptual framework for guiding the design of the data 
collection and analysis and answering the research questions. It focuses on three main 
aspects: pursuing good governance, determinants of performance, and organizational 
culture. The chapter presents the development of the theoretical framework based on the 
concepts of good governance, the major determinants of performance, and 
organizational culture in order to set a basis for the data analysis and discussion in 
particular in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
 
Chapter Three presents the background, culture and values, development of good 
governance in Thailand, and provincial administration and performance agreement 
(PA). After providing general information on Thailand and its politics, the Thai culture 
and values that influence the civil service’s implementation of public sector reform, 
particularly the promotion of good governance, are offered. Regarding good governance 
in Thailand, special focus is put on the development of good governance and its 
promotion through PA. In the section on provincial administration and PA, it offers 
information about the provinces and important provincial agencies relevant to PA.    
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Chapter Four presents the research design and methodology. It describes in detail the 
research philosophy, research design, research methodology, research approach, data 
collection, data analysis and interpretation, and research ethics. These give an insight 
into the application of the conceptual and analytical frameworks for data collection and 
data analysis.  
 
Chapter Five presents the research findings of the quantitative data analysis of the results 
from the questionnaire surveys. It sets out three major aspects: the overall organizational 
culture profiles of the 16 provinces; comparison of the organizational culture profiles 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces; and the description of job satisfaction 
based on the provincial cases. 
 
Chapter Six presents the empirical findings of the qualitative data analysis acquired 
from the semi-structured interviews, including in-depth interviews with the senior 
managers and focus group interviews with the practitioners. The chapter demonstrates 
the key factors of performance that deliver good governance categorized into three 
groups: leadership; human resources (HR) and reward; and performance, outputs, and 
outcomes. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses the empirical findings acquired from the quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis. All the results are compared and combined together to 
summarize the overall findings of the study. The discussion of this chapter is based  
on three main aspects: cultural determinants of performance, cross-cutting themes and  
typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces.  
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Chapter Eight summarises the key findings of the study. The important issues are 
presented, including conclusions and implications, contributions to theory, reflection on 
the research, policy implications and recommendations, and limitations of the research. 
Finally, recommendations for further research are made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on good governance, performance and 
organizational culture in the public sector (see Figure 1). The purpose of the chapter is 
to develop an analytical framework for guiding the design of the data collection and 
analysis, and answering the research questions.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Pursuing good governance 
 
 
2.2.1 Initiatives in pursuing good governance 
2.2.2 Interpretation of good governance  
2.2.3 Implementation of good governance 
through performance measurement 
2.3 Determinants of performance 
 
 
2.3.1 Performance management system 
(PMS) 
2.3.2 Nature of performance management in 
the public sector 
2.3.3 Determinants affecting performance  
 
2.4 Organizational culture 
 
 
2.4.1 Definition of organizational culture  
2.4.2 Correlation between strong culture 
and performance 
2.4.3 Theories and empirical studies of 
organizational culture  
2.4.4 Development of analytical framework 
Existing literature  
 
Objectives of the section: 
 Understand the reasons for pursuing 
good governance 
 Understand definition of good 
governance, key components, and 
the relationship between good 
governance and performance 
 Understand implementation of good 
governance through performance 
measurement 
Objectives of the section: 
 Understand the purposes of PMS with 
relevance to good governance 
 Identify difficulties of performance 
management delivering good governance 
in the public sector  
 Identify determinants affecting 
performance delivering good governance  
Objectives of the section: 
 Understand meaning of organizational 
culture 
 Understand the relationship between 
strong culture and performance 
delivering good governance 
   Develop analytical framework of  
the study 
 
 
Figure 1 An illustration to approach the literature review structure 
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2.2 Pursuing good governance 
2.2.1 Initiatives in pursuing good governance 
The concept of good governance has received significantly increased attention from 
many countries around the world since 1989 when the World Bank published the report 
on ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth’ (World Bank, 1989). This 
report raised the issue of a crisis of governance in Africa, namely a lack of good 
governance (e.g. accountability, transparency and rule of law). In other words, poor 
governance is apparent when ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World 
Bank, 1994, p. xiv) is not carried out properly. Mazower (2013, p. 370) stated that (bad) 
government is considered as ‘the chief enemy of (good) governance’ and the  concept 
of governance is used in the context of de-emphasising the State, namely prevalent 
intervention by international agencies in the public administration of countries around 
the world. Consequently, the quality of governance in aid recipient countries has been a 
concern for aid donors such as international organizations. This can be observed through 
efforts in promoting good governance by several international organizations such as the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2001; UNDP, 1997; 
UNESCAP, 2009). The idea behind good governance is to oppose ‘bad governance’ 
such as corruption, waste, abuse of power and exploitation of public means for private 
ends (Jreisat 2004 cited in Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Leftwich, 1993; OECD, 
2001). Attempts at introducing good governance are also seen as implementation of the 
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‘rules of the game’, i.e. the effectiveness of the State is in setting up the rules and 
ensuring their transparent and predictable application (Arkadie, 2012, p. 54) . 
 
The concept of good governance has become an initial aid condition and approach to 
reform programmes of many donors (Smith, 2007). An obvious example is the 
economic crisis in Southeast Asian countries3 in 1997, which led to the introduction of 
substantial governance reforms (Arkadie, 2012; Wijayati, Hermes and Holzhacker, 
2015). Bowornwathana (2000) claimed that the economic crisis in the Asian region 
could be an opportunity to compel Asian countries to undertake administrative reform 
based on good governance.  
 
2.2.2 Interpretation of good governance  
One of the foremost challenges is the difficulty of the interpretation of good governance, 
as it was simply not clear what ‘good governance’ means (Sundaram and Chowdhury, 
2012). This is consistent with the idea of ‘good enough governance’ proposed by 
Grindle (2004, 2007), who argues that ‘good governance’ provides little guidance about 
what/when/how things need to be done in the real world in practice. This shows that 
implementing good governance requires an understanding of the concept and how it is 
accomplished in practice (Grindle, 2010).  
 
In the administrative sense, a number of scholars tend to suggest that good governance 
refers to the principle or the concept of public management or public service reform or 
                                                          
3 The economic crises affected the East Asian countries, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Taiwan (Shabbir and Rehman, 2016). 
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the new public management (NPM) paradigm based on at least nine key components: 
effectiveness, efficiency, participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, 
equity, rule of law and consensus oriented (Agere, 2000; World Bank, 1992; OECD, 
2001; Rhodes, 1996; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010; UN, 2006, 2015; UNESCAP, 
2009). Here good governance is seen as a means approach, whilst it becomes an end in 
itself when its key components are addressed satisfactorily (Agere, 2000). For example, 
achieving the key components of good governance contributes to the corrective roles of 
the government organizations, such as increasing efficient and accountable 
management; raising transparency of the policy framework; enhancing the participation 
of all sectors in society; and obtaining elite public services (World Bank, 1992; Cheema 
and Popovski, 2010; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). The next section discusses the 
key components of good governance in the context of public sector management and 
reform. The detailed definitions of governance and good governance are shown in 
Appendix 1. 
 
Key components of good governance  
Many international organizations and scholars define different meanings of the key 
components of good governance (see Appendix 2). Table 1 summarizes the definitions 
of the nine key components of good governance in the sense of the public sector, which 
can be considered in three crucial points overarching the definitions or components. 
Firstly, the main purposes of efficiency and effectiveness appear to be congruent, 
namely producing results that meet the needs of society with the best use of resources. 
Secondly, accountability is considered as a cornerstone of good governance by several 
scholars (e.g. McNeil and Malena, 2010; UNDP, 1997). This is because it focuses on 
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the government organizations’ responsibilities for their activities and decisions that 
impact on stakeholders. Moreover, the four elements of good governance – 
transparency, participation, rule of law and equity – emphasize the rights of stakeholders 
in society.  
 
Table 1 Definitions of the nine key components of good governance 
Component Definition 
Efficiency 
 
Processes and institutions produce results or management efficiency that meet the 
needs of society while making the best use of the resources at their disposal. It 
also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the 
environment. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Effectiveness Processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while 
making the best use of resources. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Accountability  
 
Accountability is the heart/prerequisite/key requirement of good governance. The 
governmental institutions, private sector and civil society organizations have to be 
responsible and answerable for their actions, activities and decisions to the public 
and to their institutional stakeholders. (World Bank, 1994, p. 12; UN, 2006, p. 10; 
UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Transparency  
 
Transparency is built on there being accessible information, such as public 
knowledge, policies, and strategies of government, which all citizens who are 
concerned with them can access with enough information to understand and 
monitor them. (Agere, 2000, p. 7; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010, p. 12; 
UNDP, 1994a, p. 5) 
 
Participation  
 
Participation is generated based upon a recognition that people, both men and 
women, should have a voice in decision making, either directly or through 
legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives, such as taking decisions on 
public policy and sharing control over resources and institutions that affect their 
lives. (Agere, 2000, p. 9; UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2) 
 
Rule of law  
 
Rule of law signifies a legal framework that is fair and enforced impartially, such 
as full protection of human rights, which the clear or uniform laws are required to 
apply through objective, and independent judiciary. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; 
UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2) 
 
Equity  
 
All members in a society (all genders, classes, races, educational qualifications, 
religious and political beliefs) have opportunities to improve or maintain their 
well-being. They have a stake in it and are not excluded from the mainstream of 
society. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Responsiveness  Responsiveness refers to institutions and processes trying to serve all stakeholders 
within a reasonable timeframe. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 2009, p. 2) 
 
Consensus 
oriented 
Consensus oriented is associated with many viewpoints of actors in a given 
society. Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus 
on what is in the best interests of the whole community, where possible and how 
this can achieve the goals of such development. (UNDP, 1994a, p. 5; UNESCAP, 
2009, p. 3)  
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Good governance and performance 
As good governance became more closely associated with administrative reform and 
new public management (NPM) in the 1990s (see Greiling, 2005), so it came to be seen 
increasingly in terms of performance. Performance measurement came to be seen as an 
essential component of good governance and a means of bringing it about  
(see Mimba, Helden and Tillema, 2007). Greiling (2005) argued that performance 
measurement was an important instrument for enhancing the accountability, effectiveness 
and efficiency of public service, the reason being its ability to influence the behaviour 
of employees (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015).  
 
2.2.3 Implementation of good governance through performance measurement 
Performance measurement has featured in many internationally-supported good 
governance programmes (World Bank, 1994; 2002; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2008), for example in  Latin America (e.g. Bolivia, Chile and Argentina), Southern 
Africa (e.g. Zimbabwe) and Southeast Asia (e.g. Indonesia, China, Vietnam and 
Thailand) (Barbarie, 1998; Brushett, 1998; Marcel, 1998; OPDC, 2003a; Painter, 2012). 
Developed countries have also used performance measurement for public service 
reform, for instance the USA, Germany, France, Norway and the UK (Dooren, 
Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Hood, 2007; Peters and Savoie, 1995).  
 
However, the implementation of performance measurement programmes is not a 
panacea for achieving good governance in practice, which can be held back by societal 
or institutional factors such as a lack of desire for reforms or consensus orientation on 
change; difficulty in getting access to public information; lack of participation by civil 
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society (e.g. NGOs, and consumer groups); and inefficient judicial processes (e.g. 
reluctance to punish corrupt officials) (Charoenserbsakul and Sombatpeam, 2014; 
Nikomborirak, 2007; Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). In other words, there may be a 
vicious circle whereby a lack of good governance makes it difficult to implement good 
governance.  
 
2.3 Determinants of performance 
2.3.1 Performance management system (PMS) 
Having established that performance measurement is a key component or key condition 
of good governance. In practice, it is necessary to consider the ambiguity of the term 
‘performance’. The term ‘performance’ can portray both an act and the result of an act 
(Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006). Many scholars (e.g. Dooren, Bouckaert and 
Halligan, 2015; Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Kearney and Berman, 1999;  
Williams, 1998) agree that performance is an act, which refers to the programme, 
strategy, management, activity and action of organizations in order to achieve the 
outcomes of activities or programmes or something intended; and to change or improve 
individuals’ contributions and organizations’ overall success (see definitions of 
performance in Appendix 3: 3.1). Meanwhile, performance is the result of an act, which 
focuses on ‘productivity’ or ‘effectiveness’ (Kearney and Berman, 1999; Talbot, 2010).  
 
In the public sector, performance refers to outputs (quantity and quality of services); 
efficiency (cost per unit of outputs); effectiveness (achievement of formal objectives); 
responsiveness (measures of satisfaction); and democratic outcomes (Boyne et al., 
2006). Therefore, the citizens’ expectations regarding the performance measurement 
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and reporting outputs of the government’s activities are increased (Halachmi, 2005; 
Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; Kearney and Berman, 1999).   
 
Purpose of performance management system (PMS) 
Performance management (PM) is considered as the strategy, approach, system, 
method, range of practices, and processes applied in order to deliver success, create a 
shared vision of, or connect the organization’s aims amongst people, enhance a target 
person or group’s performance, and generate performance information for making 
decisions (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Fletcher, 1993; Houldsworth and 
Jirasinghe, 2006; Moores, 1994; Moynihan, 2008) (see definitions of performance 
management (PM) in Appendix 3: 3.2). PM is considered by some to be a central 
element of NPM (Gianakis, 2002 cited in Greiling, 2005) in order to improve 
performance in the public sector.  
 
Several scholars (e.g. Cooke, 2003; Moores, 1994; Moynihan, 2008; Williams, 1933;  
Williams, 1998) suggest that there are two main objectives of PM: improving 
organizational performance (tasks or activities) and improving human resources. Firstly, 
PM facilitates the improvement of performance in terms of setting goals, increasing 
integrated management, and providing performance information (e.g. feedback). Goal 
setting can facilitate accountability and participation (e.g. the employees’ commitment) 
to the organizations (Improvement and Development Agency, 2002; Moynihan, 2008; 
Varma, Budhwar and DeNisi, 2008; Wood and Locke, 1990 cited in Willaims, 1998). 
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In terms of improving human resources, PM enables the improvement of employee 
communication (e.g. communicating the organizations’ objectives to the members), 
generates employees’ commitment (e.g. brings involvement and organizational 
commitment as well as job satisfaction), and identifies the required training (Armstrong 
and Baron, 1998; Fletcher, 1993; Moores, 1994). It is seen that participation and job 
satisfaction can be generated by PM.   
 
Performance measurement 
Performance measurement is defined as an instrument of control, a spur of appropriate 
action, and a form of output steering (Brignall, 1993; Bruijn, 2007; Jackson, 1995) (see 
Appendix 3: 3.3). It is not only an essential component of PM (Julnes, 2006 cited in 
Julnes et al., 2007), but can also have a beneficial effect on public organizations (Bruijn, 
2007). Performance measurement is a source of performance information used in order 
to improve organizational performance (e.g. setting work goals, determining performance 
standards, assigning and evaluating work, providing feedback) and improving 
individual performance (e.g. determining training and development needs, distributing 
rewards) (Varma, Budhwar and DeNisi, 2008, Fletcher, 1993). In this respect, 
performance measurement or performance assessment can identify any potential 
problems and facilitate possible change (Osborne et al., 1993). Phusavat et al. (2009) 
stated that performance measurement is an instrument of management used in order to 
deliver good governance, such as accountability and transparency. 
 
However, there are various challenges of performance measurement such as the 
difficulty of measuring performance in terms of outputs and outcomes, and a problem 
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of receiving genuine information. One of the most important challenges of performance 
measurement in the public sector appears to be a complexity of measuring outputs and 
a difficulty of preventing undesirable outcomes produced by the application of 
performance measures (Jackson, 1989). Other scholars (e.g. Bruijn, 2007; Glaser, 2007; 
Halachmi, 2005; Kotler and Lee, 2007) argue that the public sector’s performance can 
be measured in the same way as that of the private sector, namely products and services 
(e.g. unit costs of services delivered, and certain quality or standards of services), 
viewed as outputs in the form of quantitative and qualitative factors that can be 
measured. Meanwhile, the performance of public organizations can be measured by 
outcomes such as goal achievement and response to citizens (e.g. citizens’ satisfaction 
with service delivery) (Glaser, 2007, Kotler and Lee, 2007). 
 
The public sector reforms need to use information acquired from performance 
(indicators) measurement or performance appraisal for making improvements (Jackson, 
1989; Hatry, 1996 cited in Julnes, 2007; Moynihan, 2008). Therefore, measuring 
performance requires people to tell the truth about their activities and tasks. The 
likelihood of useless, false information may be influenced by the design of the control 
system (focus on measures rather than performance, for example); a lack of coherence 
between the measured value and the real value; unknown importance of the underlying 
phenomenon; too many indicators; and the reward system of the organization (Dooren, 
Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Neely, 1998 cited in Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006; 
Murphy and Denisi, 2008). A solution to this problem may be understanding the nature 
of performance management in the public sector.  
 
 
29 
 
2.3.2 Nature of performance management in the public sector 
The difficulty of performance management in the public sector in delivering good 
governance can be considered in relation to two aspects: 1) the differences between 
public and private organizations; and 2) the complicated performance management of 
the public organizations themselves.   
 
The differences between public and private organizations 
Performance management in the public sector appears to be more problematic than in 
the private sector. This is because the nature of the public sector has multiple objectives, 
diversity of stakeholders, emphasis on policy, administration or leadership, and socio-
political environments (Behn, 1991; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Jackson, 
1995; Mimba, Helden and Tillema, 2007). The prime purpose of public organizations is 
to serve the citizens’ needs and deliver actual value or public value, whilst the prime 
purpose of private companies is to meet customers’ needs in terms of value and 
satisfaction in order to make profits for the owners of the business (Alford, 2001; 
Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Kotler and Lee, 2007). Public service management is, 
therefore, a complex area of management activity (Harrow and Willcocks, 1990).  
 
The complicated performance management of the public organizations themselves 
There have been attempts to introduce new public management (NPM) for public sector 
management and reforms, for example increasing the focus on organizational objectives 
and goals, enhancing the efficiency of government, stretching effectiveness of scarce 
public resources, and increasing the responsiveness of government to citizens (Eakin, 
Eriksen and Eikeland, 2011; Harrow and Willcocks, 1990; Hughes, 1998; Parker and 
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Bradley, 2000). In other words, bureaucratic organizations have been encouraged to 
shift from control mechanisms (hierarchical structures) to market-based mechanisms 
such as performance indicators and greater flexibility (Parker and Bradley, 2000). 
However, public sector management seems to retain the features of traditional public 
administration (hierarchical model) such as determining by top-down performance 
management, having a high degree of centralization, and highlighting bureaucratic 
processes (Bratton et al., 2007; Hughes, 1998, 2007; Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; 
Talbot, 2010). Armstrong and Baron (1998b) stated that control orientation may inhibit 
performance rather than enhance performance. Other scholars (e.g. Holmes and Shad, 
1995 cited in Hughes, 2007) claimed that using control or authority may facilitate the 
managers in terms of building support in the broader community, matching authority 
and responsibility to improved performance and increased accountability and 
transparency through the need to report on results. Although performance management 
is associated with NPM and with a flattening of organizational structures in the public 
sector, it may also be facilitated by traditional hierarchical public administration due to 
its focus on accountability. Good governance and hierarchy are not necessarily 
contradictory principles. 
 
2.3.3 Determinants affecting performance 
A number of scholars (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Bazeley and Richards, 2000; 
Boyne, 2003 cited in Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Campbell et al., 1993 cited in 
Williams, 1998) have suggested that there are at least seven determinants influencing 
organizational performance: personnel factors, motivation factors, leadership factors, 
management styles and strategic management, team factors, system factors, and 
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contextual (situational) factors. This study focuses on three key elements – job 
satisfaction, motivation and leadership – that play a crucial role in performance in the 
specific context of performance measurement delivering good governance.  
 
1) Job satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is generally defined as an individual’s affective reactions to a job based 
upon a range of expectations and preferences associated with the individuals’ feelings 
about intrinsic and extrinsic job elements (Fields, 2002). A number of scholars (e.g. 
Cranny, Smith and Stone, 1992; Fields, 2002; Greenberg and Baron, 2003) have 
suggested that there are several key aspects to measuring job satisfaction such as pay, 
promotion, supervision, co-workers, and the work itself. These elements are under the 
rubric of two major elements: intrinsic and extrinsic. Job satisfaction is, therefore, 
important in affecting organizational performance. It is associated with the individual’s 
positive or negative attitudes towards their work, which attitudes are related to 
organizational behaviour, job performance, and voluntary turnover (Greenberg and 
Baron, 2003).  
 
A number of empirical studies on job satisfaction tend to suggest that the staff members’ 
job satisfaction is associated with leadership (see Ashraf, Farooq and Din, 2014; Wong 
and Laschinger, 2012) and motivation or pay (see Green and Heywood, 2008; Judge et 
al., 2010; Stringer, Didham and Theivananthampillai, 2011). For example, Ashraf, 
Farooq and Din (2014) explored the correlation between leadership culture and job 
satisfaction and work commitment, which revealed that job satisfaction and work 
commitment facilitate organizations in accomplishing their goals, in which leadership 
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styles can influence employee performance and job satisfaction. In particular 
participative leadership, rather than directive leadership, increases job satisfaction and 
work commitment. Regarding the relationship between job satisfaction and pay, Green 
and Heywood (2008) studied performance-related pay (PRP) and stated that PRP is 
associated with enhanced pay satisfaction, but it seems to negatively affect job 
satisfaction. Stringer, Didham and Theivananthampillai (2011) argued that extrinsic 
motivation is not associated with pay satisfaction and negatively associated with job 
satisfaction, but intrinsic motivation is positively associated with both pay and job 
satisfaction. This is because extrinsic motivation makes some employees concerned 
about fairness, particularly the employees who often make comparisons with others or 
feel that pay does not reflect their effort. In this respect, pay or extrinsic motivation 
could be negatively or positively associated with the individuals’ satisfaction, whereas 
it seems to negatively affect job satisfaction. However, intrinsic motivation appears to 
be positively associated with pay and job satisfaction. 
 
2) Motivation 
Motivation is a key element in increasing productivity and job satisfaction (Wilson, 
2010). In particular, intrinsic motivation appears to have a more significant impact on 
performance than extrinsic motivation (Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and Beech, 2002).  
Intrinsic motivation refers to several elements such as giving greater recognition, 
additional job flexibility, opportunities to gain more responsibility, higher exposure to 
senior management, a sense of fulfilment (e.g. the individuals pride in achievement), 
satisfaction of social needs, and opportunities to increase skills (Armstrong, 1990; 
Fletcher, 1993; Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003; McKenna and Beech, 2002). 
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Intrinsic motivation has a significant impact on the individuals’ job dissatisfaction as 
well as on withdrawal and turnover (Greenberg and Baron, 2003). Extrinsic motivation 
refers to elements such as working conditions, opportunities for promotion and 
enhanced status, and performance-related pay (PRP) (Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and 
Beech, 2002).  
 
Using a financial reward seems to be more popular in practice than a non-monetary 
reward, although intrinsic motivation is the more significant element affecting 
performance than extrinsic motivation. This can be seen in the context of PMS, in which 
performance-related pay (PRP) is the most famous of the motivational approaches 
(Hatry, 2007). The use of financial reward may bring significant motivational power as 
it symbolizes several intangible goals, although it may have no intrinsic meaning 
(Armstrong, 1990). PRP has many merits, such as motivating the existing staff for 
greater performance, attracting and maintaining high performers, and achieving cost 
effectiveness (Fletcher, 1993; Gerhart and Trevor, 2008). Moreover, motivation can 
lead to being market oriented in terms of reward based achievement (Zammuto and 
Krakower, 1991). Similarly, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) pointed out that motivation is 
important to shaping organizational culture (informal institutions) and pursuing goal 
achievement. This implies that management of motivation can shape organizational 
culture. 
 
There are a variety of challenges to using PRP within the appraisal system, for example 
disappointment (e.g. people receive fewer benefits on PRP than they anticipated); a 
problem of equity (e.g. people are concerned about unfair discrimination and equal 
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opportunities); distortion of appraisal consequences; and different reward preferences 
amongst employees of different ages (e.g. one incentive system is applied to all people) 
(Fletcher, 1993; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). Although such motivation, especially 
financial reward, has both negative and positive effects, at least it motivates and helps 
to retain employees, particularly high performing human capital (Moynihan and Pandey, 
2005; Price, 2011). 
 
However, using money is only partly an incentive (Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003; 
Moores, 1994); correlation between PRP and high levels of organizational performance 
cannot be proved. Therefore, organizations should decide which forms of incentive 
(monetary or non-monetary rewards) are appropriate. If organizations consider using 
PRP, they need to recognize when the appropriate pay format is used and the staff are 
impartially rewarded (Pfeffer, 1998 cited in Price, 2011). This is because the nature of 
the incentives employed needs to be considered due to this complexity (Leroch, 2014). 
In particular, whenever money comes into the phenomenon, anxiety appears to follow 
(Hatry, 2007).  
 
In conclusion, motivation is vital to performance in terms of  enhancing effectiveness 
(increasing productivity and pursuing goal achievement), accountability (increasing 
responsibility), equity (fairness of reward), and rule of law (appropriate form of reward). 
 
3) Leadership 
Leadership is one of the most important determinants affecting organizational 
performance, particularly leadership style and strategic management. The existing 
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literature (e.g. Improvement and Development Agency, 2002; Armstrong and Baron, 
2005; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Gill, 2006) suggested that leadership 
styles should be a driver of organizations; provide resources and resolve problems; 
motivate employees; shape culture; and respond to change. This is compatible with the 
idea proposed by Cameron and Quinn (2011) that leadership style in four types of 
culture should express the following characteristics (see more detail in section 2.4.3): 
 Clan culture: facilitator, mentor, team builder, and parent-figure 
 Adhocracy culture: innovator, entrepreneur, risk taker and visionary 
 Market culture: hard driver, competitor, and producer 
 Hierarchy culture: coordinator, monitor, and organizer 
 
The leaders who are drivers can make decisions, set direction (the organizations’ 
mission, vision and values), provide guidance and communicate these to the 
organizations’ members (Improvement and Development Agency, 2002, Dooren et al., 
2015). Similarly, the characteristics of leaders that are desired by the employees consist, 
for example, of paying attention to tasks, providing a clear and attractive mission, and 
communicating vision and values, which facilitate better performance of tasks (Gill, 
2006; Moynihan and Pandey, 2005). Kultahti, Edinger and Brandt (2013) stated that 
young people, in particular Generation Y who were born between 1981-2000, seem to 
expect more from their leaders than the older generations.  
 
The team building style of leadership is seen as crucial for performance in terms  
of generating commitment; creating teamwork and managing teams by meetings; 
motivating employees and shaping culture. When generating commitment, the 
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employees need the managers to use managerial authority and power for issuing 
commands in order to gain involvement (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). This is 
compatible with the idea that generating coordination needs to be promoted by the leader 
designing the structures and standards (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992; Thompson, Zald 
and Scott, 2007).  
 
In terms of motivating the employees and shaping culture, the managers can motivate 
the employees by stimulating and inspiring them to perform their tasks, for instance by 
explaining about goals and the importance of work in order to persuade staff to achieve 
goals (Gill, 2006; Williams, 1998). Huang et al. (2010) stated that the intrinsic 
motivation of individuals is associated with participative leadership. Effective 
leadership can shape their organization’s culture, such as by promoting desired values 
through strategies and programme goals and combining the messages, actions,  
and attitudes deliver to people around the leader themselves (Improvement and 
Development Agency, 2002; Kearney and Berman, 1999). Bratton et al. (2007) argued 
that achieving transformation relies 70 - 90 percent on leadership and only 10 - 30 
percent on management. Therefore, poor leadership (e.g. lack of capacity to manage and 
having outdated policies of HRM) may lead to many problems (e.g. lack of trust, high 
rate of staff turnover, deficient morale) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). 
 
Leadership style may thus have a significant influence on motivation and performance. 
There are diverse types of leadership styles defined by many scholars (e.g. Armstrong 
and Baron, 1998; Chakrabarty and Chand, 2012; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; 
Williams and Huber, 1986), from which two predominant types of management style 
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are found: authoritarian (control) style and participative style. These styles focus on 
different purposes and have different levels of difficulty for change. 
 
The control management style involves authority, rules and regulations (Armstrong and 
Baron, 1998; Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015). The managers who have an 
authoritarian style appear to have a highly centralized management approach, which 
may take longer to shift and therefore improve performance in the context of 
performance measurement (Jackson, 1989). Contrary to this, the participative style 
focuses on the employees, which is seen through much evidence, for instance a greater 
concern with the employees’ needs; a greater confidence in staff willingness and 
responsibility; a greater extent of people’s involvement in organizational planning and 
decision making (Williams and Huber, 1986). These derive from the process of 
discussing, analysing problems, and consulting between the managers and staff, through 
which their suggestions and opinions are taken into account in the consensus on what to 
do and how it is to be achieved (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). Gill (2006) 
found that the participative style was not confined to Western managers but could also 
be found among Southeast Asian managers. 
 
Many scholars (e.g. Bratton et al., 2007; Jackson, 1989; Williams and Huber, 1986) tend 
to agree that the participative style is more effective than the authoritarian style in terms 
of improving a managers’ ability for making decisions; facilitating change by 
participation due to enhancing people’s voices on a policy or course of action; 
empowering people through a positive relationship (e.g. satisfaction, motivation, and 
participation); and receiving a high level of achievement by the acknowledgement of 
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people’s goals and reduction of turnover. On the other hand, authoritarian style may be 
threatened by various challenges and may fail to deliver on the potential advantages for 
enhancing performance (Jackson, 1989). Moynihan (2008) claimed that an authoritarian 
style can contribute to meeting requirements and enforcement, although the managers 
may not generate the positive outcomes that the central government or elected officials 
or policymakers anticipate from reform.  
 
In summary, leadership is one of the most significant determinants influencing the 
performance of the public organizations in delivering good governance, particularly in 
terms of the leaders being a driver, team builder, and organizer or coordinator. These 
determinants can influence performance as well as good governance, such as by 
generating participation (creating team and involvement), being consensus oriented 
(open to the employees’ opinions), effectiveness (being a driver), and efficiency (managing 
resources). Moreover, the existing literature suggests that leadership is related to shaping 
culture such as securing resources and related elements (hierarchy culture), solving 
problems (hierarchy and adhocracy cultures), and coaching (clan culture). A 
participative leadership style, rather than an authoritarian leadership style, seems to be 
positively associated with performance.  
 
2.4 Organizational culture 
2.4.1 Definition of organizational culture 
Defining the term ‘organizational culture’ is a difficult task because it requires the 
definition of the terms ‘organization’ and ‘culture’ (Brown, 1998). According to some 
opinions in the literature, the definitions of culture may be classified into two broad 
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directions: objective entity or a variable and metaphor (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 
2008; Brown, 1998; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Senior and Fleming, 2006). Schein 
(1990, p. 111; 2004, p. 17), on the other hand, uses three levels to describe culture, 
including observable artefacts, values and basic underlying assumptions. Deal and 
Kennedy (1988, p. 107-108) describe four cultural types, including the work-hard and 
play-hard culture; the process culture; the bet-your company culture; and the tough-guy 
and macho culture. Culture is defined as ‘the integrated pattern of human behaviour that 
includes thought, speech, action, and artefacts and depends on man’s capacity for 
learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations’ (Deal and Kennedy, 
1988, p. 4). 
 
It can be concluded that culture is a property of a human group or a system of shared 
meaning held by an organization’s members which significantly differs from other 
organizations (Robbins, 2005; Schein, 1991; Senior and Fleming, 2006). Others 
(Eldridge, 1973; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) have suggested 
that culture refers to a pattern of beliefs, values, attitudes, assumptions, expectations, 
and ways of behaving shared among members of an organization. There are many 
definitions of culture that broadly follow this approach, which are set out in Appendix 4: 4.1.  
 
The formulation of Hofstede et al. (1990) serves to integrate the various dimensions of 
organizational culture as follows: 
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‘The organizational/corporate culture construct: it is (1) holistic, (2) historically 
determined, (3) related to anthropological concepts, (4) socially constructed, (5) 
soft, and (6) difficult to change.’ (Hofstede et al., 1990, p. 286) 
 
This definition reflects various dimensions of organizational culture that are of 
relevance to other scholars’ opinions (see Appendix 4:4.2). Firstly, culture can reflect 
the overall picture of an organization in terms of a sense of identity of the organization’s 
members (Robbins, 2005). Secondly, the culture of an organization is formed by long-
term historical heritage viewed as an ‘invisible hand’4 in public management (Rong and 
Hongwei, 2012, p. 47). Culture is, thus, difficult to change; Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 
p. 732) stated that culture is viewed as an informal institution and change would be an 
‘extremely lengthy’ process. 
  
Thirdly, culture is related to both social and anthropological areas, which can be 
interpreted as ‘organizations have cultures’ or ‘organizations are cultures’ (Cameron 
and Quinn, 2011). Fourthly, culture can be understood as soft attributes that can affect 
organizational performance (Hofstede et al., 1990). Many studies (e.g. Adenan et al., 
2013; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Yetano and Matsuo, 2015) suggest that the implication 
of organizational culture does not only influence individuals’ attitudes, norms and 
behaviour, but also performance. Finally, organizational culture is difficult to change 
because there is a diversity of values and meanings dominating the group and group 
members value stability (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008; Schein, 2004). Here it is 
                                                          
4 Culture comprises both invisible elements (e.g. beliefs, values, attitudes, norms, and assumptions) and 
visible elements (e.g. annual report, products, technology, symbols, and systems) (Brown, 1998, Dick 
and Ellis, 2006, McEwan, 2001, Schein, 1990). 
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important to note that the issue of cultural change seems to be controversial and is 
continually debated among scholars. Some scholars (e.g. Kotter and Heskett, 1992; 
Schein, 2004; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) pointed out that an organization’s culture is 
difficult to understand, and hard to change. Other scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; Fernandez and Rainey, 2006; Lorsch, 1986; Nica, 2013; Schraeder, 
Tears and Jordan, 2005) argued that leadership (top managers) and management (top 
management) can facilitate the change of organizational culture. For example, 
Schraeder, Tears and Jordan (2005) stated that although changing the organizational 
culture of the public sector organizations is a long-term endeavour, it is possible to 
change it by leaders’ recognition of issues related to employees, i.e. training and leading 
by example to guide officials through complicated dynamics. The difficulties of 
changing organizational culture in the public sector may derive from several aspects. 
Conflict between the culture of the public sector and NPM – NPM requires the public 
sector to achieve greater outcomes, efficiency and flexibility, but the values of 
bureaucratic or hierarchical culture continue to remain – is one of difficulties for 
changing the culture of the public sector organizations (Parker and Bradley, 2000). 
Moreover, the constraints of the personal system in the public sector are more prevalent 
than in the private sector, namely the inability to punish poorly performing managers 
and to reward good managers (Nica, 2013).  
 
Nature of organizational culture in the public sector 
In terms of the framework developed by Cameron and Quinn (2011), the organizational 
culture of the public sector tends to be closer to hierarchy and clan than to market and 
adhocracy cultures. Hierarchy is seen as intrinsic to bureaucratic culture (Handman, 
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1993). This is because, by their nature, public organizations exist in the context of 
written rules and regulations for accountability (the external conduct code) and 
unwritten ethics and habits of the organizational system (inner thinking characteristics 
such as morals and values) (Rong and Hongwei, 2012). This means that, in the public 
sector, leadership has a particular significance as an important element in determining 
public organizations’ culture, such as norms and values in terms of decision making 
(Christiensen et al., 2007). In bureaucracies, legal authority and appointments to 
positions are the keys to success and power (Dick and Ellis, 2006). Thus, the hierarchy 
culture seems to be embedded in the public sector and seems to be difficult to change, 
for example the cultures of several government agencies are often affected by the norms 
and values of the parent ministries (Christiensen et al., 2007). The hierarchy culture may 
be a challenge to public sector reform, for example reform requires power redistribution 
(Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015) and political decentralization is important in 
attempting public sector reform in developing countries (Polidano and Hulme, 1999). 
Edwards (1999) argues that bureaucratic hierarchy provides advantages in order to attain 
good governance such as transparency, accountability and equity. Ashraf, Farooq and 
Din (2014) suggest that leadership culture (hierarchy culture) provides both positive and 
negative effects on employees’ performance and job satisfaction, i.e. participative 
leadership positively affects the group and cultural development department while 
directive leadership negatively affects employees’ behaviour. 
 
Clan culture may also, by its nature, tend to be associated with the public sector. It refers 
to the degree of employee cohesion and commitment (Cameron and Quinn, 2011).  
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A degree of commitment is seen as strong culture5 in order to enhance an organization’s 
success (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013). Clan culture (human resource) positively 
correlates to the performance of organizations in terms of the outcomes (Eisend, 
Evanschitzky and Gilliland, 2016) and job satisfaction (Lovas, 2007). Thus, Rong and 
Hongwei (2012, p. 48) suggest that the public sector in modern society should establish 
a ‘people-oriented’ management such as legitimate individual interests and personal 
capabilities. This raises the question of whether there is a general civil service culture. 
To this extent why some organizations operate well and why and how such 
organizations defy norms (Owusu, 2012). Understanding organizational culture 
provides many advantages, such as encouraging effectiveness of the public services, 
developing effective strategies in increasing job satisfaction, and generating policy 
proposals (e.g. clear reward system, management development and change) in the public 
services (Harrow and Willcocks, 1990; Westhuizen, Pacheco and Webber, 2012). 
 
By contrast,  the market and adhocracy cultures appear to be less characteristic of public 
organizations, although there have been many efforts to create these cultures in the 
public sector through NPM and, specifically, performance measurement, performance-
related pay (PRP), and flexible organizational culture (seen as adhocracy culture) 
(Whorton and Worthley, 1981). Generating the market and adhocracy cultures in public 
organizations is not a simple task. For example, Jingjit (2008) explored organizational 
culture in the Thai public sector and suggested that there has been a modest shift towards 
the market and adhocracy cultures and away from the hierarchy and clan cultures during 
the period of public sector reform, and Phookpan (2012) has argued that in the Thai 
                                                          
5 Strong culture is discussed later in section 2.4.2. 
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public sector the market and adhocracy cultures can be generated by external forces and 
through integration reform. Although the market culture is based on private sector 
techniques and values (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015), Moriarty and Kennedy 
(2002 cited in Radnor and McGuire, 2004) suggest that performance measurement can 
be used as a surrogate for market pressure (given that government organizations perform 
their tasks without market competition).  
 
2.4.2 Correlation between strong culture and performance 
While organizational cultures may be classified according to different types, there is 
also the question of the strength which the culture’s values are adhered to. Some claim 
that a strong culture enables organizations to achieve performance (e.g. Brown, 1998; 
Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Robbins, 2005), such that ‘strong 
cultures cause strong performance...strong performance can help to create strong 
cultures’ (Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 18) and ‘good performance is a strong culture’ 
(Kandula, 2006 cited in Ehtesham, Muhammad and Muhammad, 2011, p. 79). The term 
‘strong culture’ is broadly defined by scholars, as in the following examples: 
 
‘Strong culture is frequently employed to refer to companies in which beliefs and values 
are shared relatively consistently throughout an organization’ (Brown, 1998, p. 226) 
 
‘...the existence of a strong culture implies a commonly understood perspective on 
how organizational life should happen, with most organizational members 
subscribing to it’ (Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 177) 
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‘...organizations can be presumed to have strong culture because of a long shared history 
or because they have shared important intense experiences’ (Schein, 1990, p. 111) 
 
‘In strong culture, the organization’s core values are both intensely held and widely 
shared’ (Robbins, 2005, p. 488) 
 
These definitions imply that strong culture refers to shared values, beliefs and history 
throughout an organization. Here a high degree of sharing can contribute to a greater 
commitment and be the glue which holds the organization together (Robbins, 2005; 
Senior and Fleming, 2006). On the other hand, weak culture refers to having no 
dominant pervasive culture and the presence of several different cultures existing 
(Senior and Fleming, 2006). It may influence performance through conflict between the 
different cultures and the reduced motivation of employees (Ehtesham, Muhammad and 
Muhammad, 2011; Senior and Fleming, 2006).  
 
A strong culture may play a key role in at least three ways. Firstly, strong culture 
facilitates goal alignment, in which people share the organization’s core values and 
share the same basic assumptions (Brown, 1998; Robbins, 2005). A clear goal leads 
people to pursue the same direction, to generate initiative, energy and enthusiasm 
(Brown, 1998). These attributes can contribute to greater results of organizational 
performance due to a high degree of collaboration (e.g. people know the goals of the 
corporation), and a high level of effective and quick communication (Brown, 1998; Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982). A strong culture facilitates the process of commitment and control, 
which ensures that the employees’ values and beliefs are consolidated (Senior and 
Fleming, 2006). Christiensen et al. (2007) claimed, however, that over strong cultures 
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may be inflexible and too self-focused in public organizations, which may lead to 
resistance against democratic control and low levels of adaptation to the environment; 
such culture is seen to be associated with strong authoritarian leaders and it is often 
negative for both the internal and external environment. 
 
Secondly, strong cultures appear to have merits in relation to human resources in terms 
of enhancing the level of employee motivation, reducing the rate of employee turnover, 
and increasing behavioural consistency (Brown, 1998; Christiensen et al., 2007; 
Robbins, 2005). Strong cultures generate high levels of employee motivation and make 
people feel part of an organization (e.g. sharing their view on how the organization 
should work, and participating in decision making) (Brown, 1998; Christiensen et al., 
2007). Therefore, strong cultures can reduce employee turnover levels and increase 
behavioural consistency among the members of an organization (Robbins, 2005). 
Finally, a strong culture enables the employees to learn from the organizations’ past, for 
instance interpreting issues and events from past experience, making decisions on new 
challenges based on precedents, and promoting self-understanding and social cohesion 
through shared knowledge of the past (Brown, 1998).  
 
In this context, strong cultures can facilitate the creation of the market culture (pursuing 
goals) and clan culture (having strong loyalty and low turnover), both of which can be 
considered as a source of delivering good governance through effectiveness and 
participation. On the other hand, a strong culture could be a significant barrier to any 
effort when people pay insufficient attention to diverse strengths and the backgrounds 
that people can bring to the organization (McKenna and Beech, 2002). Similarly, Rainey 
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(1996) claimed that a strong culture, particularly one promoting bad values and 
assumptions, can contribute to making it hard to change. Brown (1998) argued that 
strong cultures may be suitable for a particular organization, but they may take other 
organizations in the wrong direction. This is because there is no one best culture, while 
different cultures will be suitable in different competitive circumstances and for 
different strategies. However, a strong culture enables strong performance, while strong 
performance can support building strong cultures (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). This leads 
to the question of how to manage organizational culture as a strong culture.  
 
Some scholars suggest that a strong culture can be created by, for example, shaping 
values (e.g. establishing standards of achievement within the organization) (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982); leadership at all levels in the organization (e.g. inspiring ideas of 
corporate culture, guiding beliefs, paying attention to the stakeholders’ needs) (Brown, 
1998; Davis, 1984; Kotter and Heskett, 1992); and management (e.g. developing formal 
rules and regulations to guide people’s behaviour) (Robbins, 2005). It can be observed 
that leadership, management and strategy are crucial elements for generating strong 
culture in organizations. The relationships between these elements are noticed, for 
instance top managers have to make decisions on strategy and agree with purposefully 
managing an organization’s culture (Davis, 1984; Lorsch, 1986).  
 
However, strong cultures in an organization are not simply created because an 
organization generally has a subculture that can affect the behaviour of the 
organizations’ members (Robbins, 2005). Furthermore, shifting organizational culture 
is difficult, takes time, and is very expensive, as is an attempt to affect organizational 
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change as a whole (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Kotter and Heskett, 1992). Alternatively, 
management can change organizational culture through top management and senior 
managers’ actions (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). This implies that strong cultures 
may be generated by management and leadership – styles and strategies. These may take 
shorter periods of time than efforts to change organizational culture because culture is 
difficult to change (Hofstede et al., 1990; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) and it can be stable 
over time (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). 
 
2.4.3 Theories and empirical studies of organizational culture  
There have been many efforts to understand organizational culture through several 
concepts and models, such as the organizational iceberg (Andrews, 2013, p. 44; French 
and Bell, 1990, 1999 cited in Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 138-139); the levels models 
(Schein, 1990; 2004); seven characteristics of organizational culture (Robbins, 2005); 
and Denison’s organizational culture model and the Competing Values Framework 
(CVF) (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). In particular, the CVF appears to be one of the most 
widely used models for studying organizational culture. It has attracted considerable 
attention in many empirical studies (e.g. Al-Kuwari, 2002; Grabowski et al., 2015; 
Jingjit, 2008; Parker and Bradley, 2001; Phookpan, 2012). It has proved useful as a 
significant approach to organizational effectiveness compared with other models. The 
current study focuses on the CVF models, although other studies on organizational 
culture in the public sector (e.g. Claver et al., 1999; Moon, 2000; Quirk, 2002) used 
other concepts and models. The reasons why the CVF is selected for investigating 
organizational culture and good governance in the current study are discussed through 
the next topic regarding what is the CVF; comparison of the CVF/OCAI to other crucial 
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organizational culture models; and identified gaps in the literature and the analytical 
framework of this study.  
 
What is the CVF? 
The Competing Values Framework (CVF) was initially developed by Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh (1983) as a consequence of research conducted on the key indicators of 
effective organizations. Since its development, the CVF has been broadly used in the 
field of organizational culture studies to diagnose and facilitate change in organizational 
culture (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The CVF comprises a set of organizational 
effectiveness indicators. Figure 2 illustrates two core dimensions: control versus 
flexibility, and an internal versus external orientation (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). From 
these two dimensions, four core categories of culture can be sorted: clan, adhocracy, 
market, and hierarchy models. Alternatively, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) represent the 
CVF through three value dimensions: organizational focus (internal versus external 
emphasis), organizational structure (control versus flexibility emphasis), and 
organizational means and ends (process versus outcomes). 
 
The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is probably the most often 
employed instrument for assessing organizational culture based on the CVF. The OCAI 
allows researchers to diagnose culture through the assessment of ‘core values,  
shared assumptions, and common approaches to work’ (Heritage, Pollock and Roberts, 
2014, p. 1).   
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Figure 2 The relationship between the values in the Competing Values Framework (CVF) 
Source: Cameron and Quinn (2011, p. 39)  Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983, p. 369) 
 
The OCAI comprises four core culture types and orientation of the organization based 
on the four core culture types as follows: 
 The hierarchy (control) culture: The hierarchy culture is a characteristic of 
bureaucracy in order to create stable, efficient, highly consistent products and 
services (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). This is because hierarchy culture has a 
clear organizational structure, standardized rules and procedures, strict control, 
and well defined responsibilities (Yu and Wu, 2009). This implies that the 
hierarchy culture can deliver efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and rule of 
law (criteria of performance-related pay). 
 The market (compete) culture: The market culture focuses on transactions with 
external constituencies such as suppliers, customers, and regulators, in which 
competitive focus, task focus, and result focus are created within the 
organizations (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). This reflects that the market culture 
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can lead to effectiveness and responsiveness (customer preferences of public 
services). 
 The clan (collaborate) culture: The clan culture is to share values and goals, 
cohesion, participation, individuality, and a sense of ‘we-ness’, in which the 
organizations’ success is generated by the internal climate and employee (e.g. 
teamwork, participation, and consensus) (Cameron and Quinn, 2011, p. 46, 48). 
The clan culture tends to increase participation, consensus orientation, 
accountability, transparency (the clear criteria of reward allocation), and equity 
(fairness of reward allocation). 
 The adhocracy (create culture): The adhocracy culture is ad hoc in that it refers 
to something temporary, specialized, and dynamic, of which the main goal is to 
foster adaptability, flexibility, and creativity in an uncertain atmosphere 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Cameron and Quinn also state that this culture can 
produce effectiveness. 
 
These four culture types are organized into six key dimensions of the OCAI:  
1) dominant characteristics, 2) organizational leadership, 3) management of employees, 
4) organization glue, 5) strategic emphases and 6) criteria of success. Each dimension 
consists of four alternatives (A, B, C and D) that reflect the four culture types (clan, 
adhocracy, market and hierarchy cultures respectively) (see Appendix 5: 5.1). In each 
dimension, the participants are asked to distribute 100 points among the four 
alternatives, depending on how similar the alternative is to their organization by giving 
the higher number of points to the alternative that is the most similar to their 
organization. Meanwhile, in these dimensions, they are required to provide answers in 
 
 
52 
 
the ‘Now’ column in the first time (an organization’s current culture) and in the second 
time complete the ‘Preferred column’ (culture that should be developed for the future) 
(see Appendix 5:5.1). After the OCAI is completed by the participants, the OCAI 
worksheet is used for scoring the OCAI (see Appendix 5:5.2).  
 
Tachateerapreda (2009) claimed that using a five-point Likert scale for the OCAI can 
facilitate the respondents, decreasing confusion caused by a variety of scales. The 
validity and reliability of using the Likert scale for assessing organizational culture are 
asserted by Quinn and Spreitzer (1991). They stated that the Likert scale leads to 
establishing convergent validity because a significant correlation between the scale 
scores from the same quadrant were seen. Furthermore, several scholars agree that the 
use of the five-point Likert scales provide many benefits, for example creating reliability 
by multi-items indicators (De Vaus, 2002); being appropriate for attitude questions by 
providing adequate response alternatives (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009); and 
generating willingness by the respondents due to  the easy items (the five-point Likert 
scale) rather than the hard ones (100 points) (Babbie, 1990). 
 
Figure 3 shows how the scores of now and preferred cultures acquired from the OCAI 
are used to construct an organizational profile. This reflects the overall picture of the 
organization’s culture through the four quadrants, in which the higher scores reflect the 
stronger culture that forms the core aspects of the organization’s culture. 
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                                 Figure 3 Organizational Culture Profile 
Source: Cameron and Quinn (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Figure 4 The Competing Values Framework of Organizational Culture (CVF) 
 Source: Adapted from Zammuto and Krakower (1991)  
 
Figure 4 demonstrates how the interpretation of the organization’s culture is supported 
by the four major culture types of the CVF (Cameron and Quinn, 2011), considered by 
important elements in each quadrant. The individuals’ perspectives on phenomena are 
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interpreted to understand the attainment of good governance, such as a high cooperation 
level reflecting participation of members of an organization. 
 
Comparison of the CVF/OCAI to other crucial organizational culture models 
There are diverse types of models measuring organizational culture developed by 
scholars as stated earlier. Among these models, Denison’s organizational culture model 
seems to be the most similar to the CVF, which includes four traits of organizational 
cultures: involvement, consistency, adaptability, and mission (Denison and Mishra, 
1995). The four traits of the Denison model appear to be more complex than the CVF 
and its sub-dimensions have been challenged by some researchers (e.g. Wang et al., 
2006 cited in Yu and Wu, 2009).  
 
However, the CVF and OCAI are criticized in terms of scale, for example Yu and Wu 
(2009) claimed that using only two or three dimensions of the CVF is insufficient  
to measure organizational culture. Other models seem to contain more items for 
measuring organizational culture, for example the Organizational Culture Profile, 
includes 54 questions in nine dimensions (O'Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell, 1991);  
the Multidimensional Model of Organizational Culture, includes 135 questions in six 
dimensions (Hofstede et al., 1990); and the organizational Culture Inventory, includes 
120 items in three dimensions (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Furthermore, the OCAI 
appears to focus on limited evidence of psychometric suitability and has a weak criterion 
validity when it is employed to assess ideal culture (Heritage, Pollock and Roberts, 
2014). 
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However, the CVF and OCAI have various merits compared with the above models. 
Firstly, the CVF and OCAI allow the organizations measuring organizational culture  
to enhance organizational effectiveness and identify the existing and preferred 
organizational cultures in order to promote cultural change (Cameron and Quinn, 2011; 
Heritage, Pollock and Roberts, 2014; Rojas, 2000). This is because the CVF can 
integrate most organizational culture dimensions, particularly the value dimension 
relevant to effectiveness (Yu and Wu, 2009). Secondly, the CVF and OCAI have few 
dimensions for measuring organizational culture but broad implications compared to 
other models. In other words, the CVF and OCAI are likely to be less complex, but the 
benefits are broader through interpretation. Thirdly, the CVF and OCAI provide 
empirical validity and reliability in terms of the standard questions in the OCAI 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2011), which has been used for much empirical research (e.g. 
Howard, 1998; Ralston et al., 2006).  
 
Fourthly, the CVF and OCAI allow the researchers to use multiple methods in a single 
study, as seen from several empirical studies (Jingjit, 2008). Fifthly, the CVF is 
considered an appropriate method for examining the extent of bureaucratic culture 
(hierarchy model) within the public sector (Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 
2001). This is consistent with the idea of Rojas (2000) that the CVF can provide benefits 
for research in the non-profit sector. Finally, the OCAI is one of the most extensively 
employed as an appropriate instrument in cross-cultural research in many countries, 
particular Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Thailand 
(Kwan and Walker, 2004; Yu and Wu, 2009).  
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Identified gap in the literature and developed analytical framework of the study 
Although the extensively used OCAI has proven beneficial as an approach to studying 
the effectiveness of organizations, particularly in the public sector, the six key 
dimensions of the OCAI seem to allow the researcher to learn little about the employees’ 
job satisfaction and the feature of reward. This is for two main reasons.  
 
Firstly, the items of reward and job satisfaction matter in a particular context such as the 
programme of performance evaluation that is focused on the current study. At a 
minimum, some association between culture and motivation is inevitable (Pheysey, 
1993) as well as between culture and job satisfaction (Lovas, 2007; Lund, 2003). The 
correlations between reward and job satisfaction are equally significant and should be 
considered. Reward is crucial in terms of enhancing the job satisfaction level and 
organizational commitment, and promoting organizational effectiveness, particularly 
financial reward (Moon, 2000). Rewarding achievement is often seen as one of the 
purposes of a programme of performance management (Moores, 1994). Regarding job 
satisfaction, it is important to measure how employees feel about working conditions, 
such as how interesting their work is, reasonable workload, and pay and promotion 
(Lam, 1994). Such a programme of performance evaluation, viewed as a control system, 
may affect people’s job satisfaction. Here it is important to note that the employees’ 
satisfaction is significantly stronger in conditions of a high level of autonomy (Jong, 
2016) and measuring job satisfaction is different from organizational culture, namely 
organizational culture is descriptive, while job satisfaction is evaluative (Robbins, 
2005).  
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Secondly, the OCAI is viewed as a standard instrument for assessing organizational 
culture, but it does not show what works or what is more effective. This is consistent 
with the idea proposed by Talbot (2010) that the CVF model was not a multidimensional 
performance model at all. Similarly, Jingjit and Fotaki (2010) state that the complexity 
of organizational culture means that is not simple to cover all aspects in a single study. 
Therefore, the six key dimensions of the OCAI do not sufficiently accommodate the 
aspects of reward and job satisfaction. Although Heritage, Pollock and Roberts (2014) 
claimed that the OCAI demonstrates a significant relationship with job satisfaction in 
voluntary organizations, this may not hold for other types of organization where intrinsic 
motivation plays less of a role than in the voluntary sector. Jingjit and Fotaki (2010) and 
Parker and Bradley (2001) used the item of organizational reward in the form of 
promotion, based on the idea of Zammuto and Krakower (1991), whilst Parker and 
Bradley (2001) used the item of job satisfaction for the questionnaire.  
 
According to the reasons as stated above, the analytical framework of the current study 
was developed. Figure 5 illustrates the analytical framework of the study that combines 
the six key dimensions of the OCAI based on the CVF (Cameron and Quinn, 2011) – 
the CVF was originally developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) – and the items of 
organizational reward in the form of promotion and job satisfaction (Jingjit and Fotaki, 
2010; Parker and Bradley, 2001; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). The eight key 
dimensions can be used to conduct questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews 
in the context of PA. These may elicit information regarding implementing good 
governance through the lens of PA. 
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Figure 5 The analytical framework of the study 
                                       Source: Author’s construct 
 
Although the CVF has been used to measure the organizational culture of the public 
sector in many countries (e.g. Al-Kuwari, 2002; Lovas, 2007; Parker and Bradley, 2001) 
and also the Thai public sector (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Phookpan, 2012), a combination of 
the six key dimensions of the OCAI and the aspects of reward and job satisfaction has 
not so far been used to study organizational culture in the context of performance 
measurement as well as good governance. Although there are similar empirical research 
studies by Sathornkich (2010), Srimai (2015) and Srimai, Damsaman and Bangchokdee 
(2011), they investigated the implication of the PMS and PA at the provincial level in 
Thailand. In contrast to the latter, the current study focused on the relationship between 
organizational culture and good governance in the provincial administration through 
using mixed methods and a combination of the OCAI and the aspects of reward and job 
satisfaction. Therefore, the findings of the current study may differ from the previous 
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study. Receiving quantitative data allows the researcher to compare values that affect 
performance based good governance by the OCAI based on the CVF. The quantitative 
data may be more valid or reliable (Goddard, Mannion and Smith, 1999) due to being 
based on a structured approach. Furthermore, the study obtained qualitative data through 
in-depth and focused group interviews. These results are compared and combined in 
order to assess the validity of the findings.  
 
2.4.4 Development of analytical framework 
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks are important in order to contribute practical 
and analytical frameworks – how to collect data and analyze collected data. There are 
three main phases to develop analytical frameworks: review of literature; assessment of 
theoretical and conceptual approaches; and practical and analytical framework, as 
demonstrated in Figure 6. 
 
The first phase was a review of the literature on three key features: good governance, 
performance and organizational culture focused on the context of public administration. 
The existing literature suggested that the concept of good governance is considered to 
be a condition of aid donors, especially international organizations, in order to 
encourage performance management in the public sector. Performance management is 
not simple in practice because there is an organizational culture, which is viewed as a 
key determinant that can both enable and inhibit its success.  
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Figure 6 Development process of analytical framework 
 
The second phase was an assessment of theoretical and conceptual approaches on good 
governance, performance and organizational culture. The evidence suggested that good 
governance is viewed as a concept for public management and reform. In addition, the 
concept of performance is related to PMS. Particularly, the stage of performance review 
included performance measurement, performance assessment, performance evaluation, 
and performance appraisal. The CVF developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) is 
considered to be one of the most important models for analysing organizational culture, 
and for enhancing organizational effectiveness and facilitating change.  
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These theoretical and conceptual approaches led to the development of practical and 
analytical frameworks in the third phase. The principle of good governance consists of 
at least nine key components, and the components can be used as a means or an end for 
public management and reform. Regarding PMS as focused on performance 
measurement, determinants of performance are identified in three main categories, and 
these can lead to a consideration of what determinants affect performance that delivers 
good governance. In terms of organizational culture, the OCAI is a crucial instrument 
based on the CVF model, and comprises six key dimensions: dominant characteristics 
of the organization, leadership style, management of employees, organizational 
cohesion, organizational strategic emphasis, and organizational success criteria 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The six key dimensions were combined with the 
dimensions of reward in the form of promotion and job satisfaction (Jingjit and Fotaki, 
2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). This is because these 
attributes are important in the context of performance evaluation. Therefore, the total 
number of key dimensions used for the surveys and the interviews was eight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
2.5 Summary  
This chapter has aimed to develop the analytical framework for the study of the 
relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the civil service. 
Constructing the analytical framework required understanding of three main topics: 
pursuing good governance, determinants of performance, and organizational culture.  
 
The concept of good governance in the public administrative sense comprises at least 
nine key components. There are few empirical studies that have investigated 
comprehensive components of good governance in a single study, particularly  
the relationship between organizational culture and performance related to good 
governance. In contrast, this research focuses on all components of good governance 
through the PA scheme. In addition, some empirical studies used the OCAI with the 
aspect of reward or job satisfaction, but this research integrated both reward and job 
satisfaction in a single study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CULTURE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE  
IN THAILAND 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Having considered the impact of organizational culture on performance in the previous 
chapter, the present chapter considers the national cultural context and its influence on 
good governance and civil service performance. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss 
Thai culture and values, and the development of good governance in Thailand. It begins 
with a background (section 3.2), which sets out general information on Thailand, its 
politics and provincial administration. This is followed by section 3.3, which considers 
Thai culture and values (drawing on the framework of Hofstede), and the values of the 
Thai public sector. Section 3.4 considers good governance in Thailand, including civil 
service reforms before and after 2002. Section 3.5 focuses on the performance 
agreement (PA) in provincial administration. This comprises the structure of provincial 
administration and the government agencies relevant to PA, monetary incentive, 
creating PA, and challenges of PA. The chapter ends with an attempt to draw these 
strands together to provide an overview of good governance and civil service reform in 
the Thai political and cultural context.  
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3.2 Background 
3.2.1 General information on Thailand 
Thailand is situated in Southeast Asia and is bordered by Myanmar (Burma), Laos 
People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Malaysia. Thailand was formerly known 
as ‘Siam’ and was renamed ‘Thailand’ in 1939 (NESDB, 2006). It consists of four 
regions, North, Central plain, Northeast and South and is divided into 76 provinces and 
the capital Bangkok, which is a special administrative area. The total population of 
Thailand is around 65.73 million people6 (Department of Provincial Administration, 
2015). The major ethnic group is Thais, who make up about 80 percent of the population 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2013). The second largest 
ethnic group is Chinese, which is about 10 percent. The vast majority of Thais are 
Buddhist, about 90 percent of the population, and the remaining 10 percent comprises, 
for example, Muslim, Christian, and Hindu (National Statistical Office, 2010).  
 
Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was never colonized by European 
powers such as Great Britain and France (CountryWatch, 2016). As a result it has a  
self-contained political system and a high degree of cultural uniqueness (Shor, 1960). 
Stability has been assisted by the country’s relative homogeneity and, perhaps, the 
pacifying role of the Monarchy. Democratization is seen as being based on good 
governance, the rule of law, human rights, transparency, and accountability (Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2013).  
 
                                                          
6 The statistical population of Thailand on the 31st December 2015 was given by Department of Provincial 
Administration’s promulgation on the 4th February 2016. 
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3.2.2 Politics 
Thailand was ruled by an absolute monarchy before the country’s politics were 
transformed to a constitutional monarchy by a bloodless coup in 19327 (Baker and 
Phongpaichit, 2014; CountryWatch, 2016; Hewison, 1997a). Thailand is a constitutional 
monarchy, in which sovereign power belongs to the Thai people and the King rules as 
the head of state in relation to the country’s Constitution (Royal Thai Consulate-
General, 2016). The country’s administration is conducted by a prime minister as head 
of a parliamentary government and the cabinet that the prime minister forms, which is 
relatively similar to the United Kingdom (Royal Thai Consulate-General, 2016; 
Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2016). The Thai government is based on a 
parliamentary system headed by the prime minister, who is elected through an open vote 
by members of the House of Representatives. Thailand’s political system has been 
dominated by several significant factors, particularly the monarchy, military, 
constitution, business groups and religion (Hewison, 1997a; McCargo, 2012; 
Selaratana, 2009).  
 
The institution of the monarchy was established in Thailand in the 13th century. 
Although Thailand’s politics have been based on the constitutional monarchy since 
1932, the institution of the monarchy appears to play a significant role in Thai politics, 
as observed from the following evidence: 
 
                                                          
7 Revolution converts absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy on 24th June 1932 (Baker and 
Phongpaichit, 2014). 
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‘...The Thais view the King as sacred and as a spiritual leader who serves as a symbol 
of unity...Because of this, the monarch remains above all conflicting political 
groups. Support of the monarchy remains an indispensable-source of political 
legitimacy. A political leader or regime, even a popularly elected government, 
would not be truly legitimized without the King’s blessing’  (Surin, 1992 cited in 
Hewison, 1997b, p. 61). 
 
Likewise, Hewison (1997b) emphasizes that the monarchy’s influence on Thai politics 
is ‘crucial to political stability’ and ‘the sole source of unity and strength’ in the nation. 
The social and political crises were often solved by the monarch’s intervention 
(Maisrikrod, 1999). Maisrikrod also stated that the monarchy is important as a primary 
source of Thai values and culture.  
 
Regarding the military, Thailand’s politics are inevitable in relevance to a history of 
military interventions. Chai-Anan Samudavnija (1997 cited in Maisrikrod, 1999) 
claimed that political power under military regimes should be replaced by a strong civil 
society. Nevertheless, the power of the military has not been diluted in Thai politics. 
The dominance of military coups was portrayed between 1947 and 1992, namely this 
was a period characterized by coups, attempted coups and various protests (Baker and 
Phongpaichit, 2014; CountryWatch, 2016). Thereafter, there were various military 
coups, for example in September 2006 by the Council for National Security (CNS) – the 
government of Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown by a coup (Baker and Phongpaichit, 
2014; CountryWatch, 2016). In 2014, a coup was launched by National Council for 
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Peace and Order (NCPO)8 led by Prayut Chan-o-cha, the Prime Minister from 2014 to 
date (The Secretariant of the House of Representatives, 2016). The reason for the junta 
provided by NCPO was the prolonged political deadlock and protests, various violent 
situations, and the ineffective performance of the caretaker government of Yingluck 
Shinawatra9 (Royal Thai Government, 2014). It is important to note that the drafting of 
successive constitutions of the Kingdom of Thailand often occurs after a military coup.  
 
Since the peaceful transformation in 1932, Thailand has had a total number of 19 
existing constitutions of the Kingdom of Thailand (The Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives, 2016), including the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Interim) 
Act B.E. 2557 (2014) that has been in use so far. However, the latest draft Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2559 (2016) was approved through a constitution 
referendum on 7th August 2016 by 61.35 percent 10 (Office of The Election Commission 
of Thailand, 2016).  
 
The other factor that has influenced Thailand’s politics is business groups, the power of 
private sector capitalists11 (Handley, 1997). Christensen (1993 cited in Hewison, 1997a) 
stated that several business groups, such as organized business, industrialists, urban 
                                                          
8 The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) took control of the national administration on the 
22nd May 2014 promulgated on the 24th May 2014, which was led by Prayut Chan-o-cha, head of  
NCPO. (The Secretariant of the House of Representatives, 2016) 
9 Yingluck Shinawatra was the first female prime minister of Thailand and Thaksin’s sister, viewed as a 
puppet of her older brother. (from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13723451 
Accessed: 28 March 2016) 
10 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2559 was carried on by the government of Prayut 
Chan-o-cha.  
11 Wealth became a central determinant of policy and political position...For example, post-Prem 
government period, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)- the participation of a huge number of 
middle- and upper-class investors- was a strong determinant of political behaviour (Handley, 1997,  
p. 94, 113). 
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bankers, provincial elites and the rural majority, have sought opportunities from political 
systems for their own benefits. The most distinct example is the case of former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra who possessed the biggest telecommunications empire in 
Thailand. Moreover, businessmen at the local level are likely to influence local politics. 
They are not only rich but also powerful and attempt to participate in local politics, 
where some of them use their power position for their own benefits in order to use 
money in the political system in rural areas, such as using money for obtaining votes 
(Selaratana, 2009). In Thailand, the interaction between businessmen and politicians can 
contribute to purchasing opportunities and favours. The same is true for many Southeast 
Asian countries where the relationship between big businesses and public servants can 
also be linked to political control (Mutebi, 2008).  
 
In addition, the correlation between Thailand’s politics and the sangha 12  has been 
described as a ‘continuous dialogue’ because the sangha is considered as an instrument 
of state power and legitimation (McCargo, 2012). For example, a few hundred pro-
Thaksin ‘redshirt’ monks participated in the protests in 2010. By contrast, there was a 
movement of monks (e.g. the Santi Asoke, V. Vajiramedhi) to the other political side 
called the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a ‘yellowshirt’ royalist grouping. 
The monks’ involvement in politics plays a significant role because the majority of 
Thais (over 90 percent) are Buddhists (Royal Thai Consulate-General, 2016). The Thai 
people’s character and personality is therefore shaped by their belief in Buddhism such 
as politeness, modesty and tolerance (Kusy, 1991).  
                                                          
12 Sangha refers to a community of monks, including Theravada (or Hinayana or lesser vehicle) and 
Mahayana (or greater vehicle) (Kusy, 1991). 
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The development of Thailand’s politics has been very volatile because of the 
interactions of the factors highlighted earlier. It can therefore be observed that there is a 
linkage between the political system and the bureaucratic system. Politics appears to 
play a significant role in the civil service reform in Thailand. This point is emphasized 
by the research findings of Chula Unisearch (2005) who argued that the attitudes and 
behaviours of politicians, government officers, and related persons in bureaucracy have 
a strong impact on the characteristics of the responses to the context of change of the 
Thai civil service. Politics is not the only crucial factor affecting civil service 
implementation, however, there is also the influence of the culture and values of Thais 
discussed in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.3 Provincial administration 
The state administration of Thailand is divided into three levels: central administration, 
provincial administration, and local administration, in accordance with the State 
Administration Act B.E. 2534 (1991) (Office of the Council of State, 1991). At  
the provincial level, a province is administered by a Governor who is a permanent civil 
servant and appointed by the Ministry of Interior (Sopchokchai, 2001). The Governor 
performs their duties in collaboration with 2-3 Vice Governors (Mektrairat, 2007). 
Administration at the provincial level, the policies and primary executions, are based on 
the regional offices of ministries and departments, whose authority and certain decision-
making responsibilities are authorized to the agencies in a province (Sopchokchai, 2001; 
UN, 1997). 
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Provincial administration comprises 75 provinces with Bangkok Metropolitan Area and 
was increased to 76 provinces in 2011 when the 76th province, Bueng Kan, was 
established 13  (The Secretariant of the House of Representatives, 2011). Provincial 
administration is important because the government agencies are relatively close to the 
citizens in the area in terms of increasing citizens’ well-being and responding to citizens’ 
needs and problems (Sathornkich, 2010). The provinces’ performance has a significant 
impact on the citizens in the provinces (Srimai, 2015).  
 
3.3 Culture and values 
The characteristics of Thai national culture and values appear to influence the reforms 
of Thai public organizations (Pimpa, 2012). This section discusses Thai national culture 
and values acquired from the existing literature and many empirical studies and also 
discusses the culture of the Thai public sector.  
 
3.3.1 Thai national culture and values 
The construction of Thai national culture is significantly correlated with geographic, 
economic, demographic and political national indicators (Hofstede, 1981), including 
historical reasons, religion and monarchy. Several Asian countries such as India, China, 
and Cambodia have dominated the foundation of Thai culture (Thailand, 2013). In 
particular, India influenced Thai culture in terms of religion (Charnnarong, 2013). The 
dominant role of Buddhism is a consequence of religious movement seen as Theravada 
                                                          
13 Bueng Kan is the 76th province of Thailand, in accordance with the Act establishing Changwat Bueng 
Kan B.E. 2554 (2011) promulgated on 11th March B.E. 2554 (2011) (The Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives, 2011). Thus, Bueng Kan was not included for performance agreement between 2007 
and 2011 used for this study. 
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Buddhist society, which has a significant impact on Thais’ folklore and identifies the 
national culture in Thailand (Evans, 1998; Reynolds, 2006). Moreover, the monarchy 
has influenced Thai culture because the King is believed to be ‘Saksit’ (metaphysically 
powerful) (Evans, 1998).  This can be observed through the statement ‘the Monarchy is 
an institution of worship. Any transgression to the Monarchy either openly or secretly 
is a misdemeanor according to the Constitution’ (Ministry of Culture, 2013, p. 1).  
 
Understanding a nation’s culture and values is necessary because these can contribute  
to grasping the values and behaviour of the people in that country. Such a statement is 
emphasized by some scholars (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Rokeach, 1970) who argue that the 
national culture14 can shape the value systems of the main group of the population and 
stabilize over long periods in history. Likewise, Komin (1990) stated that a system of 
values becomes a guide to people’s behaviour found in every culture. Here the 
discussion of Thai culture and values is considered by Hofstede’s national cultural 
dimensions, with particular studies related to Thai culture and values.  
 
Relevance of Hofstede and particular studies on Thai culture and values 
Hofstede (2001, p. 1) proposed five cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and collectivism, masculinity and femininity, and long-term 
and short-term orientation. Alternatively, Komin (1990) proposed that the Thai national 
characteristics comprise nine value orientations: the ego, grateful relationship, smooth 
interpersonal relationship, flexibility and adjustment, religio-psychical orientation, 
                                                          
14 The pattern of national culture is known as ‘national character’ or ‘social factor’ (Hofstede, 2001, 
Rokeach, 1970).  
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education and competence, interdependence, fun-pleasure, and achievement-task. 
Regarding national values, Hofstede et al. (2010) stated that a country’s values are 
strong and not easily changed because they are related to the structure and functioning 
of its institutions – the basic elements of society such as the family, the school, and the 
community. Komin (1990) claimed that values may change or become stable to 
constitute national characteristics.  
 
However, other scholars (e.g. Chevrier, 2003; Pimpa, 2012) have criticized Hofstede’s 
interpretation of culture. Chevrier (2003) claimed that Hofstede employed a quantitative 
study based on North American values, which might not be useful in a cross-cultural 
project involving members of different cultural backgrounds, such as Asian and 
European. Pimpa (2012) also argued that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions may lack 
validity in a society where subculture is strong, such as religion and belief, race and 
ethnicity, and geopolitical factors. Meanwhile, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are used by 
many empirical studies (e.g. Pimpa, 2012; Selaratana, 2009). The five cultural 
dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1991) can be explained as follows: 
 
(1) Power distance 
Power distance refers to the distribution of interpersonal influence in a culture and the 
degree of inequality in power between a more powerful individual and a less powerful 
one (Hofstede, 2001). According to Hofstede’s exploring of power distance differences 
in 50 countries, power distance in Thailand is categorized in the group of high power 
distance value countries. Country power distance index values in Thailand are 64, from 
a range of between 104 for Malaysia and 11 for Australia, meaning inequality in Thai 
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society is normal. Komin (1990) argued that existential inequality among Thai 
employees can be accepted, which is different from American culture that has smaller 
power distance (a higher degree of equality among its people). In Thailand, inequality 
has been seen in different dimensions of society, for example, gender, education, 
economics, social status and opportunities (Selaratana, 2009).  
 
Moreover, inequality in Thai society may be derived from other values such as 
‘Bunkhun’ (goodness or usefulness) and hierarchy. ‘Bunkhun’ builds on personal 
motivations, and on affiliation and security (Mulder, 1994). Hierarchy in Thai society  
is based on a folk-Buddhist conception of karma, incarnation and ranking according to 
accumulated merit (Hanks, 1962). Hierarchy in Thailand is also based on age and 
gender. Thai people usually use the prefixes ‘phii’ (meaning elder) and ‘nong’ (meaning 
younger) when they speak to others (Sparkes, 1998). The age hierarchy is also expressed 
through the common belief that ‘roojak thee soong thee tam’ (knowing your place and 
liking it), which means that Thai people have to place themselves in a proper hierarchy 
(Maisrikrod, 1999, p. 404). For gender hierarchy, according to Buddhist scripture and 
practice, men are able to become monks and accumulate merit more than women who 
are associated with the mundane and materialism. Women in Thai society are associated 
with being duty-bound to be responsible for their parents and family, although this has 
faded in modern Thai society (Benedict, 1943 cited in Pimpa, 2012; Sparkes, 1998). 
Such features reflect why hierarchical systems are relatively strong in Thai society, and 
that Thai bureaucrats frequently accept existential inequality, which places a strong 
value on relationships, and accept authority and special privileges (Komin, 1990). 
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(2) Individualism and collectivism  
From Hofstede’s study on individual index values (IDV) for 76 countries, individualism 
in Thailand is ranked between 58th and 63rd, which is classified as a low level 
individualism and tends to be a collectivistic society. Thailand is characterized as a 
collectivistic country, in which ‘people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty’ (Hofstede, 1991, p. 51). Thus, Thailand is a strong 
relationship society with cohesive in-groups (Hofstede, 1984). Hofstede pointed out that 
IDV scores in almost all wealthy countries were high, while almost all poor countries 
had low scores. However, Thai society has been shifting from collectivism  
to more individualism in recent years as the country’s economy became wealthier 
(Hofstede, 1999).  
 
Many scholars (e.g. Benedict, 1943 cited in P. H. C., 1953; Embree, 1950; Klausner, 
1997; Phillips, 1965) agree that Thais are characterized as individualistic, which is 
different from the first research of Hofstede in the 1980s. However, his research  
findings during the following decades found that Thais were individualistic. Thais are 
individualistic, self-centred, highly independent from others, and prefer working  
alone and lack social groups, which is different from other countries, such as  
those in Western Europe, America and Japan (Embree, 1950; Phillips, 1965; 
Wiratchaniphawan, 1987). The current generation of Thais tend to accept other cultures, 
in particular those of Western countries, and deviate from traditional culture (NESDB, 
2013), which contributes to more individualistic behaviour among younger generations 
in the Thai public sector (Pimpa, 2012).  
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Moreover, Thais’ individualism may be derived from other factors such as type of 
family (extended family or nuclear family), the circumstances of the case, and belief in 
Buddhism. Children from a nuclear family may learn to think of themselves as ‘I’ which 
reflects their individual characteristics (Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010). For the 
circumstances of the case, Komin (1998) illuminated that individuals’ behaviour is 
motivated by ‘I’ and ‘me’, namely ‘I’ and ‘Bunkhun’ (grateful relationship) will 
demonstrate sincere, honest, reliable, stable and predictable behavior. Contrary to this, 
is ‘me’ motivated behaviour, seen as selfish, opportunistic, unreliable, irresponsible, and 
unpredictable. Regarding Buddhism, it is an important part in influencing individualism 
in Thai society (Pipat, 2013a). For example, it focuses on attainment of enlightenment 
only through an individual’s effort (Podhisita, 1998). This sense is based on the law of 
‘karma’ through the proverb ‘do good, receive good; do evil, receive evil’ or ‘Tham 
bun’ (merit-making), which demonstrates that ‘karma’ and ‘Tham bun’ depend on 
individuals (Pipat, 2013a). 
 
Individualism may lead to many disadvantages, such as regularity (rules and regulations 
ignored) and patronage systems (individuals’ benefits focused). Lack of rules and 
regulations may occur when people choose to ignore them as a consequence of a low 
social sanction (Klausner, 1997; Vichit-Vadakan, 2012). It has been recognized that 
Thai relationships are built on patronage systems, which reflects through the concept of 
‘Phu Num - Phu Tam’ (leader-follower), ‘Luk Phii - Luk Nong’ (boss-subordinate) and 
‘Phu Yai - Phu Noi’ (elder-younger) and may be based on reciprocal benefits in order 
to facilitate corruption (Wiratchaniphawan, 1987). This may affect the relationships 
between boss and employees in the work-place in terms of work behaviour and 
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progression of position level in an organization. Moreover, patronage systems may lead 
to the relationship orientation in the pattern of ‘Kraeng cai’ (to be considerate, to feel 
reluctant) (Komin, 1990) in order to reluctant to argue with superiors when staff have 
different views from their superiors (Wiratchaniphawan, 1987). This situation in Thai 
social life may be called ‘Choei-choei’ (indifferent, stable) (Pipat, 2013a). 
 
(3) Masculinity and femininity 
Differences between the sexes is a dimension of societal culture in which behaviours  
are considered in terms of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ (Hofstede, 1991, p. 80-81). The 
findings of Hofstede’s study on masculinity in 50 countries suggested that Thailand is 
classified as a feminine country where people in society are supposed to be modest, 
tender and concerned with the quality of life (Hofstede, 1991). Thailand scores 34 on 
the masculinity index (MAS) values (rank 44th), which is the lowest rank of masculinity 
among the Asian countries, compared to the Asia average of 53 and the world average 
of 50. Hofstede explains that masculinity is unlike individualism and is unrelated to the 
degree of economic development of a country, and can be found in both rich and poor 
countries. Hofstede also states that feminine cultures may provide more opportunities 
for mutual help and social contacts in the work-place. 
 
In the context of Thailand, masculinity was dominated by Buddhism, for example, 
women are born because of bad karma and cannot attain enlightenment as men can 
(Pipat, 2013b). Furthermore, there is a traditional Thai concept that a man is ‘Chang 
Tao Na’ (the front legs of the elephant, leader) and the woman is ‘Chang Tao Lung’ (the 
rear legs of the elephant, follower) (Pimpa, 2012). This may be an obstruction to the 
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development of women as well as to acceptance in Thai society. However, this  
idea has slightly faded away in modern Thai organizations. Meanwhile, Thai men, as  
in many other societies, are expected to be the leader in most circumstances, nonetheless 
some men will be recognized as ‘Toot’ (unmanly men) (Pimpa, 2012). 
 
(4) Uncertainty avoidance 
The dimension of uncertainty avoidance describes the extent to how people in one 
society feel about uncertain or unknown situations (Hofstede, 1991). Hofstede stated 
that it is the cultural heritage of societies that is transferred through basic institutions 
such as family, school and state, which reflects the collectively held values of the 
members in a particular society in terms of tolerance of ambiguity and acceptance of 
risks. In the results of Hofstede’s study on the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) value 
for 50 countries, Thailand is indicated in the middle score with about 64 and ranked 30th 
(Hofstede, 2001). This implies that Thai society may have a low level of tolerance for 
uncertainty.  
 
It is reasonable that Thais make an effort to minimize the level of uncertainty, such as 
with strict rules, regulations, laws and policies for adaptation and implementation 
(Pimpa, 2012). Komin (1990) claimed that Thailand is not a law-oriented country, but 
one where practice, principles and laws are ever-adjustable to suit people and existing 
situations. For instance, Thai government officials might be lenient on law infringement 
that relates to individuals of good connection or money in order to generate a problem 
of corruption, this characteristic being referred to as ‘flexibility and adjustment’, and 
demonstrates how Thais may be unpredictable, non-committal, irresponsible and 
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opportunistic. In addition, Thai organizations attempt to control and eliminate the 
unexpected in achieving their ultimate goal (Pimpa, 2012). Pimpa pointed out that this 
perspective is expressed through one of the traditional concepts in Thailand ‘Cha Cha 
Dai Pla Lem Ngam’ (Do thing slowly and make sure you get a beautiful big knife). This 
concept reflects the Thai way of management, that Thais will not take risk in any 
activities, if the quality and practices are uncertain. The implication is that Thai society 
seems to be high in uncertainty avoidance and may infrequently accept change and be 
risk averse.   
 
(5) Long-term and short-term orientation 
The fifth dimension is based on the teaching of Confucius, which describes cultures on 
long-term and short-term orientations (Hofstede, 2001). Short-term orientation includes 
respect for tradition, personal stability, saving face and reciprocation of greeting, while 
long-term orientation comprises respect for persistence, thrift, having a sense of shame 
and ordering relationship by status (Hofstede, 1991). Thailand has long-term orientation 
(LTO) index values of 56 and is ranked 8th of 23 countries (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstede 
maintained that East Asian countries seem to be more oriented towards traditions and 
saving face than are Western countries.  
 
Long-term results are often predicted by the development of economies, societies and 
politics. For example, the government and departments rarely had any long-term 
planning before the economic crisis in 1997 but this situation changed after public sector 
reform in 2002. All Thai government agencies are expected to not only do strategic 
planning in the long-term period (four years), but also in the short-term period (one year), 
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which emphasizes responsiveness to change. This implies that Confucian values are 
associated with economic growth, as argued by Hofstede. Furthermore, the concept of 
long-term orientation in Thailand is associated with Buddhism, especially the law of 
karma. Thais believe in ‘Tham bun’ (merit-making) such as religious activities (e.g. 
giving food and offerings to monks, supporting temples, etc.) and  social activities (e.g. 
taking care of aged parents, helping the poor, etc.) that can bring about a better life in 
the future or incarnation (Pipat, 2013a). Here, implications of belief in the result of 
activities and being felt in the next life are influential for long-term aspirations.    
 
3.3.2 Values of the Thai public sector 
A review of the literature on politics and organizational culture in the Thai public sector 
(e.g. Mutebi, 2008; Selaratana, 2009) suggests that there is a linkage between political 
culture and bureaucratic culture in Thailand. The development of Thai bureaucracy is 
considered to be based upon a self-developed bureaucracy because it was not shaped by 
Western ideas as a colony (Shor, 1960). This reflects the uniqueness of Thai bureaucracy 
and a correlation with politics. In the nineteenth century, the dominant feature of the 
political structure was bureaucratic nobility (Wyatt, 1968). This reflects how the 
hierarchical nature of bureaucracy contributes to the importance of only a small group 
of people at the top (Rig, 1966 cited in Ockey, 2004).  
 
The relationship between the bureaucracy and the three branches of power is inevitable. 
Ockey (2004) illuminated that the law-making process involves bureaucrats when the 
parliament leaves bureaucrats to develop bills relating to specific procedures and 
regulations. Regarding the administrative branch, Ockey explained that the politicians’ 
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plans may be hindered without the active encouragement of bureaucrats. However, the 
relationship between the bureaucrats and politicians may lead to opportunities for 
patronage. Thai bureaucracy always respects the judicial branch, particularly elected 
politicians, who were elected to check the activities under the 1997 constitution.  
 
Wiratchaniphawan (2004) explained the development of government officials’ values 
from 1932 to 2003 through a categorization of four periods: values of ‘king’ (Sukhothai 
to Ayutthaya), values of ‘phraya’15 (Rattanakosin before 1932), values of ‘phraya’ 
(1932 - 1957), and values of ‘businessmen’ (1958 - 2003). This suggests a legacy of 
tension between monarchical and bourgeois concepts of the state that may be reflected 
in the bureaucracy, and which also explains the latter’s close identification with the 
King. The original word for civil servant in Thai is ‘kharatchakan’, in which ‘kha’ 
signifies  servant and ‘ratchakan’ means affairs of the King (Jingjit, 2008, p. 67). 
Wiratchaniphawan also proposed several characteristics of civil servants that influence 
the development of the Thai public sector, particularly public sector reform. He stated 
that the Thai government’s values that affect national development consist of internal 
and external systems. The internal system derives from the officials themselves or 
human nature related to negative sides, including illegal use of authority, values like a 
boss, individualism and conservatism.  
 
 
                                                          
15 A collection of genealogies of major noble families begun by Phraya Rattanakun in 1920, the official 
genealogy of the royal family, and the genealogies of the families of the mothers of the Bangkok 
kings. (Neher, 1979, p. 43) 
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The external system refers to environment factors such as economics, social, politics, 
administration, and family, which lead to patronage systems, favourite convenience and 
laziness, and favourite adulation. In particular, the patronage system seems to be deep-
rooted in the Thai bureaucracy. Almost 41% of people who become Thai civil servants 
have always been the elite, who have relationship with civil servants, military, police 
and other government officials (Tjiptoherijanto, 2012). However, patron-client, 
superior-subordinate relations, have been found not only in Thailand but in other 
Southeast Asian countries (Pye, 1999). Many scholars (e.g. Charoenserbsakul and 
Sombatpeam, 2014; Wiratchaniphawan, 2004) agree that the officials’ values are crucial 
elements that determine the success or otherwise of Thai public sector reform. The next 
section discusses Thai public sector reform through many efforts, particularly 
introducing good governance. 
 
3.4 Development of good governance in Thailand 
The debate on governance development in Thailand needs to be traced back to the story 
of the Thai civil service reform before and after 2002. There was much legislation and  
many plans issued as part of the reform even prior to 2002, as well as after, as shown in 
Figure 7. The next section discusses how good governance has been developed in the 
Thai civil service both before and after 2002.  
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Figure 7 Overall development of good governance in Thailand based on the legislation and plans 
Source: Author’s construct adapted from Sathornkich (2010), Tamronglak (2014) and OPDC (2012)  
 
 
3.4.1 Civil service reform before 2002 
A review of literature on the Thai civil service and good governance (e.g. Nikomborirak, 
2007; OPDC, 2012; Sathornkich, 2010; Suthapreda, 2013) suggests that the Thai civil 
service reform was a consequence of the economic crisis of 1997, called ‘Tom Yam 
Goong Crisis’ 16  (Niratpattanasai, 1999). Thai authorities sought the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) help to rescue the economy (Bullard, Bello and Mallhotra, 
1998; IMF, 1997-1999). Conditionality appears to have been a key driver for 
introducing reform programmes in the Thai public sector, including the civil service 
reform (see Thailand Letter of Intent 1997-1999) (IMF, 1997-1999). However the 
rationale was not only imposed externally. Many public agencies in Thailand have 
                                                          
16 The 1997 Asian crisis is called by some people ‘Tom Yam Goong’, sour & spicy prawn soup - Thai 
style (Niratpattanasai, 1999). 
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increasingly paid attention to good governance and performance because they anticipate 
that it can contribute to solving problems of inefficiency, corruption, and nepotism 
(Nikomborirak, 2007; OPDC, 2012).  
 
The Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC)17 was the main central agency  
that propelled the implementation of the reform (Chula Unisearch, 2005; OCSC, 2016). 
This is because OCSC has the authority to make proposals and advise the Council of 
Ministers on civil service management systems, public personnel administration, and 
improvement of administrative procedures and processes under Section 8 of the Civil 
Service Act of 1992. Many reform programmes were therefore launched by the OCSC 
to introduce, for example, performance measurement (1994), the project of 
Administrative Renewal (AR) (1998-1999) and the Public Sector Efficiency and 
Effectiveness Enhancement Scheme18 (2001) (Sathornkich, 2010). The main objectives 
of the programmes were to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of 
the civil service, and financial incentives were made available to achieve these.  
 
However, implementation of the programmes has faced several challenges, such as 
resistance from government officials for whom Western concepts such as the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC), were not simple to comprehend; some civil servants seemed to lack 
knowledge about how to develop KPIs and performance targets and performance 
                                                          
17 The OCSC is a central government agency under the Prime Minister’s Office which has roles and 
responsibilities to advise the public sectors (e.g. managing human resources, protecting the civil 
service’s merit system practices), and evaluate environment and quality of life for government 
officials based on the principle of good governance in order to benefit the people and the nation’s 
sustainable development (OCSC, 2016). 
18 The cabinet approved the Public Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness Enhancement Scheme on  
the 3rd April 2001 (Sathornkich, 2010). 
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analysis skills; and reward systems seemed to be controversial in terms of the eligibility 
of individuals to receive rewards, fairness of reward allocation in an organization, and 
limited budgeting processes and allocation of rewards (Sathornkich, 2010).  
 
3.4.2 Civil service reform after 2002 
For Thai civil service reform the period after 2002 may be considered as a golden age 
of good governance. Many key pieces of legislation and plans were enacted to promote 
the principles of good governance: Thai Constitution B.E. 2550 (2007); State 
Administration Act (Volume 5) B.E. 2545 (2002) Section 3/1; Royal Decree on Criteria 
and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003); the National Economic and 
Social Development Plans: 9th B.E. 2545 - B.E. 2549 (2002 - 2006), 10th B.E. 2550 - B.E. 
2554 (2007 - 2011), and 11th B.E. 2555 - B.E. 2559 (2012 - 2016); and Public Sector 
Development Strategic plan: B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003 - 2007), B.E. 2551 - B.E. 
2555 (2008 - 2012) and B.E. 2556 - B.E. 2561 (2013 - 2018) (shown earlier in Figure 
7). These have been continuously improved in order to promote the principles of good 
governance in the country. In this era, the Office of the Public Sector Development 
Commission (OPDC)19 was the main host organization (OPDC, 2003a). Its main roles 
and responsibilities were, for example, to serve the Public Sector Development 
Commission (PDC); analyze policy issues as assigned; monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of the structural reform plans of ministries and departments; and 
provide advice and suggestions to other government agencies aiming to meet the goals 
                                                          
19 The Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) is a non-departmental 
government agency under the Office of the Prime Minister established on 3rd October 2002, in 
accordance with Section 71/9 of the State Administration Act (Volume 5) B.E. 2545 (2002) (OPDC, 
2003a). 
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of bureaucratic reform, namely the greatest benefit for people through ensuring effective 
public outcomes and worthiness of government functions (OPDC, 2003a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 The major legislation and plans following the civil service reform in 2002 for 
delivering good governance in Thailand  
Source: Author’s construct adapted from Sathornkich (2013) and Suthapreda (2013) 
 
The OPDC has played a significant role in encouraging good governance in the Thai 
civil service since 2002 through the PA scheme based upon three main legislations and 
plans: the State Administration Act (Volume 5) B.E. 2545 (2002) Section 3/1, the Royal 
Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, B.E. 2546 (2003), and Public 
Sector Development Strategic Plans (5 year plan). Figure 8 depicts the legislation and 
plans after the civil service reform in 2002 for promoting good governance in Thailand. 
These contribute to PA of government agencies: central and provincial administrative 
agencies and academic institutions. This study however focuses on only the provincial 
administrative agencies. The importance of each legislation or plan can be described as 
follows: 
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State Administration Act (Volume 5) of 2002 Section 3/1 
The Public Administration Act of 2002 states two main objectives (OPDC, 2003b). 
Firstly, public administration must undertake the greatest public benefit by achieving 
results-based implementation, efficiency, value-for-money, work process and cycle time 
reduction, rightsizing and decentralization. Secondly, all government agencies must 
implement their duties based on the principles of good governance such as ensuring 
budget allocation in relation to the principles of increasing public participation, 
disclosing information, and monitoring and evaluating performance. These contribute 
to creating the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedure for Good Governance B.E. 2546 
(2003) as a guideline on public administration, directives and administrative procedures 
and government officers’ practices (OPDC, 2008b). 
 
Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, B.E. 2546 (2003) 
The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003) 
consists of nine major parts that prescribe the criteria and procedures for good 
governance (OPDC, 2003b). The first part is good governance, which refers to the 
administration required to meet seven targets: (1) responsiveness; (2) results-based 
management; (3) effectiveness and value for money; (4) lessening unnecessary steps of 
work; (5) reviewing missions to meet changing situations; (6) providing convenient and 
favourable services; and (7) regular evaluation. Furthermore, the eighth part in the 
Decree identifies the target concerning performance evaluation, for example the 
government agencies must ‘establish, under the rules, procedures and period as  
specified by PDC, an independent inspection committee in order to evaluate the 
performance of duties of the government agency related to the result of the mission, 
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quality of service, pleasure of customers, and value for money’ (OPDC, 2003b, p. 12). 
This is a vital reason leading all government agencies to performance evaluation, which 
has been managed by the OPDC from 2003 to date.  
 
Public Sector Development Strategic Plans 
The OPDC has created the public sector development strategic plans (5-year plan). 
There have been three plans from B.E. 2545 (2002) to the present, including B.E. 2546 - 
B.E. 2550 (2003 - 2007), B.E. 2551 - B.E. 2555 (2008 - 2012), and B.E. 2556 - B.E. 
2561 (2013-2018) (OPDC, 2003a, 2008a, 2015). The public sector development 
strategic plan B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003 - 2007)20 gave priority to the four key goals: 
‘service quality improvement, rightsizing, a high performance management relevant to 
the national budget, international standard work capacity and responsiveness to the 
democratic government’ (OPDC, 2008b, p. 16). Seven major strategies were identified 
to accomplish these goals: (1) re-engineer work processes; (2) restructure the framework 
and administration of public organizations; (3) reform financial and budgetary systems; 
(4) review the human resource management and compensation systems; (5) change 
management paradigms, culture and values; (6) modernize the public sector through e-
government system development; and (7) enlist public participation in the work of the 
government systems (OPDC, 2003a, p. 85).  
 
The public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2551 - B.E. 2555 (2008-2012)  states 
that ‘the Thai public sector system will strive to ensure the well-being of the citizens 
                                                          
20 The public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2546 - B.E. 2550 (2003-2007) was approved by the 
cabinet resolution of 19th May 2003 (OPDC, 2008b).  
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and to maintain the national interest through high capability on the part of its officials, 
who will have the capacity to learn and to adjust and respond to change, while at the 
same time exhibiting strong ethical values and operating under the principle of good 
governance’ (OPDC, 2008a, p. 3). It is comprised of four key strategies: (1) leveraging 
service and performance to respond to the sophisticated, diverse, and changing 
expectations and needs of citizens; (2) re-engineering work processes to achieve an 
integrated approach that generates coordination, networking, and public participation; (3) 
moving towards a high capability organization with professional manpower ready to 
learn, to innovate, and to adjust to shifting situations; and (4) creating an effective self-
monitoring system to ensure transparency, confidence, and cognizance of accountability. 
In the provincial administrative agencies, the assessment framework between 2008 and 
2012 included four main dimensions: (1) effectiveness of mission, (2) quality of service, 
(3) efficiency of performance, and (4) organizational development. 
 
The current public sector development strategic plan B.E. 2556 - B.E. 2561 (2013-2018) 
emphasizes alignment in accordance with the strategy of the country (OPDC, 2013b). 
The seven strategies of the current public sector development plan broadly fall  
under three pillars, to include organizational excellence (service excellence, high 
performance organization, public value, and integration); sustainable development 
(collaboration and integrity); and moving towards becoming international (readiness for 
ASEAN B.E. 2558) (Charoensuk, 2014; OPDC, 2013b). The performance evaluation 
framework from 2004 to 2011 comprised four dimensions: effectiveness of mission, 
quality of service, efficiency of performance and organizational development. The 
purpose of each dimension are explained in Table 2.  
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Table 2 The purpose of the four dimensions of the performance evaluation framework 
at the provincial administration from 2004 to 2011 
Dimension 1 Effectiveness of mission Dimension 2 Quality of service 
Focused on the end results to be 
delivered by provinces and provincial 
clusters. Each one had to specify its 
strategic plan and targets, giving primary 
importance to the greatest benefits to the 
public, to the needs and interests of the 
people, and to economic and social 
prosperity. 
Focused on the findings that had to be taken 
into account of citizen surveys on the quality 
of public sector service delivery. Each 
province had to improve the quality of its 
services, emphasizing responsiveness to 
citizens’ interests, public participation, 
prevention of corruption, and an increased 
level of transparency. 
Dimension 3 Efficiency of performance Dimension 4 Organizational development 
Focused on the standardization of process 
improvement.  For example, each 
province was expected to improve the 
efficiency of its budget management 
process, reduce costs, and maximize the 
usage of energy. 
Focused on human resource development, 
quality management, information technology 
management, and regulatory management.  
The emphasis in this dimension was on 
internal development, which was the key 
enabling factor for the achievement of 
ministry strategies. 
Source: Adapted from OPDC (2008a, p. 2-53 - 2-54) 
 
The assessment framework of the provincial administration was changed in 2012, so  
that four dimensions are categorized into two main perspectives: external and internal 
perspectives (Sathornkich, 2013). The external perspective consists of dimensions of 
effectiveness and service quality, while the internal perspective comprises dimensions 
of efficiency and organizational development.  
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Table 3 The assessment framework of the provincial administration 
 
Perspectives 
 
Dimensions 
Fiscal Year 
B.E. 2556 
(2013) 
B.E. 2557 
(2014) 
B.E. 2558 
(2015) 
B.E. 2559 
(2016) 
External  Effectiveness 60% 60% 65% 70% 
Service quality 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Internal  Efficiency 15% 10% 10% 10% 
Organizational 
development 
15% 20% 15% 10% 
Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: OPDC (2012, 2014, 2015) and Mangkarothai (2016) 
 
Table 3 reflects that the percentage of each dimension varies in each fiscal year. PA of 
the fiscal year B.E. 2559 (2016) focuses on dimensions of effectiveness of over 70%. 
The KPIs within each dimension have been changed in each fiscal year. The reasons are 
based on the government’s important policies and consistency between the strategy  
of the country and of provincial clusters 21  and provincial development plans 
(Mangkarothai, 2016; OPDC, 2015). The guidelines of PA for the provincial 
administration in the current fiscal years are set out in the next section. However, 
although the performance evaluation framework was changed in 2012, it has been used 
to date. The four dimensions and the key concept of delivering good governance have 
been maintained. 
 
 
                                                          
21 Provincial cluster refers to 18 provincial clusters (included total 75 provinces) created based on the 
area-based approach (e.g. potential, development requirement, and benefit of that area) and 
participatory governance approach (e.g. consultation and public hearing process for provincial 
development planning), in accordance with the State Administration Act 2007 and the Integrated 
Provincial Planning and Clustering Decree 2008 (promulgated on 25 December 2008) (Ministry of 
Interior, 2010, OPDC, 2008b).  
 
 
91 
 
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the four dimensions of the performance 
evaluation framework and the key components of good governance, with each 
dimension including many KPIs that reflect the key components of good governance. 
For example, dimension 1 includes a menu of KPIs such as quality of tourism and 
preparation for good agricultural practice (GAP) for the provincial clusters and 
provinces. They can make the decision to choose some of the KPIs, around 1-5, based 
on their action plans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 9 The four dimensions of the performance evaluation framework in relation to the key 
components of good governance 
Source: Author’s construct adapted from OPDC (2008b, 2015) 
 
The provincial members of the clusters need to cooperate to achieve the KPIs as part of 
the overall result of the provinces. Meanwhile, the provinces have to perform their own 
chosen KPIs. From dimensions 2 to 4, they consist of compulsory indicators for  
all provinces. Each dimension comprises the KPIs as follows: dimension 2, e.g. 
satisfaction of services and prevention of corruption; dimension 3, e.g. expenditure of 
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budget and reduction of process time of services; and dimension 4, e.g. quality of  
public management (see detail of the KPIs in Appendix 6). 
 
3.5 Performance agreement (PA) in provincial administration 
There are 75 provinces that committed to PA between B.E. 2547 (2004) and  
B.E. 2554 (2011). The total number of provinces that engaged with PA has been 76 
since 2012. It is important to note that the study considered information on PA of 75 
provinces into 18 provincial clusters between B.E. 2550 (2007) and B.E. 2554 (2011) 
for sampling appropriate provinces for the study (see Appendix 7: 7.1). This is because 
the results of PA represent the most up-to-date information at the time of carrying out 
the current study. Moreover, the information solicited was based on the same 
performance evaluation framework. 
 
Figure 10 depicts that there are three main types of government agencies at provincial 
administration level with relevance to PA: the central government agencies, provincial 
agencies and local government agencies. The current study focuses on the agencies that 
are related to PA at the provincial level: the central government agencies at provincial 
administration level and the provincial agencies (see Appendix 7: 7.2).  
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Figure 10 The structure of provincial administration 
Source: OPDC (2013a, 2010) and Mektrairat (2007)  
Note: The structure focuses on the agencies in relevance to PA as the KPI host 
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The number of central government agencies at provincial administration differs and 
depends on the size of the provinces (Mektrairat, 2007). Meanwhile, the provincial 
agencies are established in all provinces, except for the Provincial Office of Tourism 
and Sport (31 provinces and provincial cluster) and the Provincial Prison (50 provinces) 
(OPDC, 2013a). The total number of key agencies who are often appointed to be KPI 
hosts in a province comprise at least 35 provincial agencies as illustrated in Figure 10. 
The Provincial Governor’s Office is the main provincial agency established in every 
province and that is responsible as a secretariat of the Governor and a coordinator  
among the agencies within a province.  
 
The provincial agencies are not the only crucial part in implementing PA in the province, 
but also the central government agencies at provincial administration level. The variety 
of agencies in a province appears to contribute to several challenges for implementing 
PA. For example, the officers of the central agencies at provincial administration level 
are appointed, promoted and relocated by their parent ministries or departments 
(Sathornkich, 2010). Consequently, the provincial Governor frequently copes with 
various challenges of integrated collaboration in the provinces such as a lack of 
efficiency and a deficient unity (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2015).  
 
The provincial agencies in each province are required to perform the provincial KPIs as 
main or second KPI host agencies, while they are allocated responsibilities depending 
on the correlation between their main tasks and the KPIs. In each KPI host agency, the 
chief of agencies or managers of departments are viewed as the KPI director (senior 
managers), whilst the agencies’ members who are responsible for the KPIs are viewed 
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as data collectors (practitioners). The KPI host agencies are required to monitor and 
assess their performance and generate self-assessment reports (SAR) at the ends of the 
sixth, ninth and twelfth months depending upon agreement. These reports are required 
to be delivered to the OPDC by official document and online report called electronic 
self-assessment report (e-SAR). At the end of the fiscal year, provincial performance is 
evaluated by the team of the OPDC and outsourced to dependent inspectors at sites in 
terms of the correlation between their self-assessment report and their genuine 
performance. Then the results of PA of all provinces are offered to the Public Sector 
Development Commission (PDC) for approval. 
 
Monetary incentive 
Allocations of monetary reward to the provinces are based on the organization’s PA 
results (or scores) and the total salary paid to officials within an organization (OPDC, 
2009; Sathornkich, 2013). It is a one-time payment, and is not included in salary-based 
pay and will not be forwarded to the retirement pension plan (Sathornkich, 2013). The 
eligible organizations are those that achieve performance scores of more than 3.00 from 
total scores of 5.00, while the eligible individuals are those who contribute to the 
achievements in their respective organizations. 
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Creating performance agreement (PA) in provincial administration 
The procedures for creating performance agreement (PA) in the Thai public sector and 
in the provincial administration are described in this section. Figure 11 demonstrates  
the process of creating PA in the Thai public sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 The process of creating performance agreement (PA) in the Thai public sector 
Source: Sathornkich (2013) 
 
The process of PA consists of three main steps: strategy formulation, performance 
agreement implementation, and performance measurement. In the current study, this 
process is seen as PA or performance evaluation or performance measurement because 
such terms as ‘performance assessment’, ‘performance evaluation’, ‘performance 
review’, ‘performance management’, and ‘performance appraisal’ refer to the process 
where the work performance of an employee is assessed (Vallance and Fellow, 1999).  
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Figure 12 The guideline of creating performance agreement (PA) in the provincial administration 
Source: OPDC (2015) 
 
Regarding the particular process of creating PA in the provincial administration, which 
is set out in Figure 12, this shows that the OPDC bears responsibility, as the main host, 
for carrying out the procedures from the identifying assessment framework, producing 
KPIs, negotiating and producing PA, monitoring and evaluating an organization’s 
performance, and allocating financial reward22 to the provinces.  
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Financial rewards have been allocated in the Thai public sector since fiscal year B.E. 2547 (2004)  
(OPDC, 2009). 
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Challenges of PA in provincial administration 
This section sets out the challenges of PA in the provincial administration. Some 
scholars (e.g.  Sathornkich, 2013; Srimai, 2015) revealed that there are problems in the 
context of PA at the provincial level in Thailand. Figure 13 shows the constraints in the 
process of PA in the Thai public sector. This is the result of research on the impacts of 
PA and incentives for improving work efficiency proposed by the National Institute of 
Development Administration (2008 cited in Sathornkich, 2013). It can be seen that there 
are two major categories of PA constraints, personnel factors and environment and system 
factors, at play. Personnel factors may include inappropriate skills, issues about pay (lack 
of trust in reward management) and transparency. Regarding environment and system 
factors, these refer to characteristics such as inefficient work coordination, insufficient 
budget/resources and inaccurate performance evaluation. 
 
Furthermore, Srimai (2015) suggested that two main problems occur in implementing 
PA at the provincial level. Firstly, PA are seen as a control system and have contributed 
to the provinces’ view that they were being forced to be accountable for the KPIs and 
targets that are uncontrolled. Meanwhile, using control systems was affected by a lack 
of available data and management information system (MIS). Secondly, PA and its KPIs 
and its targets are considered to produce several problems, for instance some KPIs were 
difficult to understand and were unachievable. 
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Figure 13 Summary of the constraints in the process of PA in the Thai public sector 
Source: National Institute of Development Administration (2008 cited in Sathornkich, 2013) 
 
3.6 Summary 
Thailand presents a very specific configuration of politics, national culture and values, 
which differs from other Southeast Asian countries, perhaps as a result of never having 
been colonized. A diverse range of determinants have influenced its culture, including 
monarchy, religion (Buddhism), and a mixed-culture acquired from neighbouring 
countries (India, China, and Cambodia). As stated earlier, a review of literature 
suggested that the public sector culture may be based on a balance between three factors: 
political culture, national culture, and bureaucratic culture (e.g. the civil service culture) 
as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14 Public sector culture in Thailand based on a balance between bureaucratic culture, 
political culture, and national culture 
Source: Author’s construct 
 
Political culture can influence the national culture (Hofstede, 1981) and bureaucratic 
culture – political influence can dominate the civil service (Nikomborirak, 2007). 
Meanwhile, the national culture has a strong impact on the civil service bureaucratic 
culture, such as shaping the value systems and behaviour of a major groups of the 
population, and officials (Hofstede, 2001; Komin, 1990; Rokeach, 1970). Thus, 
bureaucracy is viewed as the heart of a nation’s state machinery (Nikomborirak, 2007).  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research design and methodology 
underpinning this study, which includes the collection and analysis of data to answer 
the research questions. The chapter is structured into eight sections. It starts with 
research philosophy in section 4.2, and then discusses research design in section 4.3. 
There follows research methodology in section 4.4, including a discussion on 
quantitative research, qualitative research, and mixed-methods, and sampling cases. The 
research approach is discussed in section 4.5 and then data collection in section 4.6. It 
moves on to data analysis and interpretation in section 4.7, regarding quantitative and 
qualitative data analysis. The next section (4.8) discusses research ethics. The final 
section (4.9) provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
 
4.2 Research philosophy  
This study aimed to examine the relationship between organizational culture and good 
governance that is viewed through the lens of the PA scheme. The study is therefore 
concerned with organizational culture, which can be viewed as ‘objective reality’ 
(Denscombe, 2010b, p. 119) and ‘objective social entities’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 32, 34). 
Organizational culture is viewed as objective reality, i.e. ‘something an institution is’ 
(Christiensen et al., 2007, p. 43). Meanwhile, organizational culture is also considered 
as objective entity in that it has cognitive (to do with thinking), affective (to do with 
feeling) and behavioural characteristics (Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 141). The 
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implication is that organizational culture – the pattern of, for example, beliefs, values, 
and behaviour identified by theorists (Brown, 1998) – can be understood by 
postpositivist and constructivist (interpretivist) approaches. A postpositivist approach 
allows a researcher to start with a theory, then gather data that either refutes or supports 
the theory; the postpositivist assumption holds true more for quantitative research than 
for qualitative research (Creswell, 2014). Phillips and Burbules (2000) stated that 
postpositivism demonstrates the thinking after positivism. Positivism is based on 
ontological assumptions about the nature of social reality and epistemological 
assumptions about how best to create knowledge about social reality (Denscombe, 
2010b).  
 
In contrast, an interpretivist approach – known as constructivism (Gray, 2004), is often 
applied in qualitative research. Interpretivist or constructivist approaches enable 
researchers to understand meanings of the world from the participants’ perspectives  
and through their experiences of the situation being studied (Creswell, 2014). For 
example, qualitative research can use open-ended questions to elicit opinions from the 
participants (Crotty, 1998 cited in Creswell, 2014). Creswell (2014) also states that 
constructivist researchers typically address the specific context in studying culture and 
they attempt to understand the meanings of phenomena by their interpretation rather 
than by starting with a theory.  
 
In the study of organizational culture, it is valid and useful to employ a dual approach, 
combining postpositivist and interpretivist approaches. A philosophical underpinning 
for the current study seems to be closest to the pragmatic approach, which focuses on 
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mixed methods to understand the problem (Creswell, 2014; Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and 
Turner, 2007; Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). This philosophy leads the current study 
to both deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive process starts with theories 
and is usually associated with quantitative research, whilst the inductive process 
contributes to developing theories and is usually associated with qualitative research 
(Bryman, 2012).  
 
The deductive approach is represented through an analytical framework, in Chapter Two 
section 2.4.3, which draws on the CVF or the OCAI and previous studies to guide the 
collection of data using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The theoretical 
approach also enables the analysis of data, namely analyzing quantitative data based on 
the CVF or the OCAI and analyzing qualitative data based on theory. The inductive 
approach is employed in analyzing qualitative data by coding based on data. The mixed 
methods research is discussed in section 4.4.1. 
 
4.3 Research design 
Research design is a prior stage before identifying any specific method. Its function is 
‘to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as 
unambiguously as possible’ (De Vaus, 2001, p. 9). Gorard (2013) emphasizes that the 
generated evidence should be based on the research questions. Therefore, the selection 
of an appropriate research design for this study was based on the research questions and 
cautiously considered the advantages of each type of research design. There are diverse 
types of research design provided by scholars. This section focuses on five dominant 
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research designs, comprising experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, case study and 
comparative designs (Bryman, 2012, p. 45).  
 
Experimental design 
Experimental design is concerned with establishing a causal relationship between 
variables (Shuttleworth, 2008). Two variables are focused on: the independent variable 
(the cause/intervention) and the dependent variable (outcome) (De Vaus, 2001). The 
research questions or hypotheses are tested (Gray, 2004). The context within the 
experiment being conducted means it should be possible to assign subjects to conditions, 
which is important for the rigour of the experimental design (Gray, 2004; De Vaus, 
2001). The experimental design is perhaps not appropriate for examining organizational 
culture – underlying assumptions (Schein, 1990) – as it is complex and also due to the 
diverse opinions of people in a phenomenon being studied.  
 
Cross-sectional design 
Cross-sectional designs are probably the most broadly employed designs in social 
research (De Vaus, 2001), as they are often seen as survey designs (Bryman, 2012). 
They emphasize a snapshot of a population at a single point in time, establish more  
than one case, provide quantitative data and examine relationships between variables 
(Bryman, 2012). Such cross-sectional designs are useful to describe changes over time 
(Gorard, 2013). A cross-sectional design allows participants to recall details about  
a past situation that is being studied, which is consistent with this study in that it requires 
participant recall about the PA scheme between 2007 and 2011. However, its feature is 
not based on random allocation (De Vaus, 2001), but it is a snapshot sample that is 
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established at a fixed point in chronological time (Kaplan, 1997). This is perhaps not 
applicable to this study, as it requires selection of potential participants in each level – 
province, agency, and individual – by a combination of multi-stage, stratified and 
purposive sampling relevant to the research questions. 
 
Longitudinal design 
Longitudinal design is slightly different from cross-sectional design (Bryman, 2012), 
namely because cross-sectional design data is gathered in a single time period whilst 
longitudinal design data is collected for two or more time periods (Menard, 2008).  
It refers to the study of change and development over time (Gray, 2004) by the 
comparison of the difference between samples over a long period. However, this 
research does not focus on distinguishing organizational culture over a long period of 
time but on the comparison of organizational culture between two different groups – the 
low and high KPI scoring provinces – in a single period of time. Therefore, longitudinal 
design is perhaps far from the answer for the research questions in this study.  
 
Case study design 
Case study design contributes to generating knowledge of an individual, group, and 
organization and to understand complex social phenomena, in particular the nature of  
the case in question (Bryman, 2012; Yin, 2002). The case study can help to answer 
‘how’ and ‘what’ questions (Yin, 2002). This is compatible with the research question 
of this study. Case study design has been extensively used in empirical studies of 
organizational culture, for example Phookpan (2012), and Adenan et al. (2013). Many 
features of case study design are close to examining the relationship between 
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organizational culture and performance (good governance) of public organizations. 
Firstly, case study is a useful design for studying organizations, particularly public 
organizations (Hakim, 1987). Secondly, case study design can elicit information on 
various issues of an organization (e.g. organizational performance, policy analysis, and 
relationships between different organizations) (Bryman, 1989; Gray, 2004; Geertz, 1973 
cited in Stark and Torrance, 2005), and provide in-depth and detailed information of a 
case and of causal relationships between subjects and issues (Brewerton and Millward, 
2001; Gray, 2004; Kumar, 2011; Patton, 1990).  
 
Thirdly, case study design allows researchers to employ multiple methods and data 
sources to collect data within a single study (Bryman, 1989; Hakim, 1987; Kumar, 2011; 
Stark and Torrance, 2005). Here the case study approach is associated with a variety of 
evidence such as documents, interviews and observations (Yin, 2002). This may make 
it difficult to interpret data because it produces a massive amount of evidence (a volume 
of documentation), which makes data analysis time-consuming and difficult (Brewerton 
and Millward, 2001; Gray, 2004; Yin, 2002). Moreover, the case study design has been 
criticized by scholars in terms of a lack of rigour and a difficulty in providing scientific 
generalization (Yin, 2002). A lack of rigour in the case study is concerning because it 
does not follow systematic procedures and may influence the direction of the findings 
and conclusions (De Vaus, 2001; Yin, 2002). In challenging the scope for scientific 
generalization, the case study design is not statistical, instead it is analytical (Johansson, 
2003). This may make it hard to accept that a single case can be representative of the 
wider population. However, Bryman (1989) and Yin (2002) argued that using multiple 
case studies can enhance the range of cases of the same issue or phenomenon.  
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Comparative design 
Comparative design is established based on a systematic process, to explore similarities 
and differences between two or more cases at the same time (Berg-Schlosser, 2001; 
Bryman, 2012; Dixon, Bouma and Atkinson, 1987; May, 2010; Warwick and Osherson, 
1973). This is consistent with the purpose of this study, which requires comparison of 
organizational culture, particularly between the high and low KPI scoring provinces. 
Comparative design is not only used to compare the characteristics of two or more cases, 
but allows the use of more or less identical methods such as case studies and statistical 
analysis (Berg-Schlosser, 2001; Bryman, 2012). This may lead to theories about 
contrasting findings (Bryman, 2012).  
 
In the context of cultural study, comparative design is widely used to describe and 
understand culture because it can explain, for example, people’s relations, cultural 
impediments to implementing policy and how good the results are (Hantrais, 2009; May, 
2010). Although comparative design provides several advantages, such as facilitating 
the comparison of two or more cases, generating theory, and allowing researchers to use 
multiple methods, some scholars (e.g. Dyer and Wilkins, 1991 cited in Bryman, 2012; 
May, 2010; Warwick and Osherson, 1973) claim that comparative study in cross-
cultural research is concerned with meaning-equivalence (e.g. a specific concept for a 
particular culture, a result of a questionnaire’s validity, and problems of translation) and 
losing the researchers’ attention of the specific context.  
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Selection of research design 
Each type of research design has different purposes and advantages. I cautiously 
considered which types of research designs are suitable for answering the research 
questions of this study. A review of the literature on research design suggests that case 
study and comparative designs are closest for enabling the examination of the 
relationship between organizational culture and performance in the Thai civil service. 
The case study design was chosen based on three main reasons. Firstly, it is appropriate 
to study the performance of the public organizations. This can be observed through  
a number of empirical studies on organizational culture that used the case study 
approach, including in particular case studies of the Thai public sector (e.g. Jingjit and 
Fotaki, 2010; Pimpa, 2012). Secondly, it allows researchers to elicit the views of people 
in a particular phenomenon being studied in breadth (by surveys) and in-depth and  
in detail (by interviews). For example, surveys through multiple cases provide  
an important alternative to random sampling and facilitate generalization (Hakim, 
1987); and provide a basis for a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
(Bryman, 1988; Darlington and Scott, 2002). Thirdly, it permits triangulation and greater 
validity of research findings.  
 
Comparative design has been selected for three main reasons. Firstly, it facilitates 
analysis of many cases in a single study - in this case cultural determinants of 
performance could only be assessed through the study of low and high KPI scoring 
provinces. Secondly, it can help researchers to understand the culture of an organization 
through in-depth measurement at the individual level in different places against  
a common framework, which is useful for a topic such as culture where all values are 
 
 
109 
 
relative (Hantrais, 2009). Thirdly, the comparative study enables researchers to compare 
the findings obtained from both quantitative and qualitative sources for an overall 
conclusion (Harkness, Vijver and Mohler, 2003). 
 
4.4 Research methodology 
4.4.1 Selection of research method 
A research method is a technique for collecting data with relevance to a specific 
instrument, such as a self-completion questionnaire and a semi-structured interview 
schedule (Bryman, 2001). There are three main categories of data collection method: 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. Selecting research methods should be 
determined by the hypotheses or research questions (Matthews and Ross, 2010), which 
means researchers can use more than one data collection method in a single study. This 
section discusses the appropriate choice of methods employed for collecting data to 
address the research questions.   
 
Quantitative methods 
Quantitative methods refer to collecting data based on systematic and standardized 
designs (Kumar, 2011). Quantitative methods provide quantifiable data, such as 
numerical data and name codes (Blaikie, 2000; Kumar, 2011; Matthews and Ross, 
2010). Using quantitative methods provides advantages in three main aspects: collection 
of data, analysis of data and reliability of data.  
 
For collecting data, it allows researchers to measure the responses of a large number of 
people and to generalize based on the findings (Patton, 1990). It follows conventional 
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standards of reliability and validity, which is different from qualitative research as this 
is often focused on a single context (Burns, 2000). Bryman (2001) claimed that 
quantitative research draws on the view of positivism that a standard device based  
on the principles of the scientific methods can apply to all phenomena, but in fact 
phenomena in the investigation is different in the real world in practice because  
of different contexts. Bryman also argued that quantitative research emphasizes 
administering research instruments to subjects or controlling situations to determine 
their effects. For instance, survey respondents may answer questions by using their 
knowledge, sense of similarity and importance in their everyday life. Collecting data in 
the context of a cultural and behavioural study appears to be a controversial issue.  
 
A critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas, claimed that social research based on the scientific 
model is inappropriate to study the behaviour of people (Hall and Hall, 1996). Likewise, 
Hakim (1987) stated that qualitative research is more appropriate to study individuals’ 
attitudes, motivations and behaviour than quantitative research, because it provides 
descriptive reports of individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and feelings. 
Although many scholars have criticized the use of quantitative research for studying 
culture and behaviour, many empirical studies (e.g. Jingjit, 2008; Parker and Bradley, 
2000) used quantitative methods, particularly questionnaire surveys, whilst qualitative 
methods (interview) were perhaps used to eliminate the weaknesses of the questionnaire 
surveys.  
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Regarding analyzing data, quantitative research is based on standardized measures in 
order to facilitate the analysis of data in the form of statistical analysis, for example 
answering research questions or testing hypotheses by comparison and statistical 
aggregation of the data (Matthews and Ross, 2010; Patton, 1990).  
 
The most commonly employed quantitative method is surveys. There are two main types 
of survey research: self-completion questionnaire (supervised, postal, and internet) and 
structured interview (face to face and telephone) (Bryman, 2012).  The questionnaire is 
probably one of the most broadly used methods in surveys (Gray, 2004; Matthews and 
Ross, 2010). A questionnaire is a written list of questions where respondents provide 
answers based on their interpretation (Kumar, 2011), which produces many types of 
data, such as behavioural and attitudinal data (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). This 
confirms that questionnaire surveys may be used for studying culture.  
 
There are four types of questionnaires: self-completion (no researcher present), self-
completion in a group (with researcher present), interview (face to face), and interview 
by telephone (Hall and Hall, 1996). Self-completion questionnaires are perhaps 
appropriate for examining organizational culture in terms of eliminating interviewer 
effects (e.g. bias from the interviewer asking questions in different ways); facilitating 
respondents to complete a questionnaire as the respondents wish; and being cheaper  
and quicker than interviews (Bryman, 1989, 2012). Moreover, self-completion questionnaires 
enable researchers to collect data from potential respondents over a wide geographical 
area (Kumar, 2011). It is therefore appropriate for the current study, which requires data 
to be collected from many public organizations in four regions of Thailand. 
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Qualitative methods 
Qualitative research differs from quantitative research in many aspects, such as the 
construction of method, research strategy, and data analysis. Qualitative research tends 
to rely on little theory and, as a result, it permits the researcher to employ unstructured 
and non-sequential conduct with little usage of theory and no hypotheses (Bryman, 
1989; Kumar, 2011). Qualitative research frequently starts with defining very general 
concepts, in contrast with quantitative research that begins with theories and concepts 
(Brannen, 1992; Bryman, 1988). Qualitative research is flexible regarding research 
strategy because it allows researchers to use different types of data collection 
approaches, methodologies and philosophies (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). For data 
analysis, qualitative research does not rely on statistics, but rather on context and the 
interpretation of observations involving individuals’ perception of situations in order to 
capture individual definitions, descriptions, and meaning of events (Bryman, 1989; 
Burns, 2000). Thus, qualitative methods are appropriate to explore meanings of people 
in a phenomenon being studied in various aspects such as stories, accounts, and 
individual’s values, attitudes, beliefs, feelings, perceptions and behaviour (Blaikie, 
2000; Burns, 2000; Hakim, 1987; Kumar, 2011; Matthews and Ross, 2010).  
 
Qualitative research has many merits. For example, it can help researchers to 
increasingly understand participants’ perspectives or processes of social life through 
investigating in-depth and in detail within a small number of people and cases (Hakim, 
1987; McQueen and Knussen, 2002; Patton, 1990). Although qualitative methods 
decrease generalizability (Patton, 1990), they can explain contexts and inform more 
structured or quantitative studies (Hakim, 1987; McQueen and Knussen, 2002).  
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However, qualitative methods have been criticized in terms of reliability and validity.   
Qualitative research relies on the researchers’ skills and abilities, which is not 
acknowledged in quantitative research (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). The researchers 
can carry out research based on their own cultural assumptions and data (Brannen, 1992) 
because it is possible that the flexibility and lack of control in qualitative studies makes 
it difficult to check the researchers’ bias (Kumar, 2011). Nevertheless, scholars have 
proposed various ways to ensure the reliability and validity of qualitative methods, such 
as enhancing the skill, competence, sensitivity, integrity and rigour of the researcher 
doing fieldwork. Bryman (2012) suggests that qualitative research can be conducted 
based on criteria to assess research in a similar way to quantitative research. For 
example, using several strategies can contribute to external reliability (e.g. using more 
than one observer and integrating identification). Moreover, qualitative methods may be 
combined with quantitative methods. Using several methods can enabling checking of 
result, or triangulation – combining more than one method, data source, or observer in 
the study of social phenomena (Bryman, 2012; Patton, 1990; 2002).  
 
Among the three sources, interviewing is a major instrument in qualitative research. 
Interviewing allows researchers to elicit information, opinions, feelings, values, 
attitudes and the meanings that underpin people’s lives and behaviours by asking 
questions on the issues being studied (Bryman, 1989; Corbetta, 2003; Gray, 2004; 
Matthews and Ross, 2010; Patton, 1987). Hence, interviewing is appropriate for 
studying organizational culture. Other advantages of interviewing are that it may lead 
to predictions of change through oral history, talking and respondents’ suggestions (Hall 
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and Hall, 1996); and it can be combined with other approaches in a multi-method design, 
such as questionnaires and observation (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). 
 
There are three major forms of interview: structured, unstructured and semi-structured 
(Burns, 2000). Firstly, structured interviews involve a prescribed set of questions, which 
an interviewer asks in the same wording and order of questions as specified in the 
interview schedule (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Bryman, 2012; Kumar, 2011). 
Therefore, structured interviews provide uniform information that facilitates the 
comparability of data (Kumar, 2011). Participants tend to be controlled more than in 
unstructured interviews, where they are free to tell their story in their own way 
(Matthews and Ross, 2010, p. 220). Structured interviews may be inflexible to elicit 
perspectives of people in the project being studied and may be far from getting 
information to answer the research questions of the current study.  
 
Secondly, unstructured interviews focus on a wide area of discussions and enable 
participants to answer questions within their own frame of reference (Matthews and 
Ross, 2010; May, 2010). Therefore, unstructured interviews allow flexibility for 
researchers to order content, structure and questions as they wish (Kumar, 2011). The 
researchers may be challenged, for example by getting deviating data from the 
interviewees’ perspective or their understanding of the topic (Bryman, 1988); leading to 
a chance of losing the desired issues; being time-consuming due to interviewees’ being 
free to give answers; and requiring high level of interviewing skill of researchers 
(Brewerton and Millward, 2001).   
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Thirdly, semi-structured interviews incorporate elements of both quantifiable and 
qualifiable, fixed-choice responding and the facility in describing in greater detail 
(Kumar, 2011). This helps the researcher to explore, and probe in more depth 
information by asking additional questions to solicit greater detail and understanding of 
the interviewees’ point of view (Brewerton and Millward, 2001; Bryman, 2001; Gray, 
2004). Using semi-structured interviews provides many merits, such as being flexible 
and having a more natural conversation than with a structured interview (Hall and Hall, 
1996); seeking elaboration and clarification on the data provided (May, 2010); and 
ensuring validity due to the use of open-questions to receive the respondents’ real 
perception (Burns, 2000). Therefore, semi-structured interviews are the closest for 
receiving a variety of perspectives from respondents on the PA scheme, because 
interview circumstances may be flexible and they can share their experiences without 
controlled orientation. 
 
There are two main forms of interviewing: in-depth and focus group interviews. In-
depth interviews provide an understanding of the interviewee’s underlying point of view 
by using open-ended questions, listening to and recording the answers, which provides 
in-depth detail of the interviewees’ values, attitudes, perception of their environment 
and their experience (Burns, 2000). Using in-depth interviews facilitates the collection 
of information from people who are experts on their own experience (Hall and Hall, 
1996). This seems to be close to the intent of the current study, which focuses on senior 
managers who have a lot of experience of bureaucracy and performance evaluation 
schemes, such as the chief of the agencies. Focus group interviews enable researchers 
to understand ‘why people feel the way they do’ (Bryman, 2001, p. 338) by exploring 
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people’s opinions, beliefs, values, attitudes, discourses and understandings of issues as 
being valid in their own right (Brewerton and Millward, 2001). Focus group interviews 
should be neither too large nor too small (eight to ten people) (Kumar, 2011). Using 
focus groups may be a useful tool for identifying issues regarding how practitioners 
think and how they perform the PA scheme. 
 
Mixed methods  
Mixed methods research focuses on collecting, analyzing and mixing both qualitative 
and quantitative methods in a single study, known as a research design (Creswell and 
Clark, 2007). The combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single 
study provides a range of different types of data by using different methods in order to 
generate a well-integrated picture of what is happening in the area of interest and to get 
a better understanding of the research questions than could be acquired from either 
approach alone (Creswell and Clark, 2007; Matthews and Ross, 2010).  
 
Darlington and Scott (2002) state that there are five main purposes of using mixed 
methods: triangulation, complementarity, development, initiation and expansion. In 
particular, triangulation is often seen in a number of pieces of literature on mixed 
methods. Triangulation is to compare and integrate data collected from using more than 
one method in a single study by seeking convergence of results in order to understand 
the research problem and enhance the credibility of the research findings (Creswell and 
Clark, 2007; Darlington and Scott, 2002; Hesse-Biber, 2010; Patton, 2002). However, 
using triangulation has various challenges, such as a high requirement of effort and 
expertise, difficulty in integrating evidence produced and contradiction between 
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quantitative and qualitative results (Brannen, 1992; Creswell and Clark, 2007; 
Darlington and Scott, 2002). The different data generated by both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches should not be considered as a problem, but needs further work 
that may provide a better understanding of what is happening. Brannen (1992) also 
suggested that differences in findings are not expected to be consistent but they are seen 
to be complementary.  
 
Some scholars (e.g. Bryman, 1988; Darlington and Scott, 2002) propose that there are  
at least three types of mixed methods: (1) qualitative then quantitative – qualitative 
methods produce hypotheses to test quantitatively or to develop research instruments; 
(2) quantitative then qualitative – quantitative methods provide statistically representative 
data that provides a basis for the sampling of cases and comparison groups that form  
the intensive study and are then followed up by more in-depth analysis using qualitative 
methods; and (3) qualitative and quantitative concurrently – both approaches are given 
equal emphasis, which results in two separate but linked studies and integrates the 
methods in the one study. This is done by using triangulation, complementarity, 
combination of qualitative and quantitative. 
 
Among the three types of mixed methods, quantitative then qualitative appears to be the 
most appropriate approach to the current study, which is related to a large number of 
cases or people. Using a quantitative approach can also facilitate the selection of the 
interesting cases for the interview approach, which can be called quantitative then 
qualitative.  
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Selection of research method 
As stated earlier, a review of the literature on research methods suggests that the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in the same study allows access to 
different levels of reality (Bryman, 1989; Patton, 1990), particularly in ethnographic 
studies of organizational culture. In this area, qualitative methods are not the only 
approach employed, but quantitative methods can also be used in mixed-methods. Thus, 
it can be observed that many organizational culture studies have used mixed-methods, 
for example Zammuto and Krakower (1991), Ehtesham et al. (2011), Hofstede (1990), 
Parker and Bradley (2000), Al-Kuwari (2002), and Jingjit and Fotaki (2010). This 
research focuses on investigating organizational culture and civil service performance 
of the provincial administration in Thailand. The use of quantitative methods is 
considered to be appropriate for a wide geographical area and collected data can be 
analyzed by statistical methods and compared. Meanwhile, using qualitative methods 
enable the eliciting of underlying assumption, by definition, of life. Here the strength of 
one method offsets the weakness in the other method (Blaikie, 2010). Thus, a mixed 
methods approach is closest for answering the research questions.   
 
Using a self-completion questionnaire survey, known as a major instrument of the 
quantitative method, provides many benefits for this study. Firstly, it permits the 
researcher to measure the reactions of a large number of people or to collect data over a 
wide geographical area by using a limited set of questions in order to attain a 
generalizable set of findings (Kumar, 2011; Patton, 2001). This facilitates the study of 
organizational culture among civil servants across 75 provinces in four regions of 
Thailand. The self-completion questionnaires (post) can eliminate interviewer effects, 
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such as biases and pressure from the interviewer (Bryman, 2012). Secondly, the standard 
questions of the OCAI have been extensively used by many empirical studies on 
organizational culture (e.g. Howard, 1998; Ralston et al., 2006). Thirdly, quantitative 
findings can be replicated and retested (Kumar, 2011) due to being based on structured 
features. Finally, the quantitative method can be used to develop the qualitative phase, 
which helps to identify groups of particular interest in order to undertake in-depth 
analysis using qualitative methods (Darlington and Scott, 2002).  
 
Regarding qualitative methods, a semi-structured interview is considered suitable for 
the current study for three main reasons. Firstly, it elicits information in order to 
understand several issues in-depth and in detail with a small number of people and cases 
(Patton, 2002), for example, feelings, beliefs, values, attitudes, perceptions and 
experiences (Kumar, 2011). Secondly, it is a flexible approach that permits the 
participants to talk about topics or a set of questions in their own way (Matthews and 
Ross, 2010). Moreover, it can be used in conjunction with other research techniques, 
such as surveys, to follow up issues (Gray, 2004), in particular important sources of 
required information. This facilitates a combination between the semi-structured 
interview and questionnaire survey in this study.   
 
4.4.2 Sampling cases 
Sampling is an important procedure because it determines representative samples of a 
wider population about which generalizations will be made (Bryman, 2012; Gray, 2004; 
Warwick and Osherson, 1973). The objective of this study was to generate findings of 
relevance to the civil servants (senior managers and practitioners) in the provincial 
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administration of Thailand as a whole. The findings of this research would represent the 
overall picture of the relationship between organizational culture and performance in 
delivering good governance within the PA scheme, particularly at the provincial level 
in Thailand. 
 
There are two main techniques of sampling: probability or random sampling and non-
probability or non-random or purposive sampling (Denscombe, 2010a; Gray, 2004; 
Kemper, Stringfield and Teddie, 2003). Probability sampling is primarily employed in 
quantitative research and is associated with representative samples (a cross-section of 
the population) (Denscombe, 2010a; Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Meanwhile purposive 
sampling is primarily used in qualitative research and is associated with exploratory 
samples (a way to the discovery of new ideas or theories). By using mixed methods 
several sampling techniques can be used or it can combine probability and purposive 
sampling together according to the research question being studied (Kemper, Stringfield 
and Teddie, 2003).  
 
This study requires sampling at several levels – province, agency and individual. 
However, each level requires the use of different approaches, which can be seen as a 
case for using mixed methods (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Therefore, a combination of 
probability and purposive samplings was the closest technique of sampling for this 
study. Three techniques of sampling were used in this study, including multi-stage 
sampling, stratified sampling and purposive sampling. Multi-stage sampling involves 
selecting samples in a sequence of stages, which allows researchers to reduce the sample 
by selecting a random sample from the previously selected cluster (Denscombe, 2010a; 
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Kemper, Stringfield and Teddie, 2003). In the multi-stage sampling, stratified random 
and purposive samplings were used. There are two reasons for using stratified sampling: 
(1) this study has clear information on the population and sampling frame and (2) this 
study has performance evaluation scores that enables the researcher to select the 
samples. Denscombe (2010a) states that stratified random sampling can be used when 
there is a known population, a sampling frame (a list of all items in the population) and 
a process of random selection. In addition, using stratified sampling provides many 
advantages. For example, it can ensure that the results of the sample are distributed 
based on the same stratifying criterion, removing the risk of inadequate representation 
of the sample, increasing precision by reducing sampling error, saving fieldwork costs 
by reducing sample size and allowing the researcher to use various stratifying criteria 
(Bryman, 2012; Sapsford and Jupp, 2006).  
 
In summary, the multi-stage technique was used in this study, in which each stage in 
this technique was used in different type of sampling. Collecting data for this study 
started with a questionnaire survey and then used the survey findings for selecting 
interview samples known as quantitative then qualitative methods. Thus, the description 
of sampling starts with sampling for the questionnaire survey and then sampling for the 
interview. 
 
Sampling for the questionnaire survey 
A purpose of sampling in quantitative research is to represent a generalization of  
a population (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Thus, this study cautiously considered  
the samples for the questionnaire survey. Figure 15 shows a sampling diagram for 
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questionnaire survey, which uses a combination of techniques – multi-stage, stratified 
and purposive samplings were used. The sampling frames – information about the 
research population (Denscombe, 2010a) – are necessary for sampling at each level. In 
summary, the intended samples of this study involved: 
 Provincial level: of 75 provinces in four regions at the provincial administration 
level in Thailand that engaged with the PA scheme between 2007 and 2011. 
 Agency level: of 35 provincial agencies who were KPI host agencies in each province. 
 Individual level: officials in each KPI host agency who were responsible for 
KPI(s) between 2007 and 2011 (at least one year of experience), including chiefs 
of agencies, viewed as director of KPIs or senior managers and other officials 
viewed as data collectors or practitioners.  
 
Provincial level 
The population of this study was from 75 provinces in four regions of Thailand from which 
the samples were selected by purposive sampling. The provinces were selected based on 
using performance evaluation scores or KPI scores in five fiscal years between 2007 and 
2011 approved by the PDC, using stratified random sampling. According to the distribution 
of the KPI scores, it was not a normal distribution, namely left skewness23 –  the score is 
clustered at the high end (right-hand side of a graph) (Pallant, 2010, p. 57). Therefore, a 
median was used as the cut-off point to divide the sample into two groups (Pallant, 2010, p. 
89), the low and high KPI scoring provinces. There are two main steps in using the median 
to select the low and high KPI scoring provinces to be representatives of each region. 
                                                          
23 The skewness value provides an indication of the symmetry of the distribution (Pallant, 2010, p. 57).  
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Figure 15 Sampling diagram for questionnaire survey 
Key:                       mean purposive sampling;                         mean stratified sampling.  
 
Note: The process of sampling is under the multi-stage sampling; 1) Provincial level: ‘Low’ and ‘High’ mean low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively 2) Agency level: N, 
C, NE and S mean provincial codes in each region and number 1,2 and 3,4 mean low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively; List of 10 agencies is shown in Table 6 
In the context of multi-stage sampling 
Thailand 
Provincial level 
Northern region 
(17 provinces) 
Central region 
(25 provinces) 
North-eastern 
region 
(19 provinces) 
Southern region 
(14 provinces) 
Low 
(2 provinces) 
High 
(2 provinces) 
Agency level Individual level 
Low 
(2 provinces) 
High 
(2 provinces) 
Low 
(2 provinces) 
High 
(2 provinces) 
Low 
(2 provinces) 
High 
(2 provinces) 
N1: 10 agencies 
N2: 10 agencies 
N3: 10 agencies 
N4: 10 agencies 
C1: 10 agencies 
C2: 10 agencies 
C3: 10 agencies 
C4: 10 agencies 
NE1: 10 agencies 
NE2: 10 agencies 
NE3: 10 agencies 
NE4: 10 agencies 
S1: 10 agencies 
S2: 10 agencies 
S3: 10 agencies 
S4: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
1 Senior manager &  
      2 Practitioners per agency 
N2: 10 agencies 
Grey boxes White boxes 
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Step 1: Defining values of low, median and high in each fiscal year is shown in Table 4. 
These values were used as the criteria to determine the representatives of the low and 
high KPI scoring provinces in each region. 
 
Table 4 Range of scores for determining the provinces for further study 
Range of score 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Low 4.1935 4.2218 3.7955 4.0370 3.6503 
Median 4.3545 4.3438 3.9966 4.3185 3.8820 
High 4.5117 4.4712 4.1356 4.4978 4.1126 
 
Step 2: Defining which provinces were in the low and high KPI scoring groups by 
comparing among provinces within their own region. Table 5 shows that the two lowest 
and two highest KPI scoring provinces were selected as representatives of each region. 
Therefore, the total number of provinces per region was four and the total number of 
provinces in four regions was 16. 
 
Table 5 Selection of provinces for survey 
Regions Low  High  Total (provinces) 
Northern N1, N2 N3, N4 4 
Central C1, C2 C3, C4 4 
North-eastern NE1, NE2 NE3, NE4 4 
Southern S2, S2 S3, S4 4 
Total (provinces) 8  8  16 
Note: Low and High mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively 
 
Agency level 
After the 16 provinces were selected, the agencies in each province were selected for 
the samples of agencies by stratified sampling. There were 35 provincial agencies that 
were related to the KPIs as the main or second KPI host agencies (see Chapter Three: 
Section 3.5, Figure 10 or Appendix 7:7.2). According to a comparison of the KPIs in 
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five fiscal years and in the 16 provinces, there were 10 main KPI host agencies that were 
often responsible for the KPIs over five years (see the list of KPI host agencies in 
Appendix 6). Table 6 shows a list of the 10 provincial agencies that were selected and 
the total number of participants for the survey in each province. 
 
Table 6 List of the 10 provincial agencies selected and the proportion of participants for 
the surveys 
No. 
 
Provincial agencies 
 
Director of KPIs Data collector 
(Senior manager) (Practitioner) 
1 Provincial Governor’s Office 1 2 
2 Provincial Administration Office  1 2 
3 Provincial Agricultural Extension Office  1 2 
4 Provincial Livestock Office 1 2 
5 Provincial Community Development Office 1 2 
6 Provincial Natural Resources and 
Environment Office 
1 2 
7 Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation 
1 2 
8 Provincial Office of the Controller General 1 2 
9 Provincial Employment Service Office 1 2 
10 Provincial Public Health Office 1 2 
  10 20 
Total  30 
Note:  The list of the 10 agencies were used to collect data in the 16 provinces. 
 
Individual level 
Two types of officials were related to KPIs in an agency. Firstly, officials who were 
responsible as KPI director and were often assigned as chiefs of agencies or heads of 
department were considered as senior managers. The other officials who were 
responsible as KPI data collectors were considered as practitioners within their own 
agency. The senior managers were important figures because they had been involved 
with KPIs for a long time. Meanwhile, the practitioners were crucial in the practice of 
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the KPIs because the KPIs were related to their tasks and they also directly delivered 
services to citizens in the provinces. In each agency, there were at least one senior 
manager and two practitioners who were responsible for an agency’s KPI. Therefore, 
the proposed participants were three per agency, including one senior manager and two 
practitioners (see Table 6) and were selected by stratified sampling from the selected 
agencies. 
 
In summary, the samples for the questionnaire survey comprised 16 provinces and each 
province consisted of 10 provincial agencies. The participants in each agency included 
one senior manager and two practitioners, with 30 participants per province. The total 
number of proposed participants for the survey was 480 (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7 Summary of the samples for the questionnaire survey 
Regions Code of 
provinces 
Type of 
group  
 
 
No. of 
agencies 
No. of participants  
per agency 
Total 
(10 agencies x 
3 participants) Senior 
managers  
Practitioners 
 
Northern N1 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 N2 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 N3 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 N4 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
Central C1 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 C2 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 C3 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 C4 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
North-
Eastern 
NE1 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
NE2 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
NE3 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
NE4 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
Southern S1 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 S2 L 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 S3 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
 S4 H 10 1x10 2x10 30 
Total (No.) 16 16 160 160 320 480 
Note: 1) Table 7 shows the proposed number of participants.  
          2) L and H mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively.  
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Sampling for interviews 
The main purpose of sampling in qualitative research is to select individuals or sites that 
can provide the necessary information (Creswell and Clark, 2007). Before a discussion 
on interview samples and sampling size, it is important to note that the survey findings 
were used for considering the interview samples through purposive sampling. Figure 16 
shows a sampling diagram for interview, where a combination of techniques was used 
in the same way as the sampling for the survey. The characteristics of the interview 
samples in each level included: 
 Provincial level: The provinces that were selected as the interview sample were 
acquired from the data analysis from the 16 provinces where the questionnaire 
survey was carried out. The criteria for selecting the provinces included. Firstly, 
the provinces had to have a survey response from the Provincial Governor’s Office. 
Secondly, they were not the non-variant provinces, such as a special area identified 
as having insurgency or unique geography (e.g. a lot of high mountains resulting in 
difficult transportation).  
 Agency level: The agencies that were considered for selection as the interview 
sample were required to be within the 10 provincial agencies in the provinces 
selected for interview. The agencies were different in each province and depended 
on the survey findings. The results of the survey provided the criteria for selecting 
the agencies included. Firstly, the mean scores of the 10 agencies were compared 
in their own provinces based on the results of the statistically significant 
differences of the four culture types. Secondly, the agencies that were considered 
for the sample had to undertake three complete questionnaires from one senior 
manager and two practitioners.  
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 Individual level: Two types of officials were selected as participants of the 
interview, including senior manager and practitioner. The proposed characteristics 
of the participants comprised (1) senior managers who were KPI directors and had 
experience with KPI(s) and (2) practitioners who were responsible for KPIs with 
at least one year of experience. They were considered whether they had completed 
the questionnaire survey or not.  
 
Provincial level 
The survey findings were analyzed with SPSS (Independent-Sample t-Test), the 
statistically significant differences of four culture types between the high and low KPI 
scoring provinces, and were used to select the interview samples. The survey findings 
revealed that four types of culture between both groups had significant differences, 
namely clan and market, hierarchy and adhocracy respectively. Thus, eight provinces in 
each group, low and high groups, were compared by the mean score within their group 
based on the four culture types as stated earlier. The four provinces were selected for 
interviews by stratified sampling, including two low and two high KPI scoring provinces 
(see Figure 16).  
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Figure 16 Sampling diagram for interview 
Key:                       mean purposive sampling;                        mean stratified sampling.  
 
Note: 1) Provincial level: PL and PH mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces selected based on the survey findings; 2) Agency level: There were three agencies 
per province, e.g. province PL1 included three agencies: PL1.1, PL1.2 and PL1.3; 3) Individual level: Each agency comprised at least one senior manager and one to 
two practitioners. 
                 In the context of multi-stage sampling 
Survey 
Findings  
(16 provinces) 
Provincial level 
 
Low 
(8 provinces) 
PL1 
PL2 
Agency level Individual level 
PH1 
PH2 
 
High 
(8 provinces) 
1) PL1.1 
2) PL1.2 
3) PL1.3 
1) PL2.1 
2) PL2.2 
3) PL2.3 
1) PH1.1 
2) PH1.2 
3) PH1.3 
1) PH2.1 
2) PH2.2 
3) PH2.3 
1 senior manager & 
1-2 practitioners per 
agency 
1 senior manager & 
1-2 practitioners per 
agency 
1 senior manager & 
1-2 practitioners per 
agency 
1 senior manager & 
1-2 practitioners per 
agency 
Grey boxes White boxes 
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Agency level 
In the four provinces selected for interviews, there were three agencies per province 
selected from the 10 agencies by stratified sampling. The mean scores of the 10 agencies 
were compared based on the statistically significant differences of the four types of 
culture within their province. For example, province PH2 revealed statistical 
significance on market, hierarchy, adhocracy and clan cultures respectively. Then the 
mean scores of the 10 agencies in province PH2 were compared, based on the order of 
four types of culture as stated earlier. Only the agencies that had three completed 
questionnaires from one senior manager and two practitioners were selected as the 
interview samples. The Provincial Governor’s Office was required to be selected as one 
of the three agencies in the selected province.  
 
Table 8 Summary of provinces, agencies and participants for the interviews 
Code of 
Interview  
Code of 
Agencies 
Agencies 
Senior 
Managers 
Practitioners Total 
PL1 PL1.1 1. Provincial Governor’s Office 1 1-2 3 
 PL1.2 2. Provincial Livestock Office 1 1-2 3 
 PL1.3 3. Provincial Public Health Office 1 1-2 3 
PL2 PL2.1 1. Provincial Governor’s Office 1 1-2 3 
 
PL2.2 2. Provincial Community 
Development Office 
1 1-2 3 
 
PL2.3 3. Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation 
1 1-2 3 
PH1 PH1.1 1. Provincial Governor’s Office 1 1-2 3 
 
PH1.2 2. Provincial Administration 
Office 
1 1-2 3 
 
PH1.3 3. Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation 
1 1-2 3 
PH2 PH2.1 1. Provincial Governor’s Office 1 1-2 3 
 PH2.2 2. Provincial Livestock Office 1 1-2 3 
 
PH2.3 3. Provincial Employment Service 
Office 
1 1-2 3 
Total no.   12 12-24 36 
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In conclusion, three agencies per province were selected by stratified sampling to be 
representatives of the 10 agencies in their provinces. The total number of agencies were 
12. The list of agencies in each province is shown in Table 8.    
 
Individual level 
Two types of officials were selected for the interviews by stratified sampling, including 
at least one senior manager and one to two practitioners. The selection of senior 
managers and practitioners was considered based on the criteria as stated earlier. The 
proportion of senior manager and practitioners per agency was one and one to two 
respectively. Thus, the total number of proposed participants was 36 in the four 
provinces (see Table 8). In-depth and focus group interviews were carried out with 
senior managers and practitioners respectively. 
 
In summary, sampling for the interviews combined three techniques, multi-stage, 
stratified and purposive sampling together, the same as the sampling for the survey 
questionnaire. Sampling for the interviews was based on the survey findings and 
required representatives from the low and high KPI scoring provinces, thus this stage 
was viewed as purposive sampling. However, stratified sampling was used at the level 
of province, agency and individual. The total number of provinces selected for the 
interviews was four provinces, including two low and two high KPI scoring provinces. 
In each province, three agencies were selected, one of them being the Provincial 
Governor’s Office. The total number of agencies was 12, with one senior manager and 
one to two practitioners per each agency. Thus, the total number of proposed participants 
for the interviews was up to 36. 
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4.5 Research approach  
According to the discussions of research design and methodology in section 4.3 and 4.4 
respectively, the overall research approach was summarized as shown in Figure 17. 
There are six steps as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Summary of the overall research design and methodology 
Source: Author’s construct 
 
Step 1 Development of research approach: This phase focuses on the literature on 
research design and methodology. The literature suggests that case study and 
comparative designs are relatively associated with this kind of study, whilst mixed 
methods are closest for answering the research questions.  
 
 
Literature Review 
Case Study 
 
 
(1) Development  
of research 
approach 
Comparative 
Study 
Survey 
findings 
conclusion 
(5) Interview 
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Step 2 Self-completion questionnaire survey: In the 16 provinces that were selected from 
a total number of 75 provinces in four regions, data was collected from senior managers 
and practitioners by post. The provinces included eight low and eight high KPI scoring 
provinces.  
 
Step 3 Survey data analysis: The data collected from the questionnaire surveys was 
analyzed in Excel and SPSS (Version 21). The data was compared and contrasted 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces based on the organizational culture 
profile. The survey findings were used to consider which provinces should be selected 
for the interview samples as discussed in section 4.4.2.   
 
Step 4 Semi-structured interviews based on survey findings: The semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with the four provinces selected based on the survey 
findings. In-depth and focus group interviews were conducted with senior managers and 
practitioners respectively. 
 
Step 5 Interview data analysis: The interview data was compared and contrasted 
between low and high KPI scoring provinces, such as between senior managers and 
practitioners, between senior managers in both groups, and between practitioners in both 
groups. 
 
Step 6 Overall conclusion: Triangulation and complementarity were used. The findings 
obtained from the surveys and interviews were compared and contrasted with the theory 
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and literature to summarize convergence, divergence and clarification of the overall 
results. 
 
4.6 Data collection 
This study was carried out by collecting data from both primary and secondary sources 
as demonstrated in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 Types of data used in the study 
 Primary sources Secondary sources 
Quantitative  Self-completion questionnaire 
surveys by post 
 Performance evaluation scores 
of provincial administration 
between 2007 and 2011 
 
Qualitative  Interviews with civil servants, 
including senior managers and 
practitioners at sites 
- 
 
Performance evaluation scores of provincial administration between 2007 and 2011, 
sourced from the OPDC, were the secondary quantitative data sources that were used as 
a prior step to sampling for the questionnaire surveys. The main sources of this study 
were primary quantitative and qualitative data that were collected in the field, at the 
provincial level of Thailand. The primary quantitative data source was collected from 
questionnaire surveys by post, whilst the primary qualitative data source was collected 
with senior managers and practitioners by semi-structured interviews at sites.  
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Getting access to data collection 
I am a staff member of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission 
(OPDC), a central government agency. I have been responsible for the monitoring and 
evaluation of performance in the provincial administration for five years. Therefore, the 
OPDC connection and my personal connections through my coordinating work helped 
me to get access to the provinces selected for the study. Moreover, I have colleagues, 
including the OPDC staff who are appointed to take responsibility for the provincial 
administration, who enabled the data collection in terms of providing relevant 
information (e.g. contact details of the provinces’ coordinators) and suggestions (e.g. how 
to approach the provinces).  
 
Getting access to questionnaire surveys 
Quantitative data was created by using self-completion questionnaire surveys (see 
questionnaire in Appendix 8:8.1). The surveys were carried out in three main steps as 
shown in Figure 18. The first step was selecting 16 provinces as stated earlier in section 
4.4.2. The second step was informal contact with two groups: the OPDC staff and the 
provincial coordinators. Brief information on the research was provided to the OPDC 
staff face to face because the staff were responsible for the selected provinces. They 
gave me contact details of provincial coordinators and suggestions about the provinces. 
Then, provincial coordinators were contacted by phone to explain about the research 
before the formal contact was processed.  
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Figure 18 Process of getting access to the surveys 
 
The final step was formal contact. The official letters with 10 sets of questionnaires were 
sent by post to the selected provinces. The provinces’ Governors were asked to agree, 
and if they did then the Governors would appoint the Provincial Governor’s Office to 
distribute the 10 sets of questionnaires to the 10 agencies on the list attached. Attached 
to each set of questionnaires was an envelope with stamp to help the agency send the 
completed questionnaires back to me. In an agency, one senior manager and  
two practitioners were asked to answer questionnaires and the total number of 
questionnaires per agency was three. The proposed number of questionnaires per 
province was 30. It is important to note that all questionnaires were coded before 
distribution in order to facilitate data analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Procedure 
Described brief research information 
to relevant OPDC staff face to face & 
the provincial coordinators  
by phone 
Sent the official letters to  
Governors for agreement to send 10 
sets of questionnaires by post  
(30 questionnaires per province)  
Step 2: Informal contact 
Step 3: Formal contact  
Step 1: Selection of 16 provinces 
Selected 16 provinces to be the 
representatives of 75 provinces 
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Getting access to semi-structured interviews 
Qualitative data was generated by using semi-structured interviews (see guideline of 
interviews in Appendix 8:8.2). The procedure of getting access to interviews was 
conducted at the same time as the surveys in terms of issuing the official letter for the 
Governors to agree to me interviewing some provinces among the survey provinces. 
Getting access to respondents for interviews was therefore conducted in three main steps 
as shown in Figure 19.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Process of getting access to the interviews 
 
The first step was informal contact with the selected provinces acquired from the survey 
findings. I contacted the provincial coordinators, the Provincial Governor’s Office, who 
were the main agency contacting the other two agencies in their province regarding the 
interviews. At the same time, the list of interview questions was sent to the provinces. 
The informal contact was very important for obtaining appointments for the interviews 
with the three agencies in a province.   
Procedure 
Conducted in-depth interviews with 
senior managers and focus group 
interviews with practitioners  
 
Made appointment for the interviews 
of three agencies in the province 
Step 2: Making appointment for the interviews 
Step 3: Visiting site for in-depth interviews and 
focus group interviews 
Contacted the provincial 
coordinators by phone to ask for 
interviews with three agencies  
in the province and sending the list 
of questions 
 
 
Step 1: Informal contact 
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The second step was making appointments with the provinces, and they were contacted 
through the provincial coordinators from the Provincial Governor’s Office. The date and 
the venue for the interviews were discussed with the province in order to obtain a time 
schedule for the interviews of the three agencies.  
 
The final step was to visit the site for the interviews, and in-depth interviews were 
conducted with senior managers in each agency, one by one. Meanwhile, focus group 
interviews were conducted once per province with practitioners, ranging from three  
to six persons, who were representatives from each agency and were responsible for 
KPI(s) with at least one year’s experience. The duration for visiting each province was 
around one to two days.  
 
4.7 Data analysis and Interpretation 
The analysis of the data was undertaken based on the research approach, namely 
quantitative and qualitative research.  
 
4.7.1 Quantitative data analysis 
Quantitative data was analyzed with SPSS because it allows researchers to generate 
descriptive statistics (e.g. percentages and frequencies) and to test for significant 
differences (May, 2010; De Vaus, 2002). The quantitative data acquired from the 
questionnaire surveys in this study was not only analyzed with SPSS (Version 21), but 
also the organizational culture profiles of the OCAI and Excel. These instruments were 
used together to increase the validity of the analysis. There are three main steps to the 
analysis. They are as follows: 
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Step 1: This step was to prepare the data for analysis. The 374 complete questionnaires 
were classified for data analysis, in which incomplete questionnaires – questionnaires 
with more than 20% (38) questions not answered – were eliminated (8.13%). The 
selected questionnaires were analyzed by compiling data in the worksheet of Excel for 
scoring the OCAI (see Appendix 5:5.2). The A, B, C, and D scores in each question was 
entered into the excel file in the ‘Now’ and ‘Preferred’ columns.  
 
Step 2: This step was to analyze the data from step 1, which was divided into two types: 
organizational culture profiles and SPSS analysis. Firstly, the average scores in step 1 
were constructed for an organizational culture profile (see Figure 3 in Chapter Two) 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2011) as per the following stages: 
1) The ‘Now’ column was used as a prior step. The average scores for each alternative 
(A, B, C, and D) were plotted on the organizational culture profile in which each 
quadrant within the profile shows four culture types: clan, adhocracy, hierarchy, 
and market cultures. 
2) The points in each quadrant were connected to form a four-sided figure in  
a kite-like shape. This profile creates a current picture of your organizational culture. 
3) The ‘Preferred’ column was plotted on the same form. The points used a dot line 
for comparison between preferred and current cultures.  
 
Excel was used to calculate the score and plot the graph of the organizational culture 
profiles. Secondly, the data was analyzed with SPSS, and the analyses included 
descriptive statistics, Independent-Sample t-Test, and One-way ANOVA. The analyses 
were chosen by considering the purpose of the analyses. 
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Step 3: This step was to analyze the last section of the questionnaire, the assessment of 
job satisfaction, which was separated from the previous steps. The quantitative data 
obtained from this section was analyzed with SPSS, and in particular, generating 
descriptive statistics and Independent-Sample t-Test. 
 
4.7.2 Qualitative data analysis 
Analysis of qualitative data generally begins with coding. Coding is an analytical 
process of organizing raw data, creating and assigning categories to selected relevant 
data (Dey, 1993; Neuman, 2013). There are several forms of coding, including with 
themes, topics, concepts and meanings, and they help researchers to focus on the 
essential issues of the research (Burns, 2000; Creswell and Clark, 2007). Boyatzis 
(1998) suggested that there are three main ways to develop themes and codes, including 
theory-driven, prior data or prior research driven, and inductive or data-driven. Burns 
(2000) also suggested that huge amounts of qualitative data, such as interview 
transcripts and field notes, have to be managed and organized, and software can provide 
advantages. In the current study, the interview data was analyzed by coding based on 
using theory-driven and inductive or data-driven approaches, and NVivo (version 10) 
was used to this end. NVivo is a software package, which is a tool to help the researcher 
with recording, linking ideas in several dimensions, and searching for the patterns in the 
data. It also helps with generating ideas and with creating and exploring documents and 
nodes where the data is coded, browsed, and linked in order to eliminate rigid divisions 
between data and interpretation (Richards, 1999).  
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The analysis of the interview data in this study was divided into three main steps: 
transcription, coding by using a theory-driven approach and coding by using a data-
driven approach (see Appendix 8: 8.3). These steps are explained below: 
 
Step 1 Transcription: The recorded verbal communications were transcribed. The 
interviews were carried out in the Thai language because the interviewees were Thais. 
Thus, the transcription was conducted in the Thai language and analyzed with NVivo. 
It is important to note that the summary of the interview data was sent to the interviewees 
for confirmation of validity before the coding of the qualitative data proceeded. 
 
Step 2 Coding using a theory-driven approach: Coding was based on the following eight 
key themes of organizational culture: dominant characteristics of the organization, 
leadership style, management of employees, organizational cohesion, organizational 
strategic emphasis, organizational success criteria, organizational motivation, job 
satisfaction and others.  
 
Step 3 Coding using a data-driven approach: This step involves scanning the entire raw 
data or field-notes to create categories and subcategories called ‘open coding’ (Strauss, 
1987). The categories can be guided by the research questions (Neuman, 2013) or found 
in the initial or emerging research questions, which may have to be redefined and 
reformulated at the final stage of the qualitative data analysis (Dey, 1993). In this study, 
creating categories, thus, was undertaken based on the actual interview data focused on 
the interview questions within each theme. The additional codes or new ideas for the 
categories emerged from the participants’ perspectives on implementing PA for 
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delivering good governance. Axial coding is used in this step, which is when the 
researcher codes more intensively around a single category (Strauss, 1987).  
 
4.8 Research ethics 
Ethical considerations matter in the conduct of social research and are focused on the 
protection of the participants and the integrity of the inquiry (May, 2010). Therefore, 
this research is concerned with ethical issues throughout the process. This section 
discusses the ethical issues of the research based on pragmatic issues.  
 
Approval for ethical review 
Ethical clearance was approved by the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review 
Committee before this research was carried out in the field. This ensured that the 
research design, methodology and instruments used in the research, such as 
questionnaires, interview guides and consent forms were reviewed in accordance with 
the ethical review procedure of the University of Birmingham.  
 
Being a civil servant of the central agency 
I am a staff member of the Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC), 
which is the main central government agency responsible for the PA scheme. I used the 
OPDC connection to get access to the provinces selected. This may be a sensitive issue 
for some officials, for example they might feel under pressure from leaders (e.g. the 
Provincial Governor and chief of agencies) to take part in the process of collecting data. 
I explained participants that the provided information would be presented in the overall 
picture and their personal information were anonymous, which might increase their 
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willingness to be interviewed. At the provincial level, permission to undertake the 
research is sought from the Provincial Governor and then cascaded to chief of agencies 
within a province, following the official procedure of bureaucracy. This permission will 
provide authorisation to undertake research in the province but will not come with any 
guarantees or pressure for officials in provincial agencies to participate in the research. 
Sending and collecting questionnaires by post, where the envelope and stamp were 
provided for the participants to send their questionnaires back to me, is not only to 
preserve the anonymity of the respondents, but also to reduce the perceived risk of 
pressure on the respondents from their leaders. The targeted participants in the agencies 
in each province are independent and have the right to make a decision on whether to 
participate even though their leaders have agreed that the research can take place in the 
province. 
 
Informed consent of research participants 
The rationale, purpose and methods of the research were informed to all participants. 
The official letters were issued by the OPDC and sent to the Provincial Governor for 
agreement to access data sources by questionnaire surveys and interviews. The letter 
would be cascaded to related agencies and individuals. Questionnaire surveys were  
one-page for research information (in Thai language). Respondents had the right to 
decide whether to participate or not in the surveys because the questionnaires were sent 
by post. Regarding interviews, all the participants were also provided with a consent 
form (see Appendix 9). A summary of the interview findings (in Thai language) was 
sent to the participants by electronic mail (email) to ensure the validity of the data that 
they provided. If the participants needed to give any feedback for more accuracy and 
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balance of the research findings, they would be able to do that by sending their feedback 
to the researcher within two weeks from the date the email was sent by the researcher. 
Then, the approved interview data was analyzed.  
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
The issues of confidentiality and anonymity were relevant to this research. Thus, the 
identities of all provinces, organizations and participants were protected. Questionnaire 
surveys were coded by using numbers and variable codes such as N1 and N2, and only 
the researcher and my supervisors know about the code. Regarding the interviews, the 
participants were informed that note taking and audio recordings were used during 
interviews. However, note taking and recordings did not identify the contributors by 
name. The interviews used numbers and variable codes in the same way as the 
questionnaires. Using numbers and variable codes for the questionnaires and the 
interviews was not only to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of all the data 
provided by the participants, but was also useful for the process of data analysis. 
Moreover, all the participants were clearly informed about the publishing of the research 
findings through the consent form and no outputs included any list of provinces agencies 
and participants’ names.  
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4.9 Summary 
The objectives of this study are to investigate the relationship between organizational 
culture and good governance in the provincial administration of Thailand. This was 
explored through civil servants’ perspectives on implementing the PA scheme. To 
achieve these objectives, a combination of case study and comparative designs were 
used. Mixed methods, quantitative and qualitative methods, were employed in order to 
use self-completion questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews (in-depth and 
focus group interviews).  
 
Using mixed methods for this study involved multi-techniques of sampling in both 
surveys and interviews, namely multi-stage, stratified and purposive samplings. The 
surveys were carried out with the 16 provinces selected from 75 provinces, and they 
include 10 provincial agencies with 30 participants per province. The total number of 
proposed participants for the surveys was 480. Meanwhile, the interviews were carried 
out with four provinces selected from the survey findings, and comprised three agencies 
with around nine participants per province. The total number of proposed participants 
of the interviews was 36. In terms of data analysis and interpretation, the survey data 
was analyzed by using three instruments: organizational culture profiles, Excel, and 
SPSS. The interview data was analyzed using NVivo. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: QUANTITATIVE DATA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the empirical findings from the analysis of the quantitative data 
acquired from the questionnaire surveys based on the 16 provinces. The questionnaire 
surveys were analyzed through the organizational culture profile of the OCAI and using 
Excel and SPSS (Version 21). The purpose of the analysis was to examine the 
relationship between organizational culture and good governance, as defined in the Thai 
civil service performance agreement (PA).   
 
The chapter is structured into four main sections. Section 5.2 reports the respondents’ 
responses to the questionnaire surveys. Section 5.3 focuses on the overall organizational 
culture profile of the provincial cases. Section 5.4 provides a comparison of the 
organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI scoring provinces.  
A description of job satisfaction based on the provincial cases is presented in Section 
5.5. The final section (5.6) is the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
It is important to note that the questionnaire survey findings as presented here have been 
translated from Thai to English – the translation procedures were based on literature on 
the OCAI (translated in Thai)24 and professional translation in both Thai and English. 
                                                          
24 There are some PhD theses that used the OCAI by translation from English to Thai such as Jingjit 
(2008) and Tachateerapreda (2009). 
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That coding was used to ensure anonymity. The coding information of the surveys is 
shown in Appendix 10: 10.1. 
 
5.2 Respondents to the questionnaire survey 
The questionnaire survey was conducted with a good response rate of 72.29 % –347 
officials from the proposed respondents of 480 (100%) took part in the survey. From the 
347 completed questionnaires25 , 308 (88.76%) were analysed. General information 
about the respondents was categorized by sex, age, position, organization, experience 
of KPI host, position on KPI host and consent for interview (if needed) and is presented 
in Table 10.  
 
Respondents were evenly divided by gender, with men and women both around 50%. 
The majority of the respondents were over 30 years old – almost 50% were aged 51 or 
over. In terms of their position level, over 50% of the respondents were at a professional 
level 26 . A small proportion (3.06%) came from low level ‘employees’ positions. 
Regarding the provincial agencies, six agencies out of ten responded with over 10% 
(10.71% - 11.36%), while the other four agencies’ percentages varied between 6.82% 
and 9.42%.  
 
 
                                                          
25 Only fully completed questionnaires were considered for quantitative analysis. Those with 
unanswered sections were excluded as were those where multiple questionnaires appeared to have 
been filled in by the same hand. 
26 Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) classifies position of officials into four main 
categories: executive, managerial, knowledge worker, and general. Knowledge worker positions 
include practitioner, professional, senior professional, expert, and advisory level (www.ocsc.go.th). 
Moreover, position of government employees (e.g. government permanent employees) are under the 
responsibility of the OCSC. 
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Table 10 Total number and percentage of respondents in the questionnaire surveys 
General information Total Percent (%) 
Sex Female 151 49.83 
 Male 152 50.17 
 Total 
 
303* 100.00 
Age 
 
 
30 or under 15 4.93 
31-40 65 21.38 
41-50 93 30.59 
51 or over 131 43.09 
 
Total 
 
304* 100.00 
Position 
 
 
 
 
Chief of the…(office, group, subdivision)… 52 17.69 
Senior Professional Level 34 11.56 
Professional Level 170 57.82 
Practitioner Level 29 9.86 
Others (e.g. employee) 9 3.06 
 
Total 
 
294* 100.00 
Organization Provincial Governor's Office 29 9.42 
Provincial Administration Office 21 6.82 
Provincial Agricultural Extension Office 34 11.04 
Provincial Livestock Office 34 11.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provincial Community Development Office 34 11.04 
Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Office 33 10.71 
Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 34 11.04 
Provincial Office of Comptroller General 35 11.36 
Provincial Employment Service Office 26 8.44 
Provincial Public Health Office 28 9.09 
 
Total 
 
308* 100.00 
Experience of 
KPIs host 
1-5 years 259 93.50 
6-10 years 18 6.50 
 
Total  
 
277* 100.00 
Position on KPIs 
host 
Senior manager 68 23.37 
Practitioner 223 76.63 
 
Total  
 
291* 100.00 
Consent for 
interview  
(If needed) 
Permit 124 48.06 
No permit 134 51.94 
Total  258* 100.00 
Note: * These totals do not include those that did not reply to the question. 
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These agencies were viewed as the most significant provincial-level agencies in that 
they had been KPI ‘hosts’ in the PA scheme for at least five years. Thus, not only could 
their officials provide details of PA, but they could also reflect on the overall picture of 
the province’s organizational culture in implementing PA. The majority of respondents 
in these agencies – 93.5% – defined themselves as the KPI host with experience of 
between 1-5 years.  
 
5.3 Overall organizational culture profile of the provincial cases 
The characteristics of overall organizational culture in the provincial cases were 
analysed by using an organizational culture profile of the OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 
2011). The four culture types, clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy were presented in 
terms of the perceived ‘now’ and ‘preferred’ organizational culture profiles. 
 
5.3.1 Overall organizational culture profile of 16 provinces 
The analysis of the quantitative data revealed that, in the current cultures of 16 
provinces, the current overall organizational culture profile has a strong tendency 
towards the hierarchy and market cultures, with a slightly lower score for the clan 
culture and a significantly lower score for the adhocracy culture, as shown in Figures 
20 and 21.  
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Table 11 Comparison of mean scores between the now and preferred organizational 
culture in 16 provinces 
Cultures Now Preferred Different mean scores 
Clan 3.59 4.48 0.89 
Adhocracy 3.45 4.41 0.96 
Market 3.64 4.49 0.85 
Hierarchy 3.64 4.46 0.82 
 
Table 11 shows that the hierarchy culture has the lowest different mean score between 
the now and preferred cultures, while the adhocracy culture has the highest different 
mean score between the now and preferred cultures, suggesting that the officials would 
prefer greater flexibility and a more external focus. The organizational culture profiles 
of the 16 provinces can be seen in Appendix 11. 
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Figure 21 Comparison of the now and preferred culture  
mean score of the 16 provinces 
Figure 20 Overall organizational culture profile of the 16 provinces 
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Table 12 Mean scores of now and preferred cultural types in the 16 provinces 
No. 
Province 
(Coded) 
No. of 
questionnaire 
Now Preferred 
Clan Adhc. Market Hier. Clan Adhc. Market Hier. 
1. N1 14 3.74 3.59 3.81 3.74 4.60 4.52 4.60 4.59 
2. N2 23 3.35 3.31 3.48 3.40 4.61 4.48 4.58 4.55 
3. N3 15 3.84 3.65 3.93 4.01 4.53 4.40 4.52 4.50 
4. N4 20 3.50 3.51 3.60 3.65 4.45 4.39 4.41 4.44 
5. C1 21 3.56 3.40 3.63 3.67 4.24 4.25 4.31 4.19 
6. C2 22 3.42 3.18 3.36 3.45 4.24 4.20 4.31 4.27 
7. C3 13 3.79 3.57 3.78 3.76 4.34 4.20 4.31 4.23 
8. C4 26 3.66 3.48 3.76 3.74 4.66 4.58 4.60 4.62 
9. NE1 19 3.47 3.33 3.47 3.57 4.45 4.41 4.40 4.48 
10. NE2 22 3.65 3.47 3.70 3.78 4.60 4.55 4.68 4.62 
11. NE3 23 4.02 3.83 4.02 3.98 4.69 4.60 4.70 4.68 
12. NE4 11 3.55 3.47 3.62 3.56 4.56 4.44 4.49 4.49 
13. S1 19 3.41 3.29 3.43 3.35 4.44 4.40 4.39 4.40 
14. S2 20 3.35 3.34 3.46 3.42 4.41 4.35 4.44 4.42 
15. S3 24 3.69 3.50 3.72 3.75 4.42 4.40 4.46 4.43 
16. S4 16 3.52 3.46 3.61 3.47 4.43 4.31 4.46 4.38 
Total 308 3.59 3.45 3.64 3.64 4.48 4.41 4.49 4.46 
Note: 1) The 16 provinces were coded (see chapter four for coding explanation).  
          2) Adhc. means adhocracy and Hier. means hierarchy 
 
Table 12 shows the mean scores of now and preferred organizational culture in the 16 
provinces. The provinces of N3 and NE3 present the highest mean score, whilst the 
lowest scores are those of provinces N2, C2, NE1, S1, and S2. It is important to note 
that C2 did not receive the questionnaire responses from the Provincial Governor’s 
Office and S2 is a particular province that is located in a special area marked by 
insurgency. Therefore, these may be seen as exceptional compared to other provinces 
and they might also have presented problems in terms of getting access to targeted 
respondents. Consequently, the provinces N2 and NE1 were selected to represent the 
low KPI scoring provinces, whilst N3 and NE3 were selected to represent the high KPI 
scoring provinces for the interviews.  
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Table 13 Statistical significance of organizational cultures in 16 provinces 
 Culture types F Sig. 
Now Clan 2.019* 0.014 
  Adhocracy 1.388 0.152 
  Market 1.852* 0.028 
  
Hierarchy 2.086* 0.011 
Preferred Clan 1.298 0.202 
  Adhocracy 0.927 0.534 
  Market 1.038 0.416 
  
Hierarchy 1.358 0.167 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.0527 
 
Table 13 demonstrates an F ratio28 and statistical significance (sig.) differences of four 
types of culture between 16 provinces. The four culture types of the 16 provinces were 
analyzed with SPSS by using One-way ANOVA - comparing the mean scores of more 
than two groups (the 16 provinces). For example, the mean scores of the clan culture of 
all 16 provinces were compared; the F ratio represents the variance between the 
provinces. The data revealed that, in the existing culture, three culture types had 
significant differences, including hierarchy (Sig.= 0.011), clan (Sig.= 0.014), and 
market (Sig.= 0.028) respectively. In contrast the adhocracy culture did not show 
significant differences (Sig.= 0.152). This result reflects that the provinces perform PA 
in different working environments such as the flexible or control system (hierarchy), 
receiving or non-receiving cooperation (clan), and pursuit or surrender of goal (market).  
 
                                                          
27 p < 0.05 refers to a risk level (called the alpha level) at 0.05, which means that five times out of every 
100 you would find a statistically significant difference even if there was none (Robert et al., 2002, p. 
118). 
28 F ratio presents the variance between the groups divided by the variance within the groups  
(Pallant, 2010, p. 249). 
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The significant difference of the hierarchy culture between 16 provinces implies that 
there are different degrees of flexibility in implementing PA among the provinces. The 
significant difference of the clan culture reflects that there are perhaps differences in 
some aspects such as cooperation, participation, teamwork, interpersonal relationships, 
and horizontal communication.  
 
Regarding the significant differences of the market culture, it seems to be the case that 
the provinces have different characteristics, for example competition, orientation of 
tasks and goal achievement, and emphasis on reward based accomplishment. 
Meanwhile, the adhocracy culture does not vary across provinces, which reflects the 
degree to which the provinces tend to focus on internal orientation rather than external 
orientation. This may derive from the influence of the hierarchy culture that tends to 
create a structured environment, such as detailed instructions and close supervision. 
Consequently, the subordinates are likely to have working limitations such as on making 
their own decisions and generating their ideas, including having no resistance for 
change. In terms of the preferred organizational culture, it was found that all four  
culture types were not statistically significant, namely hierarchy (Sig.= 0.167), clan  
(Sig.= 0.202), market (Sig.= 0.416), and adhocracy (Sig.= 0.534).  
 
5.3.2 Organizational culture profile of senior managers and practitioners 
The overall organizational culture profiles, the current and preferred cultures, of the senior 
managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces are shown in Figures 22 and 23. The senior 
managers and practitioners tend to perform based on control focus in both orientations, 
namely internal focus (hierarchy culture) and external focus (market culture). This implies 
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that the officials have slightly shifted their culture from the hierarchy culture to the market 
culture, although the hierarchy culture is still embedded in the public sector. In other words, 
the market culture can be created in the context of PA. 
 
 
 
Table 14 shows the different organizational culture between the senior managers and 
practitioners in the now and preferred cultures. The four culture types of both senior 
managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces were analyzed with SPSS by using 
Independent-Samples t-Test - comparing the mean scores between two different groups 
(senior managers and practitioners). For example, the mean scores of the clan culture of 
the senior managers and of the practitioners in the 16 provinces were compared; the t-
value represents the variance between the senior managers and practitioners. The mean 
scores of the now and preferred cultures of the senior managers were higher than for the 
practitioners in all four types of culture. The hierarchy culture is the most different in 
the now culture. This implies that the senior managers emphasised a control focus such as 
policy, regulation, and monitoring the progress of tasks, to a greater extent than did the 
Figure 23 Overall organizational culture profile  
of the practitioners in the 16 provinces 
 
Figure 22 Overall organizational culture profile  
of the senior managers in the 16 provinces 
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practitioners. Regarding the statistically significant differences of the existing and 
preferred cultures between the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces, 
the data revealed that only the hierarchy culture had a significant difference (Sig.= 0.028), 
while the other culture types – market (Sig.= 0.071), adhocracy (Sig.= 0.108), and clan 
(Sig.= 0.126)  – were not significant.  
 
 
Table 14 Comparison organizational culture between the senior managers and 
practitioners in 16 provinces 
  Cultures 
Senior  
managers 
Practitioners 
Different  t Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
mean scores 
Now Clan 3.68 3.55 0.13 1.534 0.126 
  Adhocracy 3.55 3.41 0.14 1.611 0.108 
  Market 3.76 3.60 0.16 1.611 0.071 
  Hierarchy 3.78 3.59 0.19 2.203* 0.028 
Preferred Clan 4.62 4.44 0.18 2.297* 0.022 
  Adhocracy 4.54 4.36 0.18 2.729* 0.007 
  Market 4.61 4.44 0.17 2.834* 0.005 
  Hierarchy 4.59 4.42 0.17 2.778* 0.006 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
The officials in higher positions (senior managers) – mostly older people – tend to 
support a more bureaucratic culture than other officials (practitioners) – younger people 
(see section 5.3.3 where this is discussed in detail). In the preferred cultures,  
it was revealed that all four culture types were significantly different – adhocracy  
(Sig.= 0.007), hierarchy (Sig.= 0.006), market (Sig.= 0.005), and clan (Sig.= 0.022) 
respectively. It is possible that there are different desires for change in the working 
environment, such as practitioners may prefer more flexibility while senior managers 
may require monitoring of progress.  
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The comparison of organizational culture profiles between the senior managers and 
practitioners revealed that the mean scores of four culture types of the senior managers 
were higher than those of the practitioners in both the current and preferred cultures. 
Figures 24 and 25 reveal that, in the current culture, the hierarchy culture had the biggest 
difference between the senior managers and practitioners. This implies that the senior 
managers were more likely to focus on control systems involving giving commands and 
requiring monitoring of progress; in contrast the practitioners were more likely to focus 
on greater flexibility.  
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Figure 27 Comparison of the current culture profiles of   
the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces 
Figure 25  
Figure 24 Comparison of the current culture profiles of  
the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces 
Figure 25 Comparison of the current culture mean scores of 
the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces 
Figure 26 Comparison of the preferred culture profiles of  
the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces 
Figure 27 Comparison of the preferred mean scores of  
the senior managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces 
 
 
157 
 
In the preferred culture, the clan and market cultures are not greatly different between 
both groups as shown in Figures 26 and 27. Furthermore, the adhocracy culture, in the 
preferred culture, showed the highest difference between both groups (see Figures 26 
and 27), which is consistent with the statistical significant differences in Table 14.  
 
5.3.3 Organizational culture profiles by sex, age and organizations 
This section reports the organizational culture profiles by comparison of sex, age and 
organizations. As a consequence, the section is divided into three topics. The detail of 
sex, age and organizations are demonstrated earlier in Table 10.  
 
Comparison of organizational culture profiles by sex 
The comparison of the organizational culture profiles revealed that males have higher 
mean scores than females in four culture types in both the current and preferred cultures, 
as shown in Figures 28 and 29. In particular, the hierarchy culture, in the current culture, 
was the only culture type that has significant differences between male and female 
(Sig.= 0.0382) as demonstrated in Table 15. This implies that male officials tend to focus 
on control orientation (e.g. policy, regulation, seniority and command) more so than 
female officials. Here we should note that the senior managers tended to be older men, 
who might be expected to adhere to a bureaucratic culture. Regarding the preferred 
culture, it was found that the clan and market cultures had the highest mean scores in 
both the male and female groups (see Figure 29).  
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Table 15 Comparison of mean scores and statistical significance of organizational 
culture by sex in 16 provinces 
  Culture 
Mean scores by sex  
t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Female Male 
Now Clan 3.55 3.63 -1.1164 0.2652 
  Adhocracy 3.42 3.50 -1.1521 0.2502 
  Market 3.60 3.69 -1.2596 0.2088 
  Hierarchy 3.58 3.72 -2.0822* 0.0382 
Preferred Clan 4.46 4.52 -0.9067 0.3654 
  Adhocracy 4.39 4.45 -1.0163 0.3103 
  Market 4.46 4.52 -1.0652 0.2878 
  Hierarchy 4.43 4.51 -1.3245 0.1865 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
Comparison of organizational culture profiles by age 
The comparison of the organizational culture profiles by age found that all four culture 
types, in the current culture, were significantly different by age, namely adhocracy  
(Sig.= 0.0048), hierarchy (Sig.= 0.0040), market (Sig.= 0.0105) and clan (Sig.= 0.0130) 
Figure 29 Comparison of the preferred culture profile 
between the sexes in the 16 provinces 
 
 
 
Figure 28 Comparison of the current culture profile 
between the sexes in the 16 provinces 
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respectively (see Table 16). On the contrary, the four culture types in the preferred 
culture were not significantly different between the ages. 
 
Table 16 Comparison of mean scores and statistical significance of organizational 
culture by age in 16 provinces 
  Culture 30 or under 31-40 41-50 
51 or 
over 
F Sig. 
Now Clan 3.42 3.42 3.57 3.71 3.6526* 0.0130 
  Adhocracy 3.31 3.27 3.42 3.58 4.3937* 0.0048 
  Market 3.56 3.48 3.60 3.77 3.8096* 0.0105 
  Hierarchy 3.45 3.46 3.63 3.77 4.5249* 0.0040 
Preferred Clan 4.46 4.42 4.48 4.53 0.5145 0.6726 
  Adhocracy 4.36 4.35 4.39 4.47 0.7837 0.5038 
  Market 4.45 4.43 4.49 4.52 0.4112 0.7451 
  Hierarchy 4.44 4.40 4.46 4.50 0.6100 0.6090 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
Table 17 Comparison of organizational culture between the ages by Multiple Comparisons test 
Culture Age 30 or under 31-40 41-50 51 or over 
Clan 30 or under - - 0.00513 - 0.15238 - 0.28870 
 
31-40 0.00513 - - 0.14725 - 0.28357* 
 
41-50  0.14725 - - 0.13631 
  51 or over   0.13631 - 
Adhocracy 30 or under   - 0.10814 - 0.26914 
 
31-40  
 
- 0.15430 - 0.31529* 
 
41-50   - -0.16100 
  51 or over    - 
Market 30 or under 
 
  - 0.21236 
 
31-40  
 
 - 0.29734* 
 
41-50   
 
- 0.17672* 
  51 or over    - 
Hierarchy 30 or under 
 
  - 0.32337 
 
31-40  
 
 - 0.31385* 
 
41-50   
 
-0.14119 
  51 or over    - 
Note:   (1) The results in Table 18 are based on the current culture analysed  
            (2) * refers to the pairwise test at p = 0.05 
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This reflects that the officials in the different age ranges tend to operate in different 
culture styles when implementing PA. This was emphasized by the SPSS analysis, 
multiple comparison test as shown in Table 17. It revealed that there were differences 
in all the culture types between officials in the older generation – age 51 years old or  
over – and the younger generation – between age of 31-40 years old. In particular, the 
market culture was different between the age of 51 or over and the two age ranges – 31-
40 and 41-50.  
 
Comparison of organizational culture profiles by organizations 
The comparison of organizational culture at the organizational level revealed an 
interesting finding, which was that only the clan culture showed significant differences 
in the current culture as shown in Table 18. On the other hand, all four culture types in 
the preferred culture were significantly different, namely clan (Sig.= 0.0019), market  
(Sig.= 0.0047), adhocracy (Sig.= 0.0056) and hierarchy (Sig.= 0.005) respectively.  
 
Table 18 Statistical significance of organizational culture between 10 organizations  
in 16 provinces 
  Culture F Sig. 
Now Clan 1.960* 0.0437 
 
Adhocracy 1.776 0.0722 
 
Market 1.124 0.3456 
 
Hierarchy 1.018 0.4257 
Preferred Clan 3.001 0.0019 
 
Adhocracy 2.658 0.0056 
 
Market 2.715 0.0047 
  Hierarchy 2.697 0.0050 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
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In terms of the mean scores seen in Table 19, the differences of the clan culture between 
10 provincial agencies reflect that factors such as commitment, participation, and 
teamwork are different in each organization. This may be a crucial element leading to 
different results of PA in each level of agency and the overall result of a province, as 
well as the attainment of delivering good governance. 
 
Table 19 Comparison of mean scores of organizational culture by organizations in 16 
provinces 
Organizations Now  Preferred 
 Clan Adhc. Market Hier.  Clan Adhc. Market Hier. 
1. Provincial 
Governor's Office 
3.52 3.40 3.65 3.67  4.59 4.51 4.63 4.55 
2. Provincial 
Administration 
Office 
3.38 3.24 3.46 3.55  4.09 4.05 4.10 4.10 
3. Provincial 
Agricultural  
Extension Office 
3.62 3.39 3.65 3.72  4.55 4.39 4.56 4.55 
4. Provincial 
Livestock Office 
3.61 3.45 3.70 3.65  4.26 4.16 4.29 4.27 
5. Provincial 
Community 
Development 
Office 
3.85 3.68 3.78 3.78  4.68 4.60 4.63 4.60 
6. Provincial Natural 
Resources and 
Environment Office 
3.50 3.37 3.51 3.57  4.47 4.43 4.47 4.48 
7. Provincial Office 
of Disaster 
Prevention and 
Mitigation 
3.61 3.58 3.75 3.74  4.55 4.56 4.60 4.63 
8. Provincial Office 
of Comptroller 
General 
3.63 3.44 3.64 3.66  4.62 4.50 4.60 4.56 
9. Provincial 
Employment 
Service Office 
3.75 3.65 3.78 3.64  4.41 4.38 4.37 4.35 
10. Provincial Public 
Health Office 
3.32 3.26 3.45 3.38   4.46 4.41 4.46 4.36 
Note: Adhc. means adhocracy and Hier. means hierarchy 
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5.4 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between the low 
and high KPI scoring provinces 
5.4.1 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between the low and high 
KPI scoring provinces 
The comparison of the organizational culture profiles between the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces revealed that the mean scores of four culture types of the high KPI 
scoring provinces were all higher than those the low KPI scoring provinces, as shown 
in Figures 30 and 31.  
 
Figure 30 demonstrates that the market and clan cultures had the most different mean 
scores of the current culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. This can 
also be seen in Table 20. Meanwhile, in the preferred culture, the clan culture has the 
lowest different mean scores between both provincial groups (see Figure 31). This 
implies that the market and clan cultures are the most significant factors for achievement 
in PA recognized by the officials. This finding was emphasized by the SPSS analysis 
Figure 30 Comparison of the preferred culture profiles 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
 
Figure 31 Comparison of the current culture profiles  
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces Figur  30 Comp rison of the current culture profiles between 
the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Figure 31 Comparison of the preferred culture profiles 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
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that four culture types, in the current culture, had statistically significant differences, 
particularly the clan and market cultures as shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 20 Comparison of mean scores of organizational cultures between the low and 
high KPI scoring provinces 
  
    Culture types 
Low 
scoring provinces 
High  
scoring provinces 
Different 
mean 
scores 
Now Clan 3.48 3.71 0.23 
  Adhocracy 3.35 3.56 0.21 
  Market 3.53 3.77 0.24 
  Hierarchy 3.54 3.75 0.21 
Preferred Clan 4.45 4.52 0.07 
  Adhocracy 4.39 4.44 0.05 
  Market 4.46 4.51 0.05 
  Hierarchy 4.43 4.49 0.06 
 
Table 21 Statistical significance of organizational cultures between the low and high 
KPI scoring provinces 
  Culture types t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Now Clan -3.220* 0.001 
 
Adhocracy -3.046* 0.003 
 Market -3.382* 0.001 
  Hierarchy -3.063* 0.002 
Preferred Clan -1.243 0.215 
 
Adhocracy -0.749 0.454 
 
Market -0.818 0.414 
  Hierarchy -0.893 0.373 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
Table 21 demonstrates that all types of culture in the current culture were significantly 
different, namely market and clan (Sig.= 0.001), hierarchy (Sig.= 0.002) and adhocracy 
(Sig.= 0.003) respectively. This reflects that there are statistically significant differences 
of organizational culture between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, especially 
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the clan and market cultures. This suggests that performance rests on a combination of 
hard and soft factors. Market culture alone cannot deliver performance, it also needs 
elements of clan culture. Regarding preferred culture, the survey revealed that there 
were not significant differences between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. This 
suggests that it is not that there are differences in values between the high and low 
scoring provinces, but differences in their ability to put those values into practice, 
suggesting differences in management rather than in the underlying cultural profile.   
 
5.4.2 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between senior managers in 
the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
According to the comparison of the existing cultures between the senior managers in the 
low and high KPI scoring provinces, it was found that the high KPI scoring provinces 
had higher mean scores in all culture types than the low KPI scoring provinces. The 
hierarchy and market cultures had the highest mean scores, whilst the adhocracy culture 
had the lowest mean scores in both provincial groups as shown in Figures 32 and 33. 
This implies that the senior managers in both provincial groups implement their work 
in orientation of control focus, in which internal (hierarchy) and external (market) 
focuses are emphasized. In this respect, it reflects that the different degrees of the 
hierarchy and market cultures emphasized by the senior managers may contribute to 
different results of PA at the levels of agency and province. It is important to note that 
a high degree of hierarchy does not mean a negative impact on performance because it 
depends on how the senior managers use their authority, as this might either enable or 
inhibit performance. 
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The comparison of the preferred culture between the senior managers in both provincial 
groups, as shown in Figures 34 and 35 revealed that the clan and market cultures of the 
high KPI scoring provinces were higher than the hierarchy and adhocracy cultures, 
whilst their adhocracy and hierarchy cultures were lower than low KPI scoring 
provinces. This implies that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces 
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Figure 32  
 
 
 
Figure 34 Comparison of the preferred culture mean scores of 
the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33  
 
Figure 35 Comparison between the preferred cultural 
profiles of the senior managers in the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces 
Figure 32 Comparison between the current cultural profiles of 
the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Figure 33 Comparison of the current culture mean scores of 
the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Figure 34 Comparison between the preferred cultural profiles of  
the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Figure 35 Comparison of the preferred culture mean scores of  
the senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
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perhaps place more emphasis on the clan culture (e.g. commitment) and the market 
culture (e.g. pursuit of goals and competition) rather than in the low KPI scoring 
provinces.  
 
In summary, it appears that an emphasis on the clan and market cultures by the senior 
managers is the key factor in achieving the high scores of performance evaluation or the 
PA scheme.  
 
Table 22 Statistical significance of the current and preferred cultures of the senior 
managers between the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
  Culture types 
Low KPI 
scoring 
provinces 
High KPI 
scoring 
provinces 
t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Now Clan 3.57 3.82 -1.692 0.095 
 
Adhocracy 3.45 3.67 -1.373 0.174 
 
Market 3.63 3.92 -2.072* 0.042 
  Hierarchy 3.68 3.91 -1.709 0.092 
Preferred Clan 4.59 4.65 -0.578 0.565 
 
Adhocracy 4.55 4.53 0.181 0.857 
 
Market 4.59 4.64 -0.439 0.662 
  Hierarchy 4.59 4.58 0.196 0.845 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
The SPSS analysis of organizational culture between the senior managers in both 
provincial groups revealed that only the market culture was significantly different  
(Sig.= 0.042) as shown in Table 22. In addition, Figures 34 and 35 emphasize that  
the market culture focused by the senior managers plays a significant role in the 
achievement of PA in the provinces. The perspectives of the practitioners in both 
provincial groups are discussed in the next section. 
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5.4.3 Comparison of organizational culture profiles between practitioners in the 
low and high KPI scoring groups 
The comparison of the organizational culture profiles between the practitioners in the 
low and high KPI scoring provinces found that all culture types of the high KPI scoring 
provinces were higher than in the low KPI scoring provinces. In the current culture, the 
hierarchy and market culture mean scores were higher than the other culture types (see 
Figures 36 and Figure 37). This is consistent with the senior managers’ perspectives, 
discussed above.  
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Figure 37 Comparison of the preferred culture profiles of  
the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
 
Figure 39 Comparison of the current culture profiles of the 
practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
 
Figure 38 Comparison of the current culture mean scores of 
the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
 
Figure 36 Comparison of the preferred mean scores of the 
practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Figure 36 Comparison of the current culture profiles of the 
practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Figure 37 Comparison of the current culture mean scores of 
the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
provinces 
Figure 38 Comparison of the preferred culture profiles of 
the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
provinces 
Figure 39 Comparison of the preferred culture mean scores of 
the practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces  
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Regarding the preferred culture, it was found that the organizational culture profiles of 
the practitioners in both provincial groups hardly differed from each other. They appear 
to perform their work with an internal and control system orientation (see Figure 38), in 
which the clan and market cultures had the highest mean scores (see Figure 39). The 
practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to work based on the clan culture 
and the market culture. In particular, the clan culture shows the most different score 
(0.12) between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, whilst the market culture has 
not much different score (0.08).  
 
Table 23 Statistical significance of the current and preferred cultures of the practitioners 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
  Culture types 
Low 
scoring group 
High 
scoring group 
t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Now Clan 3.43 3.68 -3.067* 0.002 
 
Adhocracy 3.29 3.54 -3.055* 0.003 
 
Market 3.48 3.73 -3.087* 0.002 
  Hierarchy 3.48 3.72 -2.922* 0.004 
Preferred Clan 4.38 4.50 -1.558 0.121 
 
Adhocracy 4.31 4.42 -1.340 0.182 
 
Market 4.40 4.48 -1.089 0.277 
  Hierarchy 4.36 4.47 -1.381 0.169 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
Table 23 shows that all four culture types in the current culture were significantly 
different between the practitioners in the two provincial groups, in which the clan and 
market culture were the same and had the highest values of Sig. 0.002. On the other 
hand, all four culture types in the preferred culture were not significantly different. This 
implies that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring group employ greater cooperation, 
participation, and team work (clan), as well as have a greater goal achievement and 
competition (market).  
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Comparison of organizational culture between the senior managers and 
practitioners in each provincial group 
The comparison of organizational culture between the senior managers and practitioners 
in each provincial group, the low and high KPI scoring provinces (see Table 24), 
revealed that, in the current culture, there were not statistically significant differences 
between the senior managers in each group and the practitioners. 
 
Table 24 Statistical significance of organizational cultures between senior managers 
and practitioners in each provincial group (the low and high KPI scoring groups) 
    Low scoring group   High scoring group 
  Culture types t Sig. (2-tailed)   t Sig. (2-tailed) 
Now 
  
Clan 1.163 0.247 
 
1.190 0.236 
Adhocracy 1.298 0.196 
 
1.137 0.257 
Market 1.154 0.250 
 
1.707 0.090 
Hierarchy 1.595 0.113 
 
1.737 0.085 
Preferred 
  
Clan 1.913 0.058 
 
1.359 0.176 
Adhocracy 2.126* 0.035 
 
0.988 0.325 
Market 1.785 0.076 
 
1.424 0.157 
Hierarchy 2.109* 0.037 
 
1.005 0.317 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at  p < 0.05 
 
For the preferred culture, the four culture types of the high KPI scoring provinces were 
not significantly different. Contrary to this, there were two types of culture in the low 
KPI scoring provinces that were significantly different: the adhocracy (Sig.= 0.035) and 
hierarchy (Sig.= 0.037) cultures respectively. It is possible that the practitioners in the 
low KPI scoring provinces have different desires, for example a greater flexibility and 
more external focus. Meanwhile, the high KPI scoring provinces seem to present a unity 
of perspectives between senior managers and practitioners. In conclusion, both the 
senior managers and the practitioners in each provincial group tend to perform their 
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work in similar cultures to each other. In other words, the cultural differences between 
occupational groups within provinces are less significant than the differences between 
the organizational cultures of the different provinces.  
 
5.5 Description of job satisfaction based on the provincial cases 
The assessment of job satisfaction, the second part of the questionnaire survey, consists 
of 10 questions with a five-point Likert scale – ratings from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (5). This part reports overall job satisfaction and the comparison between 
the low and high KPI scoring provinces in terms of the senior managers and 
practitioners.  
 
5.5.1 Overall job satisfaction in 16 provinces 
From the SPSS analysis, it was found that the overall job satisfaction of the provincial 
cases was categorized at the level of ‘Agree’ – a mean score between 3.63 and 4.19 (see 
Table 25). This implies that the officials at the provincial administration level are 
relatively satisfied with their job in the context of PA and that they are able to express 
their views on issues affecting their work. 
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Table 25 Overall job satisfaction in 16 provinces 
Questions Mean 
Level of 
satisfaction 
1. You feel committed to the organization and its work, you 
are not just working for the money. 
4.19 
Agree 
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own 
method of working. 
3.82 
Agree 
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from the work you 
are doing. 
3.98 
Agree 
4. The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive. 3.63 Agree 
5. What you are doing well in the job receives recognition. 3.89 Agree 
6. Your supervisor supports your career development. 3.89 Agree 
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions you make from 
your supervisor. 
3.94 
Agree 
8. You get on well with colleagues. 4.07 Agree 
9. You have no concerns about the style of management. 3.73 Agree 
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you 
under excessive pressure.  
3.82 
Agree 
Note: Level of job satisfaction 
5 Strongly agree 4.21 - 5.00  2 Disagree 1.81 - 2.60 
4 Agree 3.41 - 4.20  1 Strongly disagree 1.00 - 1.80 
3 Neither agree nor disagree 2.61 - 3.40     
 
Comparing the job satisfaction between the senior managers and practitioners in 16 
provinces, it was found that the mean scores acquired from the senior managers were 
higher than from the practitioners for all questions (see Table 26). There were two 
questions, however, that showed significant differences: question 2 (Sig.= 0.042) and 
question 9 (Sig.= 0.047). The scores for question 2 – ‘Your job gives you the freedom 
to choose your own method of working’ – reflects that the officials, especially the 
practitioners, tend to work in a structured or controlled environment, for example with 
low flexibility and limited creative possibilities. In other words, they are likely to work 
in a high hierarchy model/low adhocracy model. Meanwhile, the scores for question 9 
–‘You have no concerns about the style of management’– implies that the officials, 
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particularly practitioners, tend to be concerned with leadership styles. The implication 
was that leadership styles may significantly influence officials’ job satisfaction.  
 
Table 26 Mean scores and statistical significance of job satisfaction between the senior 
managers and practitioners in the 16 provinces 
Questions 
Senior 
manager 
Practitioner t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
1. You feel committed to the 
organization and its work, you are 
not just working for the money. 
4.34 4.15 1.784 0.075 
2. Your job gives you the freedom to 
choose your own method of 
working. 
3.99 3.79 2.054* 0.042 
3. You get a feeling of 
accomplishment from the work 
you are doing. 
4.10 3.96 1.648 0.100 
4. The amount of responsibility given 
you is not excessive. 
3.72 3.62 0.841 0.401 
5. What you are doing well in the job 
receives recognition. 
4.00 3.86 1.386 0.167 
6. Your supervisor supports your 
career development. 
4.01 3.86 1.395 0.164 
7. You get the attention paid to 
suggestions you make from your 
supervisor. 
4.07 3.91 1.600 0.111 
8. You get on well with colleagues. 4.09 4.07 0.176 0.860 
9. You have no concerns about the 
style of management. 
3.93 3.69 1.996* 0.047 
10. The pursuit of organizational 
targets does not put you under 
excessive pressure.  
3.94 3.81 1.107 0.269 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
5.5.2 Comparison of job satisfaction between the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
In the comparison of job satisfaction between the low and high KPI scoring groups, it  
was found that questions 2, 6, and 10 were significantly different (see Table 27). 
Question 2 – ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of working’– 
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reflects that the high KPI scoring group seems to work with greater flexibility than the 
low KPI scoring group.  
 
Table 27 Mean scores and statistical significance of job satisfaction between low and 
high KPI scoring provinces 
Questions 
Low  
scoring group 
High 
scoring group 
t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
1. You feel committed to the 
organization and its work, you are 
not just working for the money. 
4.17 4.21 -0.453 0.651 
2. Your job gives you the freedom to 
choose your own method of 
working. 
3.68 3.98 -3.515* 0.001 
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment 
from the work you are doing. 
3.93 4.05 -1.658 0.098 
4. The amount of responsibility given 
you is not excessive. 
3.54 3.73 -1.906 0.058 
5. What you are doing well in the job 
receives recognition. 
3.84 3.95 -1.378 0.169 
6. Your supervisor supports your career 
development. 
3.75 4.03 -3.095* 0.002 
7. You get the attention paid to 
suggestions you make from your 
supervisor. 
3.86 4.03 -1.961 0.051 
8. You get on well with colleagues. 4.02 4.11 -1.278 0.202 
9. You have no concerns about the 
style of management. 
3.66 3.80 -1.524 0.129 
10. The pursuit of organizational targets 
does not put you under excessive 
pressure.  
3.69 3.96 -2.746* 0.006 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
 
Question 6 – ‘Your supervisor supports your career development’ – suggests that the 
leaders are important for promoting the officials’ positions and also allocating rewards, 
and that the high KPI scoring provinces tend to be satisfied in receiving promotion and 
rewards. On the other hand, the low KPI scoring provinces may not be satisfied in 
receiving incentive. Regarding question 10 – ‘The pursuit of organizational targets does 
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not put you under excessive pressure’ – it illustrates that the high KPI scoring group is 
likely to be more enthusiastic to pursue tasks and goal achievement than the low KPI 
scoring provinces.  
 
5.5.3 Comparison of job satisfaction between senior managers in the low and high 
KPI scoring provinces 
The views of senior managers’ job satisfaction in both the low and high KPI scoring 
groups were found not to be significantly different (see Table 28). It can be observed 
that questions 4 and 10, where the low KPI scoring group provided a higher mean score 
than the high one, present the t value – t indicates the difference of the mean score 
between two groups of variables – with positive values.  
 
Table 28 Mean scores and statistical significance of job satisfaction between the 
senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
Questions 
Low  
scoring 
group 
High 
scoring 
group 
t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
1. You feel committed to the organization and 
its work, you are not just working for the 
money. 
4.30 4.39 -0.598 0.552 
2. Your job gives you the freedom to choose 
your own method of working. 
3.86 4.13 -1.671 0.099 
3. You get a feeling of accomplishment from 
the work you are doing. 
4.05 4.17 -0.922 0.360 
4. The amount of responsibility given you is 
not excessive.* 
3.78 3.65 0.645 0.521 
5. What you are doing well in the job receives 
recognition. 
3.97 4.03 -0.350 0.727 
6. Your supervisor supports your career 
development. 
3.97 4.06 -0.467 0.642 
7. You get the attention paid to suggestions 
you make from your supervisor. 
4.03 4.13 -0.638 0.526 
8. You get on well with colleagues. 4.03 4.16 -0.859 0.393 
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Questions 
Low  
scoring 
group 
High 
scoring 
group 
t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
9. You have no concerns about the style of 
management. 
3.92 3.94 -0.079 0.937 
10. The pursuit of organizational targets does 
not put you under excessive pressure.* 
3.95 3.94 0.049 0.961 
Note: * means questions where the mean scores of the low KPI scoring provinces are higher than the other ones. 
 
Question 4 (t = 0.645) – ‘The amount of responsibility given you is not excessive’–
implies that the senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces tend not to be 
concerned about the demands of work. On the contrary, the senior managers in the low 
KPI scoring provinces may have lower accountability or pay less attention to the PA 
than in the high KPI scoring provinces. Question 10 (t = 0.049) – ‘The pursuit of 
organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure’ – reflects that the senior 
managers in the low KPI scoring provinces are likely to be less enthusiastic about PA. 
This may derive from getting less attention or pressure from higher executives. In this 
respect, it implies that leadership is important for implementing PA, particularly paying 
attention.  
 
5.5.4 Comparison of job satisfaction between practitioners in the low and high KPI 
scoring groups  
The comparison of job satisfaction between the practitioners in low and high KPI 
scoring provinces is demonstrated in Table 29. It revealed that questions 2, 4, 6, and 10 
had significant differences. Question 2 (Sig.= 0.002) – ‘Your job gives you the freedom 
to choose your own method of working’ – suggests that the practitioners in the high KPI 
scoring provinces perhaps performs their work in a more flexible environment. 
Furthermore, they tend to be positive thinking regarding work of relevance to PA, as 
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expressed through question 4 – ‘The amount of responsibility given you is not 
excessive’.Question 6 – ‘Your supervisor supports your career development’– demonstrates 
the practitioners’ satisfaction in getting promotion or encouragement. It appears that the 
practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to be satisfied with promotion and 
rewards from their leaders more so than in the low KPI scoring provinces. Question 10 
– ‘The pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure’ – implies 
that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces are more enthusiastic about 
pursuing tasks and goal achievement. 
 
Table 29 Mean scores and statistical significance of job satisfaction between the 
practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring groups 
Questions 
Low  
scoring group 
High 
scoring group 
t 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
1. You feel committed to the 
organization and its work, you 
are not just working for the 
money. 
4.12 4.17 -0.464 0.643 
2. Your job gives you the freedom 
to choose your own method of 
working. 
3.63 3.95 -3.134* 0.002 
3. You get a feeling of 
accomplishment from the work 
you are doing. 
3.89 4.02 -1.351 0.178 
4. The amount of responsibility 
given you is not excessive. 
3.47 3.77 -2.591* 0.010 
5. What you are doing well in the 
job receives recognition. 
3.78 3.94 -1.528 0.128 
6. Your supervisor supports your 
career development. 
3.68 4.04 -3.242* 0.001 
7. You get the attention paid to 
suggestions you make from 
your supervisor. 
3.82 4.01 -1.903 0.058 
8. You get on well with colleagues. 4.04 4.11 -0.831 0.407 
9. You have no concerns about the 
style of management. 
3.61 3.78 -1.532 0.127 
10. The pursuit of organizational 
targets does not put you under 
excessive pressure. 
3.64 3.98 -3.000* 0.003 
Note: * means that the test is significantly different (Sig.) at p < 0.05 
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In summary, the assessment of job satisfaction from the practitioners’ perspectives 
revealed that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to perform their 
work with positive thinking on the demands of work, pursuit of tasks and goal 
accomplishment and in more flexible circumstances. Moreover, they appear to be 
satisfied with the allocation of promotion and rewards from the leaders more so than the 
low KPI scoring provinces. This may contribute to the different results for PA between 
the high and low KPI scoring provinces. 
 
5.6 Summary 
The comparison of organizational culture between the low and high KPI scoring 
provinces revealed that all four culture types had statistically significant differences – 
market and clan, hierarchy and adhocracy cultures respectively. This implies that there 
are different organizational cultures between both provincial groups. In particular,  
the market culture (e.g. pursuit of goals and competition) and the clan culture  
(e.g. collaboration, teamwork, the leaders’ attention and commitment) were higher in 
the high KPI scoring provinces. From the perspectives of the senior managers in both 
groups, the market culture was the only culture type that had significant differences. 
This suggests that the provinces where the senior managers emphasize the market 
culture (e.g. stimulating employees to pursue goals) could attain PA. Regarding the 
perspectives of the practitioners, it was revealed that all four culture types were 
significantly different. This implies that staff in both groups perform tasks in different 
cultures in order to achieve different results of PA. The officials in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tend to implement PA with a greater positive orientation and greater 
enthusiasm. It is important to note that the senior managers in each group (low or high 
 
 
178 
 
KPI scoring provinces) do not have such different cultures as the practitioners, as seen 
from the results of the comparison of cultures between the senior managers in each 
group and the practitioners in each group.  
 
The assessment of job satisfaction found that the overall picture of job satisfaction was at 
the level ‘agree’. This suggests that officials are broadly satisfied with implementing the 
work related to PA. The comparison of job satisfaction between the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces revealed that the high KPI scoring provinces tended to work by 
pursuing goal achievement, in a more flexible environment, and with a greater level of 
satisfaction in promotion and rewards compared with the other provinces. The senior 
managers in the high KPI scoring provinces seem to be more accountable and enthusiastic 
on tasks and goal accomplishment. Meanwhile, the practitioners in the high KPI scoring 
provinces appear to incline towards positive thinking about working, be more flexible, 
satisfied with reward allocation and promotion, and work with clear goals. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: QUALITATIVE DATA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the findings of the qualitative data analysis acquired from the 
in-depth and focus group interviews with Thai civil servants in the provincial cases; two 
low and two high KPI scoring provinces. The total number of respondents for the 
interviews was 33; 15 senior managers and 18 practitioners (a detailed list of 
respondents can be found in Appendix 12). As mentioned in Chapter Two, section 2.4.4, 
the interview data were collected within eight key themes. According to the analysis of 
the interview data, the key determinants achieving performance agreement (PA) 
delivering good governance can be categorized into three groups: leadership; human 
resources (HR) and reward; and performance, outputs and outcomes. 
 
The chapter is, therefore, structured into four main sections. The first section 6.2 focuses 
on leadership in terms of the contribution of work or information, the prior support from 
leaders, the support from leaders during the process, the use of leaders’ authority, and 
leaders’ consideration of performance related reward. The second section 6.3 discusses 
HR and reward, which highlights recruitment of those responsible for the KPIs, 
assumptions on PA, characteristics of the team of Provincial Governor’s Office, training 
and meetings, rotation of personnel, demand of work, performance-related pay, and 
recommendations to improve the criteria of incentive allocation. The third section 6.4 
concerns performance, outputs and outcomes, including capabilities of individuals and 
teams, promulgation of PA in each fiscal year, factors influencing performance, 
 
 
180 
 
advantages and disadvantages of achieving high and low KPI scores, outputs and 
outcomes of PA, and recommendations for PA. The final section 6.5 provides 
conclusions for the chapter. Section 6.2 - 6.4 set out the perspectives of the civil servants 
on what determines attainment of PA in the provincial administration. The officials’ 
perspectives on PA between the low and high KPI scoring provinces are also compared.  
 
The respondents’ information is included in brackets after each quote indicating the 
level of the officials (senior manager or practitioner), position (the particular senior 
manager), date of interview and interview code respectively as shown in Figure 40. The 
respondents were not identified by name to ensure anonymity. The interview data were 
analysed by using computer software – NVivo version 10.  
 
 
 
 
     Figure 40 The respondents’ information illustrated in brackets after each quote 
 
6.2 Leadership 
Leadership appears to be one of the most significant determinants influencing 
performance of the provinces, judging  from the terms extensively mentioned by many 
respondents; for example: leaders’ attention, support and use of authority. To structure 
these responses it is useful to consider leadership in terms of which stage of the process 
it is applied. Three main stages may be identified: input (contribution to the actual task 
of work or information and prior support); processes (support from leaders during the 
“……………………………..” (Senior manager/Practitioner, Position, Date of interviews: PH1) 
Provincial name: the letter “P” indicates province, “H” indicates 
high KPI scoring group; and “1” indicates province number 
Position was indicated where the 
respondent was a senior manager 
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process, and the use of leaders’ authority); and outputs or outcomes (the leaders’ 
consideration of performance-related reward). These stages are shown in Figure 41.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41 Leadership influence in the system of performance agreement (PA) 
 
6.2.1 The contribution of work or information 
The majority of the respondents perceived that leadership was one of the most crucial 
elements influencing the process of PA. The executives’ style, particularly the Governor 
or Vice Governor, was viewed as a priority in achieving the KPIs. One of the 
interviewees explained that the leaders’ style reflected their background, whether they 
were career officials or politicians. These attributes were associated with paying 
attention to performing well in the KPIs. An example of this idea is: 
 
 
Outputs/Outcomes Inputs Processes 
  
1. Support from leaders 
during the process 
 Other facilities required for 
support (e.g. openness of 
communication, 
decentralization) 
 Coordinating the agencies 
 Generating collaboration 
and accountability 
 Mentoring the agencies 
 
2. The use of the leaders’ 
authority  
 Creating collaboration  
 Monitoring progress of  
the KPIs 
 Solving problems 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The contribution of work 
or information 
 The leaders’ attention  
to the KPIs 
 A clear policy by the 
leaders 
 
2. Prior support from  
leaders  
 Resources (e.g. budget, 
materials, equipment) 
 
 
 
The leaders’ 
consideration of 
performance-related 
reward 
 Fairness 
 Equity  
 Consciousness of 
workforce 
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“Different Governors give different levels of attentiveness. If we had the Governor from 
the field of politics, he might not pay much attention to the KPIs. On the other hand, the 
Governor from the field of bureaucracy perhaps paid more attention to the KPIs due to 
pressure from the leaders.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management 
group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
The executives who came from a bureaucratic background tended to give more attention 
to the KPIs in order for the provinces to achieve a high score in PA, resulting in clear 
policies related to the KPIs. This can be seen from some practitioners’ views that: 
 
“Having a clear policy enabled us to do our job properly.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“Policies should be introduced to the officials in order to create mutual understandings, 
which will make the officials perform the KPIs in the same direction.” (Practitioner, 
Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The chiefs of the agencies were the main people who introduced the clear policy to the 
subordinates. For example, the leaders required the subordinates to compete the KPI 
results with others agencies.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
 
The practitioners’ preference for clear policies from above may derive from a basic 
assumption of Thais. As discussed in Chapter three they generally prefer to avoid 
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uncertainty and value security and therefore they tend to perform their work based on 
directions or commands from superiors rather than making decisions by themselves. It 
can be observed that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces seem to be more 
concerned with clear policies than the low KPI scoring provinces. Conversely, the 
executives in the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to not pay much attention to the 
KPIs. It can be seen from the perspective of one of the interviewees that: 
 
“In the year that the leaders did not pay attention and support the subordinates for 
performing the KPIs, the overall KPI scores at the provincial level might be low. 
However, the KPI scores of the provinces were still maintained because the middle 
managers were the main responsible persons driving the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief 
of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 
2014: PL2) 
 
This reflects how the leaders – Governors – in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to be 
less attentive to the KPIs. It also implies that the front line managers are important in 
achieving PA in the provinces. In this respect, implementation of PA in the low KPI 
scoring provinces is perhaps more of a challenge in achieving high KPI scores than for 
the high KPI scoring provinces, particularly in the fiscal year where their leaders in both 
levels of province and agency do not pay attention to KPIs.  
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6.2.2 Prior support from leaders 
According to respondents those leaders who pay attention to the KPIs also tend to 
provide support with resources such as budget, materials and equipment for the agencies 
in the provinces, initiated through meetings:  
 
“In the meetings, the Governor or Vice Governor played an important role. If they paid 
attention to the KPIs, they could support the team, drive the resource requirements, and 
solve the problems. Most importantly, the meetings must take place regularly.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
The respondents argued that the problems of limited resources could be resolved by  
the executives as indicated by the following statement: 
 
“I think that leadership was important in terms of management of the limited resources 
such as human, materials, equipment. The Governor’s authority assisted partnership 
work and resource sharing between agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Where such support (especially budgetary support) was lacking, the executives, 
particularly the Governor or Vice Governor, were criticized by the officials. One of the 
senior managers claimed that a significant challenge in determining achievement in the 
KPIs was such deficiency, as stated below: 
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“Our problem was a lack of resources, materials and equipment. For example, we often 
used our own cars to do off site tasks. We did not receive budget in accordance with the 
amount of jobs assigned. Sometimes, we had to pay in advance before we could claim 
the expenses.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial 
Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
This reflects the degree to which resource management of a province is based on 
centralization by the Governor. With regard to the KPI host agency chiefs, on the 
contrary, they argued that they provided many resources for their employees. One of the 
senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces pointed out that he provided several 
resources for the staff such as budget, materials and equipment as stated below: 
 
“I supported the subordinates by allocating the resources (budget, materials, and 
equipment) for them. For example, they received travel expenses and daily subsistence 
allowance.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial 
Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Here it is possible that the chiefs of agencies in the high KPI scoring provinces may 
provide more support for their employees than the low scoring provinces. Here 
leadership is important in terms of being a facilitator, a leadership style in the clan 
culture, for achieving the KPIs in the context of PA.  
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6.2.3 Support from leaders during the process 
Much of the evidence suggested that the low KPI scoring provinces received less 
encouragement from their leaders. Senior managers claimed that the executive provided 
little support for achieving the KPIs. They also asked for increasing participation by the 
Governor, for instance openness to the officials’ opinions, and decentralization to the 
level of the practitioners as the following statement indicates: 
 
“The support we required from the Governor was an opportunity to share ideas. If he 
ran the office solely by his own opinion and he did not listen to anyone, his subordinates 
might be scared to share ideas.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 
July 2014: PL2) 
 
“Efficiency to perform the KPIs was generated when the officials had an opportunity to 
give an opinion on the tasks and to participate in determining on methods of work… 
The support we wanted was decentralization at practitioner level… delegation of work 
or a clear devolution.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, 
Provincial Livestock Office, 29 July 2014: PL1) 
 
These statements confirm that leadership matters in terms of mutual respect and 
empowering employees. This attribute can be observed as limited in some provinces in 
the low KPI scoring provinces. However, one of the senior managers in the low KPI 
scoring provinces argued that there were various opportunities to share ideas between 
the practitioners and their superiors, but some practitioners were perhaps lacking in 
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confidence in sharing opinions with the executives as indicated in the following 
statement: 
 
“In the meetings between several KPI host agencies…the practitioners discussed the 
problems related to KPIs which led to solving problems. On the other hand, it was found 
that in the meeting with the executives, practitioners did not feel comfortable raising the 
problems or sharing ideas.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 
July 2014: PL2) 
 
This implies that Thai civil servants are hesitant about providing negative feedback to 
their superiors. It may be a pattern of Thais’ values called ‘Kraeng cai’, meaning to be 
considerate and to feel reluctant. This value may be a barrier to improving performance 
in public service by generating a patronage system as the officials may neglect to give 
different opinions, for example, when they found the leaders’ decisions to be wrong.  
 
The patronage system is seen to survive in Thai bureaucracy, despite ‘New Public 
Management’ (NPM) having been introduced through the PA scheme. However, a 
respondent who raised the issue of the patronage system perceived that the KPIs could 
contribute to greater effectiveness and transparency in public service as stated below: 
 
“The patronage system was still deep-rooted in Thai bureaucracy. It was essential in 
some situations. However, it was viewed as a barrier of using the Western’s concept 
promoted by the OPDC. We recognized that the concepts such as organized-working 
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procedure could create transparency.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
In addition, the respondents revealed that moral support from leaders, particularly chief 
of the Provincial Governor’s Office and the chief of the main KPI host agencies, was 
important to attain PA, for example being a coordinator, being a team builder (e.g. 
generating collaboration), being a hard driver (e.g. stimulating enthusiasm) and being a 
mentor (e.g. creating  accountability). Being a coordinator between the agencies was a 
leadership style found in the provinces as shown in the following example:  
 
“I worked as a secretary of the team driving the KPIs, the team of the Provincial 
Governor’s Office. My main role was to coordinate between the agency chiefs and the 
chief of group/division/subdivision/section. I liaised with them through both formal and 
informal communications. Informal communications help cut back the red tape. A good 
relationship with other agencies is required.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
The senior managers of the Provincial Governor’s Office appear to be the key feature 
communicating with other agencies through formal and informal contact, with the 
Provincial Governor’s Office in the low KPI scoring provinces perhaps preferring 
informal communication. It is important to note that being a coordinator is considered 
as a leadership style in the hierarchy culture.  
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Moreover, a team builder was a leadership style mentioned by the respondents. They 
revealed that the chiefs of the agencies, particularly in the high KPI scoring provinces, 
tend to generate collaboration and accountability among officials through meetings. 
This idea is illustrated by the following account: 
 
“I informed the subordinates by the monthly meetings that we had to collaborate to 
work towards the KPIs. Monitoring the progress of the KPIs was required through the 
meetings. If the result of the KPIs was not close to the targets, we had to accelerate our 
team performance.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, 
Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
The implication of regular meetings between the senior managers and the practitioners 
is important because the leaders play many roles such as team builder (clan culture), 
monitor (hierarchy culture), and hard driver (market culture) in the single stage. The 
leader can create cooperation and participation among the individuals when considered 
as team builder. Meanwhile, the leaders can stimulate enthusiasm and accountability 
through monitoring the progress of the KPIs, viewed as monitor and hard driver at the 
same time. It is important to note that there is a linkage between the clan, hierarchy and 
market cultures in the context of PA, which implies there is a positive correlation in 
accomplishing the high KPI scores. In addition, being a mentor seemed to be a crucial 
leadership style in order to achieve PA, particularly for the chiefs of the agencies. They 
played a significant role in recommending and creating accountability among the 
employees as stated below: 
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“I would give recommendation and create accountability among the officials…. If there 
were any complaints from the public or service users, I could transfer my staff to a more 
appropriate position.” (Senior manager, Deputy Governor, Provincial Administration 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
In conclusion, in the process of PA, leadership is not only important in terms of concrete 
support as stated in the earlier section, but also abstract support such as opening 
opportunities for sharing opinions; as well as being coordinator, team builder, hard 
driver, and mentor. This support would contribute towards generating, for example, 
consensus orientation, participation, accountability and effectiveness in the public 
agencies. The evidence suggests that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tend to be good team builders, hard drivers and mentors rather than in the low 
KPI scoring provinces.  
 
6.2.4 The use of the leaders’ authority 
The respondents perceived that using the Governor’s authority was essential for a 
smooth operation, monitoring progress of the KPIs, and solving problems related to 
KPIs. These features are elucidated by the following accounts:  
 
“If the leaders, the Governor or Vice Governor, paid attention and monitored the KPIs, 
meetings might not be needed as the leaders could give orders to their subordinates 
directly and the agencies’ progress in the KPIs could be generated by an informal 
conversation between the leaders and the chiefs of the agencies. When the chiefs of the 
agencies paid great attention and follow-up on the progress, it created respect and good 
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cooperation.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“We had to use the Governor’s authority because he is as the key figure who gave orders 
to all agencies and then the provincial agencies had to participate.” (Senior manager, 
Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014, PL2) 
 
“The most important factor was the leaders, Governor or Vice governor, who 
understood and saw KPIs as priorities. The leaders were the main person who managed 
all agencies such as monitoring the progress of the tasks. They, in turn, would have to 
pay attention to their work because a bureaucratic culture depends on the 
leader.”(Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“Using the Governor’s authority across the province could help solving problems for 
the officials. Although the jobs were not perfectly finished, but at least the jobs were 
done.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
The data suggest that using position power – top-down authority – is strong in both  
the low and high KPI scoring provinces. The executives’ authority seems to be  
a significant element determining commitment to the KPIs, namely generating 
collaboration, participation and accountability in achieving the KPIs among the 
agencies.   
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However, the ways in which authority was used seem different. In the low KPI scoring 
provinces, the leaders tend to use authority based on command – a more authoritarian 
leadership style. The respondents commonly mention how ‘the leaders gave orders to 
the agencies or the subordinates’ for creating cooperation and participation. On the other 
hand, the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to use authority based more 
on understanding and attentiveness – a more participative leadership style. Statements 
such as ‘the leaders understood, gave priority to the KPIs, resolved the problems’ are 
often voiced by respondents in the high KPI scoring provinces. 
 
6.2.5 The leaders’ consideration of performance-related reward 
The annual reward budget of a province is linked with the overall result it attains in PA. 
The respondents perceived that leadership involved consideration of incentive 
allocation. The Governor and chiefs of agencies had a certain authority to decide 
people’s reward-based performance because the reward was cascaded from the 
provinces to agencies and individuals respectively. The data suggested that individuals 
expected incentive allocation by the leaders to be fair. Many respondents perceived that 
the incentive was a potential motivator: 
 
“The leaders should ensure fairness of allocation of rewards to subordinates such as 
bonus and credit claiming. This could motivate the officials to achieve in the KPI goals, 
especially at practitioner level.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment 
Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
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“The officials who worked hard and had greater workload should be considered for 
more rewards than others. I disagreed with dividing the reward evenly between all 
eligible employees.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, 
Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“An important support from the leaders to help the officials perform the KPIs was incentive 
for the subordinates, the system which entitled them to rewards.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
In summary, the data suggest that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces 
tend to recognize impartiality, rule of law (e.g. clear criteria of the incentive allocation), 
and equity for reward allocation among the officials.  
 
6.3 Human resources and reward 
The majority of respondents perceived that human resources were a significant element 
influencing attainment of PA whilst reward was also a crucial factor reinforcing peoples’ 
performance in terms of motivation in achieving the high KPI scores. This section 
addresses the influence of human resources and rewards on the system of PA as shown 
in Figure 42. It is divided into three stages: inputs (e.g. recruitment, assumptions29 on 
PA, and characteristics of the team of Provincial Governor’s Office); processes  
(e.g. training and meetings, rotation and demand of work); and outputs/outcomes  
                                                          
29 Assumptions refers to ‘the unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings 
that are the ultimate source of values and actions’(Senior and Fleming, 2006, p. 144).  
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(e.g. performance-related pay and recommendations to improve the criteria of incentive 
allocation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42 Human resources and reward influence to the system of PA 
 
6.3.1 Recruitment of the responsible persons for the KPIs 
According to the senior managers, selection of appropriate individuals who were 
responsible for the KPIs was viewed as the first priority in achieving the KPIs. They 
suggested that there were at least three criteria for recruiting personnel, including:  
(1) the current tasks or duties related to the KPIs; (2) knowledge and skills such as an 
understanding of the standard of the KPIs, and having skills of coordination and 
experience related to the KPIs such as being a KPI data collector, and writing reports; 
and 3) accountability.  
 
 
Outputs/Outcomes 
 
Inputs 
 Recruitment  
(duty-related, 
knowledge and skills, 
experience, 
accountability) 
 
 Assumptions about 
PA (beliefs on KPIs, 
awareness)  
 
 Characteristics of 
team of Provincial 
Governor’s Office  
 
Processes 
 
  
 Performance-
related pay (PRP) 
 
 Recommendations 
to improve the 
criteria of incentive 
allocation 
 
 
 
 
 Training and  
meetings 
 
 Rotation 
 
 Pressure of 
work 
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Firstly, the primary qualification of those responsible was to have the existing tasks or 
duties related to the KPIs, as one of the interviewees stated that: 
 
“Recruitment of responsible persons for the KPIs was considered by their duties related 
to KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
   
Secondly, the staff responsible were required to have knowledge, skills and experience 
related to the KPIs, particularly an understanding of the standard of the KPIs and having 
coordination ability. These were essential in terms of building trust, introducing 
knowledge and communicating with related agencies and people. These points are 
illustrated by the following comments: 
 
“In the Provincial Governor’s Office, the appropriate responsible persons had to have 
skills in coordination, using both formal and informal communications. Moreover, they 
had to have knowledge and understanding of the KPIs they had been assigned for.” 
(Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
 
“Understanding and knowledge of the KPIs were necessary because it involved the 
reliability in introducing the KPIs to other officials. Furthermore, experience of working 
on the KPIs was also considered.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community 
Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
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It appeared that the low KPI scoring provinces were more challenged in terms of inter-
agency communication, as indicated by the following quote: 
 
“Working on the KPIs required officials who had a specific skill of coordination. In 
fact, a number of officials did not like to liaise with other people. So, they did not feel 
comfortable performing the KPIs and preferred to do easier jobs.” (Practitioner, 
Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
Accomplishing PA requires coordination and participation – collectivism – among the 
agencies in the provinces, especially the Provincial Governor’s Office and main KPI 
host agencies and individualist officials were less able to deliver this.  
 
A number of respondents revealed that recruitment of appropriate staff performing the 
KPIs was problematic due to a limited number of personnel. This challenge was 
extensively mentioned by the senior managers as follows: 
 
“The agencies that had a large number of the officials were able to recruit appropriate 
responsible persons of the KPIs while other agencies were not able to due to the limited 
number of personnel. As a result, they had to recruit the general service officers to do 
the jobs. For example, the Provincial Governor’s Office assigned government 
employees to perform the KPIs, while the officials had little involvement.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
24 July 2014: PH2) 
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“We did not have the right to recruit the responsible people for the KPIs because we were 
able to recruit only the existing personnel.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“Our organization is a small one, so I did not have right to recruit the responsible 
personnel.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
Both the low and high KPI scoring provinces appeared to have a lack of personnel. This 
problem may lead some agencies in the provinces to use temporary employees for 
performing the KPIs, when in fact it should be the duty of genuine officials. 
 
Thirdly, the data suggested that accountability was the other crucial qualification of  
the responsible staff for PA. It was found that achieving PA was related to the officials 
who were devoted in working to achieve the KPIs, which determined individual 
accountability as one of the respondents stated that: 
 
“When budget was not allocated to help achieve the KPIs, we could still succeed by 
working in partnership between agencies, with our devoted team of staff to do the best 
we could.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
This implies that accomplishment of PA requires a combination of accountability of the 
staff and collaboration between agencies in the provinces. It also reflects the situation 
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that although the high KPI scoring provinces did not always get support from the 
superiors in terms of budget, they could achieve high KPI scores due to a better 
combination of staff accountability and agency participation.  
 
6.3.2 Assumptions on PA  
The data suggested that individuals’ assumptions such as negative or positive beliefs 
influenced the officials’ behaviour and performance in accomplishing PA. The senior 
managers in the high KPI scoring provinces revealed that there were some officials who 
believed that the KPIs were not their actual tasks or responsibilities as illustrated below: 
 
“I thought that the KPIs were not our main responsibility….We recognized that working 
on the KPIs was sometimes enforced by the executives…On the contrary, the 
accomplishment of the KPIs might derive from the officials’ conscience.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“A number of officials believed that the province meant the Provincial Governor’s 
Office, not including the other 33 agencies in the province. Thus, they thought that the 
KPIs of the province had to be responsible by the Provincial Governor’s Office.” 
(Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“The commencement of the KPIs was believed by several officials that was the OPDC’s 
KPIs and was not the province’s tasks or their own tasks. Consequently, they did not 
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see a connection between the KPIs and their line of work. Moreover, they thought that 
the result of the KPIs did not affect their routine jobs, so they could choose to do or not 
depending on themselves.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management 
group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Although the PA scheme has been promoted for over a decade, some people seem to 
have questions about it such as who is the owner of the KPIs (e.g. OPDC or Provincial 
Governor’s Office), and whether the KPIs are really linked with their routine tasks or 
provincial strategies. The implication is that some officials perform the KPIs simply 
because they are instructed or required to do so, but without any willingness on their 
own part. 
 
Employees’ assumptions about the KPIs appeared to influence performance in terms  
of commitment, accountability, participation and collaboration. This is further 
illustrated by the following quotes:  
 
“Personnel had to believe that the KPIs were a part of their tasks. If they did not have 
positive attitudes to do the jobs, it might lead to getting the low KPI scores.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“We could achieve high KPI scores if our personnel paid great attention, had careful 
planning and cooperation, and worked well with each other.” (Senior manager, Chief 
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of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: 
PL2) 
 
“Fortunately, the officials in our province had work ethics and carried out their 
responsibility to achieve the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Deputy Governor, Provincial 
Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
The implication of the individuals’ assumptions such as conscientious, positive attitudes 
and responsibility are important for the success of PA, particularly accountability. 
However, some respondents claimed that thought had to be given to how individual 
accountability was generated. One of the interviewees explained that:  
 
“Personnel’s awareness and accountability on KPIs were a crucial factor…. However, 
the official’s accountability could be categorized into two aspects. The first was they 
might be pressured by their superiors into achieving high KPI scores. The other was 
their conscience, which sometimes goes against Thais’ free thinking nature. In other 
words, they do not like enforcement.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource 
management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Here the accountability of people appears to be created by the leaders’ authority and the 
officials’ own conscience. The data suggests that it would be better if individual 
accountability were created by the personnel’s conscience than by enforcement and 
hierarchy culture (control-orientation). 
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In addition, individuals’ assumptions regarding collaboration and teamwork at the level 
of provinces and agencies were also referred to as necessary for high scores. The 
respondents stated that: 
 
“We thought that participation and teamwork between the agencies were the most 
important factors obtaining achievement of the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Governor’s Office and Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“Collaboration of the officials in the internal and external organizations contributed to 
our province’s accomplishment in the KPIs. If we communicated with each other and 
we were in agreement about KPIs, we could resolve the problems and also monitor the 
jobs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
6.3.3 Characteristics of team of Provincial Governor’s Office 
A number of officials perceived that the characteristics of the team of Provincial 
Governor’s Office were a key factor in determining achievement in the KPIs. This team 
was important not only as a facilitator of the process of PA, but also as a mentor for the 
agencies in their provinces. The interviewees elucidated that: 
 
“Fortunately, our province had a competent team of Provincial Governor’s Office as a 
good coach. We could contact the coordinator at the Provincial Governor’s Office 
whenever we had problems related to the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
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“One of the crucial roles that engaged the KPIs was being a mentor for the agencies 
because a few problems occurred when the responsible persons for the KPIs, internal 
and external agency, were changed and the standard of the KPIs were changed. As a 
coordinator in the central agency, we had to support them.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014, PH1) 
 
6.3.4 Training and meetings 
The majority of respondents perceived that they did not have much training relevant to 
the KPIs, but they had had meetings instead of training. There were at least four types 
of meetings that were commonly mentioned by the interviewees: (1) central government 
meetings; (2) provincial meetings, for example on the introduction of the KPIs and 
allocation of responsibilities, and monitoring progress of the KPIs over the period of 6, 
9, and 12 months; (3) external meetings between the main and second KPI host agencies; 
and (4) the internal meetings of the KPI host agencies. These are illustrated in the 
following statements: 
 
“We did not have the actual trainings related to the KPIs, but we had various kinds of 
the meetings such as introduction of standard of the KPIs, the meetings of the central 
government by the OPDC, and  the meetings for monitoring progress of the KPIs in the 
period of 6, 9, and 12 months. So, we had the total number of the provincial meetings 
about 3-4 times per fiscal year.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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“Although we did not have much training of the KPIs, we had several patterns of the 
meetings. For example, the meetings to report the progress of the KPIs to the Governor 
which could stimulate the KPI host agencies to be enthusiastic. The meetings of the 
central government through the VDO conferences were organized by the OPDC. The 
provincial meetings between the KPI host agencies for monitoring progression of the 
KPIs (3-4 times per year were organized by the Provincial Governor’s Office.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 
2014: PL1) 
 
The meetings are a significant element in the system of PA in terms of introducing 
policies and standards of the KPIs for the officials, allocation of responsibilities, 
integrating collaboration among the agencies and monitoring progress of the KPIs. The 
implication is that provinces that had regular meetings tended to achieve in the KPIs.  
 
Nevertheless, there were several challenges to the training based on internal and external 
factors. An internal factor was the individuals themselves such as participants’ 
attentiveness during training:  
 
“The officials sometimes did not pay attention to the whole meeting, the introduction of 
standard of the KPIs through the VDO conferences by the OPDC. They would 
concentrate mainly on their own KPIs and might leave the meeting after it moved on to 
the next KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 
13 August 2014: PH1) 
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“I think that nobody wanted to attend the training of the KPIs. The responsible persons 
themselves did not want to be trained. As a result, the training was useless. Hence, the 
leaders should assign the appropriate persons to attend the training.” (Practitioner, 
Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
External factors such as the lack of introductory knowledge received from the training 
to others, and the limited budget were likely to be important barriers to getting training 
as illustrated by the followings examples: 
 
“I thought that the training sessions reflected the weakness of the bureaucracy. There 
was not much training available. We wanted our organization’s members to be more 
knowledgeable…. The persons who attended the training courses might not cascade 
their knowledge to others. They saw the training as their own personal development 
rather than being a representative of the agency.” (Senior manager, Deputy Governor, 
Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“We were deficient in budget for the training related to the KPIs for the personnel, so 
we could organize only the meetings within our organization.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“We needed the training, but we did not have a budget. If the OPDC allocated the 
budget in the training, it would help us. Actually, we would like to invite the professional 
of the OPDC to introduce knowledge of the KPIs, but we had a problem with the 
budget.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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The respondents also suggested that the training should be relevant to the KPIs in terms 
of topics and accessible language: 
 
“The topic of the training should depend on the type of KPIs….The OPDC should 
organize the regional training at a province which is the centre of the region where the 
other provinces in the region could attend.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“It was important that the training courses of the KPIs should be delivered in simple 
language, easy to understand, by real professionals such as university lecturers.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 22 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“The trainings, such as a day workshop at least once a year, would be more useful than 
attending several meetings.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
6.3.5 Rotation of personnel 
As stated earlier, training was necessary to perform the KPIs, particularly in the 
provinces where responsible persons for the KPIs were frequently relocated. Rotation 
of personnel caused problems in terms of the need for the new people to understand the 
system, and the need to reprocess the data and write new reports: 
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“If the staff members who were responsible for the KPIs were rotated frequently, the 
new ones had to spend a lot of time trying to figure out the existing KPI system.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“Rotation of the responsible persons for the KPIs was a problem that we were frequently 
confronted with. We had to restart the whole process with the replaced personnel.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The previous personnel responsible for the KPIs did not leave the documents behind 
when he moved to another workplace, resulting in lost documents during the transfer. 
So, the new one had to review the jobs again and the team of Provincial Governor’s 
Office had to support them.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
High KPI scoring provinces seem to have not found rotation to be much of a problem, 
apparently due to staff not being interested in relocation (which suggests that problems 
with rotation were a symptom of lower motivation in the low KPI scoring provinces): 
“Some officials who were placed in an office far away from their hometown might not 
want to devote to their tasks and spent more efforts in finding a way to be relocated in 
their hometown. However, the officials in this province were different from others 
because they did not want to relocate. Therefore, they paid attention to their work.” 
(Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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“Fortunately, the officials within our province do not relocate very often. They had been 
here for a long time, so they had a good relationship to each other. Consequently, our 
province had good collaboration.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Agencies in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to have a higher degree of 
collaboration on the KPIs than the low KPI scoring provinces and may also have a lower 
rate of rotation of people.  
 
6.3.6 Pressure of work 
The overwhelming pressure of work was viewed as an important challenge in 
performing the KPIs, particularly at the level of practitioners. They elucidated that 
workload within the tight timeframe perhaps influenced quality of work and 
introduction of knowledge to other people. These features are illustrated by the 
followings statements: 
 
“The proportion of jobs influenced the performance on KPIs. I had an experience 
working in a province where the workload was manageable. Thus, I had time to refine 
my work. In this province, in contrast, I was responsible for a lot of workload with tight 
deadlines which had affected the quality of my work.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“It was difficult to perform jobs within the tight timeframe because we were 
overwhelmed. Consequently, we could not finish the jobs on time and they could have 
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low quality. It looked like we could achieve the outputs, but we were not sure about the 
outcomes. ” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“I had a lot of work to do, so I did not have much time to cascade my knowledge of the 
KPIs to the new responsible persons while the new ones did not have time for studying.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
These data imply that several practitioners were struggling with overwhelming pressure 
of work on tight deadlines in the context of PA. Thus, the organizational skill of officials 
was important in getting jobs done as well as maintaining work-life balance. The 
evidence suggests that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to finish 
their tasks on the tight deadline although they are likely pressured by the strict 
timeframe. Moreover, ability to cope with pressure of work is likely to be associated 
with the officials’ job satisfaction performing the KPIs. 
 
There were at least three causes of overwhelming pressure of work, which were 
commonly mentioned by the interviewees: (1) assignment of tasks by the leaders or 
additional tasks from their own routine jobs; (2) non-dispersive work (work that could 
not be delegated); and (3) limited number of personnel.  
 
“A cause of the officials’ bias to perform the KPIs might start from the leaders, for 
example, the leaders’ decision in selecting certain people whose work dealt with the 
KPIs resulted in unequal workload distribution in the organization while the reward 
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was spread evenly.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial 
Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“Some agencies had to do a lot of jobs related to the KPIs because the KPIs were 
sometimes not dispersed to others.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“The Provincial Governor’s Office had a limited number of officials to work with the 
KPIs. We had to be responsible for every task of the province issued from the central 
government. We were the central agency of the province and we worked as the secretary 
of the Governor. Thus, we had a lot of jobs to do and work towards tight deadlines.” 
(Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“Our organization had a limitation on number of officials. There were only 10 officials 
while the rest of the staff were temporary employees. Some employees were not very 
motivated and dedicated as they wanted to seek a better job elsewhere.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
It may be noted that the leaders played a key role in distribution of responsibilities. In 
other words, the individuals’ workload could be increased or reduced by management 
decisions. An overwhelming work burden could become a cause of job dissatisfaction 
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among officials. This may be part of a more general trend whereby officials’ attitudes 
on performing the KPIs may be shaped by the managers: 
 
“A number of officials might have bias doing the KPIs. I would explain to them in the 
initial step that everyone was important in working on the KPIs and that we had to work 
as a team.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock 
Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
It has been noted that the managers in the high KPI scoring provinces appear to 
emphasise what employees viewed as a participative leadership style, whereas the 
leaders in the low KPI scoring provinces less so. This is emphasized by one of the 
practitioners in a low KPI scoring province: 
 
“I had to work on KPI alongside my main job description. It was assigned by the leaders 
and I had to do it no matter how tight the deadlines were. Some officials might not be 
willing to do it. It was a burden. It was a duty….It was important for the leaders to make 
sure that the officials had an understanding about the importance of the KPIs and how 
to delegate the duties appropriately.” (Practitioner, Provincial Community 
Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
This statement reflects that the subordinates in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to 
have job dissatisfaction. This is because leaders may not focus on the staff by ensuring 
understanding and allocating appropriate responsibilities. Also, people in the low KPI 
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scoring provinces tend to work based on the leaders’ directives (authoritarian leadership 
style) without being motivated beyond this.  
 
Other officials appeared to be neither satisfied nor dissatisfied about demand of work 
related to the KPIs. They perceived that they could cope with their workload because 
some KPIs were continuously performed for several fiscal years. Thus, these KPIs were 
viewed as their routine jobs. Furthermore, they could do their jobs following on the 
standard of the KPIs as elucidated by one of the practitioners that: 
 
“Performing tasks related to the KPIs was not too overwhelming for me. Working with 
KPIs had become a routine to me because I have worked on the KPIs for several 
years.… The new responsible one for the KPIs might find it difficult to hit the ground 
running.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 
August 2014: PH1) 
 
The implication of some KPIs is perhaps viewed by the practitioners as their routine job. 
This assumption may contribute to a lack of enthusiasm achieving goals of the KPIs 
(market culture). They may perhaps focus on how to please their superiors rather than 
on high quality of public service and how to find techniques in getting high KPI scores. 
 
6.3.7 Performance-related pay (PRP) 
There were a variety of perspectives on performance-related pay (PRP) focused on the 
criteria of incentive allocation. The data suggested that the respondents’ options on the 
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criteria of incentive allocation can be divided into three aspects: agree, disagree, and 
neither agrees nor disagrees, including suggestions on reward.  
 
Agreement with the criteria of incentive allocation 
The officials perceived that financial reward was a motivational tool for performing the 
KPIs. Many interviewees seemed to agree with the criteria of the incentive allocation in 
terms of enhancing motivation, stating that: 
 
“I agreed to maintain the criteria of reward based on result of the KPIs because the 
financial incentive was a motivation for people. However, the criteria should be 
adjusted to be more appropriate for the officials.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock 
Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The financial reward was a motivation for the officials in working on the KPIs. 
Although they were not rewarded, they still performed their tasks. However, it was better 
to provide the reward.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“I agreed with the criteria of incentive allocation because it was at the heart of working 
between the superiors and subordinates. If we did not have the incentive, the officials’ 
morale for working might be decreased and they might perform the tasks with 
unhappiness. For instance, the leaders might get only the jobs done, but the 
subordinates might not put their heart and soul into it.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
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Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development 
Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
A number of the respondents agreed that the criteria of reward allocation, particularly 
financial reward, can engender enthusiasm of the practitioners. Thus, they agreed that 
the criteria of the incentive allocation should be maintained, but that improvements were 
needed. It was noticeable that people in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to be 
more concerned about financial rewards than the high KPI scoring provinces. The 
motivation of some officials in the low KPI scoring provinces might even be dependent 
on reward allocation. On the contrary, people in the high KPI scoring provinces are 
likely to focus on the tasks more than reward.  
 
Disagreement with the criteria of incentive allocation 
On the other hand, some respondents disagreed with the criteria of incentive allocation, 
particularly at the level of the provinces. There are four main reasons that people 
disagree with the criteria of incentive allocation: (1) the limitation of people related to 
the KPIs; (2) unfairness of reward allocation; (3) a small amount of reward; and (4) 
fabrication of evidence in order to attain high KPI scores. 
 
Firstly, selection of the tasks and people related to the KPIs appeared to be limited. It 
was also viewed as a cause of argument and disharmony in the level of the provinces 
and agencies as stated below: 
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“I disagreed with the criteria of incentive allocation in the level of provinces.... In fact, 
there were various tasks of the provinces, but some tasks were selected as the KPIs. 
Hence, the other officials whose tasks were not associated with the KPIs might get less 
reward than others.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial 
Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The money issue usually causes an argument… When the responsible persons of the 
KPIs were eligible for the reward allocation, some agencies might want to be in charge 
disregarding the nature of their work which was not relevant to that specific KPI. The 
amount of rewards for each agency might vary resulting in the officials’ morale being 
undermined. This also affected the unity of the organisation.” (Senior manager, Chief 
of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: 
PH1) 
 
“The criteria of incentive allocation by the OPDC indicated that only the officials 
involved with the KPIs could receive the reward. Actually, the provinces had several 
tasks that were not evaluated as the KPIs. So, it was not fair for various officials who 
worked on other tasks… It was sometimes found that the responsible persons for the 
KPIs did not perform the tasks of the KPIs because they gained the same rate of reward 
as others.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
Secondly, the criteria of incentive allocation were a concern for officials in terms of 
unfairness of reward allocation such as the Provincial Governor’s Office getting a higher 
reward; the challenge of inter-personnel reward allocation; the different numbers of 
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officials in the provinces and agencies; the limitation on the central government staff at 
the provincial administration getting rewards: 
 
“From my experience working for several provinces, the fairness in allocating the 
reward was quite a challenge. For example, there were several provinces that the 
Provincial Governor’s Office claimed for more incentive allocation than others… 
Although there were the standard criteria of reward allocation by the OPDC, The 
Governor’s Office made a decision on the proportion of reward for all agencies 
involved.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial 
Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“Generally, the Provincial Governor’s Office managed the reward allocation for all 
agencies in the province. Consequently, the Governor’s office was likely to be criticised 
about transparency of reward allocation.” (Senior manager, Chief Provincial Livestock 
Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
This implies that the Provincial Governor’s Office appears to influence allocation of 
reward in the provinces. Many provinces tend to have a problem of transparency 
regarding reward allocation by the Provincial Governor’s Office. This may lead to a 
lack of trust regarding the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office, which may be a 
problem performing the KPIs in the provinces. 
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If the criteria of the incentive allocation were not clear, a different reward allocation 
could be found at the inter-personnel level such as between responsible and non-
responsible ones and between the superiors and the employees as explained below: 
 
“A problem of reward allocation was that the officials who were not responsible for the 
KPIs as their tasks did not directly involve with the KPIs felt they gained less incentive 
than the responsible ones. This might lead to disagreement among the staff.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“A problem of incentive allocation was the leaders. If the leader gained much more 
reward than the subordinates, it might bring disharmony in the agency.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 
July 2014: PL1) 
 
“Difference in getting a financial reward between the officials might lead to a loss of 
trust in each other.” (Senior manager, Chief Provincial Administration Office, 
Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Moreover, the different number of officials in the level of provinces and agencies 
appeared to be a challenge of the reward allocation in a province, and could lead to 
perceptions of unfairness: 
 
“When I worked in a small province with less staff members, the reward was distributed 
among a small group of officials. Consequently, the proportion of the reward was much 
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bigger. In my current job, it is a bigger province with more staff members, the 
proportion of the reward, as a result, is very small. ” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The reward distribution system is not fair. For example, the agencies with a large 
number of officials worked hard, but each one gained a little reward because it had to 
be divided between so many people. Meanwhile, the others with a small number of 
officials had a smaller workload, but each one received a bigger portion.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 
July 2014: PL1) 
 
“There were three levels of the officials: chief executive, middle managers, and first-
line officers. Some agencies had a large number of middle managers and a small 
number of first-line officers. When the reward was divided evenly according to the 
number of officials, the officials in middle management positions might receive even less 
reward than those first-line officers. Thus, the criteria should be revised. The current 
criteria might be the cause of disharmony, and jealousy among the officials which would 
affect cooperation in the future.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: 
PH2) 
 
In addition, a problem of perceptions of unfairness of reward allocation was found among 
the central government agencies working alongside the provincial administration. This 
seems to derive from the criteria of incentive allocation indicated by the OPDC, namely 
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the central agencies at the provincial administration had to receive reward from their 
parent ministries or departments.  This idea is illustrated by one of the officials stating: 
 
“The provinces could achieve in the KPIs by cooperation of the central government 
agencies in the region. However, these agencies could not get the incentive from the 
provinces as the OPDC indicated. They had to get the incentive from the central 
government.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
As stated earlier, unfairness of the criteria of reward allocation may lead to a discrepancy 
between the amount of rewards in the levels of provinces, agencies and individuals, 
which may undermine the workforce’s morale in performing the KPIs, losing trust 
between the agencies, and decreasing collaboration among the agencies. It is important 
to note that the senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces seem to show concern 
regarding equity of the incentive allocation, which indicates a good signal in terms of 
the reward management.  
 
Thirdly, a small amount of the financial reward played a significant effect on 
performance in terms of people’s motivation. These points are set out below: 
 
“These days, the reward was less. Therefore, the officials were less motivated.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community 
Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
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“We had less incentive in comparison with the local government agencies. Their annual 
reward was 4-5 times of their salary. In contrast, the provincial agencies received much 
less reward.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
This implies that people in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to focus on amount of 
the financial reward more than the high KPI scoring provinces. The lower KPI scoring 
provinces perhaps demonstrate a higher degree of individualism and consequently a 
greater focus on extrinsic motivation, such as money.  
 
Fourthly, some officials mentioned that the possibility of sanctions or high incentives 
could lead to attempts to fabricate performance data in order to receive high scores in 
some agencies or provinces. One of the respondents suggested: 
 
“The result of performance evaluation might provide either strong punishment or high 
incentive. These might lead the officials in attempting to fabricate the evidence.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 
July 2014: PL1) 
 
Not all respondents were concerned with the criteria of incentive allocation: 
 
“Some officials were likely to pay little attention to how much financial reward was 
allocated for them.” (Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
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6.3.8 Recommendations to improve the criteria of incentive allocation 
In terms of recommendations for improvement of the criteria of the incentive allocation, 
officials suggested that reward should be improved in terms of (1) providing for the 
clearer criteria of the reward allocation; (2) increasing the amount of the financial 
reward; (3) generating new forms of incentive; (4) other suggestions and cancellation of 
reward. These features are explained as follows. 
 
Firstly, the majority of interviewees suggested that the criteria of incentive allocation 
should be changed to provide clearer criteria. Particularly, it should be clear about the 
different amount of reward between responsible and non-responsible persons for the 
KPIs; the different number of officials in the level of provinces and agencies; the 
different amount of reward between the main and second KPI host agencies; and the 
different amount of reward between the senior managers and practitioners, including 
other related suggestions. These ideas are illustrated below:  
 
“The criteria of reward allocation should be clearer between the officials involved and 
not involved with the KPIs. Some kinds of tasks were not selected as the KPIs, but the 
tasks were, perhaps, the important tasks of the provinces. Hence, the officials who 
performed these tasks should be considered for the incentive as well as the responsible 
ones for the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“The criteria of incentive allocation should be considered in terms of the number of 
officials in each KPI host agency because it might lead to complaints about different 
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rewards among the agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“I think the main KPI host agencies deserved to have more reward than the secondary 
host agencies because they worked harder.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 
28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“The criteria of reward between the senior managers and practitioners should be 
improved. It should not be much different.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 
2014: PL2) 
 
The senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces appear to be more dissatisfied 
with the criteria of reward allocation than the high KPI scoring provinces, perhaps 
because their motivation is more dependent on extrinsic rewards. Some senior managers 
claimed that they should receive the same rate or higher rate of reward than the 
practitioners as indicated in the following statements: 
 
“I think the criteria of incentive allocation were not fair for the leaders. In the past, the 
leaders received more financial reward than the subordinates. These days the 
subordinates received much more than the leaders.  In fact, the KPIs would not have 
been achieved without the support from the leaders. Hence, reward allocation should 
be at least the same proportion between the leaders and practitioners.” (Senior 
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manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“I agree with the criteria of reward by the OPDC, but I think the reward for the leaders– 
Governor, Vice Governor, and chiefs of the agencies – seemed to be less than the 
practitioners. As a result, the leaders’ morale might be decreased. Thus, the reward 
allocation for the leaders should be increased.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
The perceived inequity of the reward allocation between the senior managers and 
practitioners could affect leaders’ motivation regarding the KPIs and have knock-on 
effects in terms of their staff’s motivation.  
 
Some officials offered recommendations for improving the criteria of reward allocation. 
For example, dispersion of the KPIs for more agencies and individuals, and using other 
forms of the criteria of reward allocation. The respondents suggested that: 
 
“Working in the KPIs should be dispersed for more officials. Exactly, there were only a 
few officials doing the KPIs in the agency… The criteria of reward should be improved 
and clearer.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial 
Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“The money reward should be divided into two parts. The first part provided to the 
agencies for developing their work. The other part was allocated based on the OPDC’s 
 
 
223 
 
criteria such as proportion of 30:70 or 50:50. The first proportion, 30 or 50 percent, 
was allocated to every official in the province as a gift of participation. The second 
proportion, 70 or 50, was allocated to only the officials who were responsible for the 
KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Secondly, several respondents revealed that the current financial reward seemed to be 
not much for the motivation of people. They suggested that one of the ways of improving 
rewards was to increase the amount of money. The officials elucidated that: 
 
“The only change that I needed was to increase amount of the financial reward. It would 
be more of a motivation for the officials to do their jobs.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“The amount of the reward should be increased more than the present.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 
2014: PL1)  
 
“We needed more incentive by the central government... The leaders – Governor, Vice 
Governor, and chiefs of the agencies – had to be responsible for the KPI failure by, for 
example, being transferred if they failed to achieve the KPI targets.” (Senior manager, 
Chief of Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
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Thirdly, some respondents suggested that new forms of incentives should be considered 
such as promoting to a higher position, increasing salary, receiving training, learning 
from best practices at home or abroad: 
 
“The characteristics of the reward should be varied such as being promoted to a higher 
position, getting training, having official visits to other organisations in the country or 
overseas. The reward criteria have to be clear. Like the pay rise system, the percentage 
of the reward allocation must be clearly stated.” (Senior manager, Chief of human 
resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“I disagreed with the financial reward because it was not much. The feature of the 
reward should be changed from the financial reward to better resources for agencies 
such as a government agency vehicle or equipment for working.” (Senior manager, 
Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The new forms of the reward should be created when the officials could achieve the 
KPIs, for example, providing 4-5 times of the salary reward, giving better welfare, and 
promoting to a higher position... Without the right motivation, the officials might refuse 
to work on KPIs in the future.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group and Chief of human resource management group, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
These ideas reflect that a number of the officials seem to require the central government, 
the OPDC, to review the financial reward and consider new forms of the reward. It might 
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contribute to more motivation in implementing the KPIs, although, as noted above, high 
performing provinces were not primarily concerned with rewards. This does not mean 
that increasing rewards might not positively impact on the motivation of lower 
performing provinces. 
 
Finally, the interviewees recommended other issues suggesting that the leaders’ 
explanation regarding reward allocation was required. This may enhance understanding 
between the employees and may prevent disharmony about monetary reward. One of 
the practitioners stated that:    
 
“In our province, 3-5 meetings were organised to come up with the best criteria for 
reward allocation. The leaders proposed different formulas to the officials to consider 
and voted for the best one. The officials took part in the process.” (Practitioner, 
Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
In addition, there were a few suggestions about whether the financial reward should be 
cancelled altogether because of the complicated allocation of the reward, especially in 
the level of provinces and agencies:   
 
“The financial reward should not be abolished. We know there have been problems with 
the reward allocation criteria. We should aim to resolve the issue and create a better 
system.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
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“We created several formulas for payment calculation of financial reward to the 
agencies…It was difficult and complicated and it might be better without the money 
reward. The officials who were responsible for the KPIs sometimes received the same 
reward as those who were not responsible. As a result, their morale to do the tasks was 
destroyed. Then, I had to call for a meeting to explain how the reward was allocated. I 
think it’s probably better to abolish the reward system.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
However, one of the respondents argued that cancellation of the reward might contribute 
to a lack of enthusiasm in performing the KPIs in the civil servants. He recommended 
that new improved alternatives for the reward allocation should be considered as 
follows:  
 
“Abolition of the reward allocation might lead to lack of motivation and enthusiasm 
among the officials to do the jobs. The OPDC had to develop new criteria for incentive 
allocation based on the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management 
group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
6.4 Performance, outputs and outcomes 
This section reports on the data related to performance, outputs and outcomes in  
the process of PA. There are three stages of the system of PA as shown in Figure 43, 
including inputs (capabilities of individuals and teams, and promulgation of PA in each 
fiscal year); processes (factors to influence performance); and outputs and outcomes 
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(advantages and  disadvantages in getting  high and low KPI scores, opinions on outputs 
and outcomes of PA, and recommendations for PA).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43 Performance, outputs and outcomes in the system of PA 
 
6.4.1 Capabilities of individuals and teams 
The officials’ competencies were a significant element in achieving the KPIs, including 
collaboration, teamwork, potential of the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office, and 
potential of the KPI host agencies. It was found that collaboration between the agencies 
and officials plays a crucial impact on attainment of the KPIs as stated below: 
 
“We could achieve KPI goals, if we receive cooperation from the officials within our 
agency. A meeting concerning the announcement of policy was important in creating 
recognition and corrective performance among the officials, particularly the level of the 
practitioners.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, 
Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014, PH2) 
 
Outputs/Outcomes 
 
Inputs 
1. Capabilities of individuals 
and teams 
 Collaboration 
 Teamwork 
 Potential of the team of 
Provincial Governor’s Office 
 Potential of the KPI host 
agencies (e.g. enthusiasm, 
responsibilities, sharing 
information) 
 
 
 
Processes 
 
  
1. Advantages and 
 disadvantages in 
achieving high and low 
KPI scores 
 Achieving high KPI 
scores 
 Achieving low KPI scores 
 
2. Opinions on outputs and 
outcomes of PA 
 Agreed 
 Disagreed 
 Neither agreed nor 
disagreed 
 
3. Recommendations  for 
 PA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors to influence 
performance 
 Understanding of 
standard of the KPIs 
 Transparency to 
perform the KPIs 
 Experience from 
previous years 
 Meeting-related 
performance 
 Attributes of 
provinces (e.g. size, 
culture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Promulgation of PA in each 
fiscal year 
 List of the KPIs 
 Time frame of performance 
evaluation 
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“We could not get collaboration from some agencies, particularly the central 
government in provinces because they did not receive benefits and believed that they 
were overwhelmed by their routine jobs.” (Senior manager, Chief Provincial 
Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
This implies that achieving PA is found in the provinces with a high degree of cohesion 
or participation – characterized by collectivism or strong clan culture. In the low KPI 
scoring provinces, there appears to be a low level of collaboration between the agencies, 
particularly the central government agencies at the provincial administration – and a 
leaning towards individualism. The data suggested that the officials in the low KPI 
scoring provinces tended to focus on their routine jobs rather than the KPIs. On the other 
hand, people in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to be conscientious because the 
chiefs of agencies introduced clear policies and created recognition of the tasks among 
the staff as the first priority. 
 
Many respondents referred to teamwork, which was viewed in terms of integrated 
collaboration in the provinces – achieving the KPIs in each agency leading the overall 
PA result of the provinces. One of the respondents elucidated that: 
 
“The crucial factors for success are working as a team or integrated agencies as the 
OPDC suggested. Establishment of stages for discussion, communication, and 
monitoring through meetings was important to accomplish KPI targets.” (Senior 
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manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
22 July 2014, PL2) 
 
Here it suggests that teamwork can be created by good communication, discussion, and 
monitoring progress of the KPIs. PA probably serves to strengthen partnership or 
collectivism in terms of pursuing achievement in the overall PA result of the provinces.  
 
The officials also commonly mentioned the significant role of the team of Provincial 
Governor’s Office, which directly affects the officials’ performance implementing the 
KPIs. The practitioners illustrated that the Governor’s Office team was viewed as  
a mentor for the agencies regarding the KPIs and was sometimes responsible for 
performing the KPIs when some KPI host agencies did not take responsibilities for 
their KPIs: 
 
“Fortunately, the agencies in our province trusted the team of Provincial Governor’s 
Office in terms of our professionalism and transparency.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
 
“I had experience working in three provinces. If the key figure from the Provincial 
Governor’s Office was not competent, assigning work to other agencies without any 
guidelines, the agencies could not do a good job.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
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“We received low KPI scores because when we assigned the KPIs to some agencies, 
they claimed they did not have a responsible person. We, the Provincial Governor’s 
Office, then had to be accountable for those assigned KPIs. We had to do everything 
ourselves.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
The data suggested that the Governor’s Office team in the high KPI scoring provinces 
tended to perform better than the low KPI scoring provinces. This can be observed in 
the lower level of inter-agency collaboration in the low KPI scoring provinces.  
 
“All KPI host agencies had to be conscientious of their own KPIs when the Governor 
paid attention to the KPIs. They were expected to report the progress of the KPIs with 
the Governor through the meetings.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 
August 2014: PH1) 
 
“The KPI host agencies might raise their problems of the KPIs in the meetings. If the 
other agencies had any information and recommendations, the problems might be 
resolved.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock 
Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The persons involved with the KPIs were invited to attend the meetings and share with 
us the problems they were facing, for example, why we could not reach the targets of 
the KPIs. This discussion might lead to resolving problems and achieving the goals of 
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the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community Development Office, 
Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
The meetings seem to be a significant element shaping the KPI host agencies’ 
performance in approaching the goals of the KPIs such as monitoring progress of the 
KPIs, sharing ideas, and solving the problems. The senior managers in the high KPI 
scoring provinces appear to highlight the communication between the officials more 
than those in the low KPI scoring provinces. This can be observed through having 
formal meetings with the Governor and solving the problems together. 
 
6.4.2 Promulgation of PA in each fiscal year 
Some respondents revealed that the delay of the promulgation of PA in each fiscal year 
could have an impact on civil servants’ performance on the KPIs. For example, a delay 
during introduction of the KPI lists perhaps led to various challenges such as a delay in 
planning tasks and a delay in collecting data, especially the KPIs based on the processes 
of the tasks. One of the interviewees stated that: 
 
“In the past, an announcement of the list of KPIs was made quite early on, so we could 
plan the tasks at the beginning of the fiscal year and could achieve over 50% of the total 
number of KPIs in six months. On the other hand, at present, we could not perform the 
tasks on time because the delay in an announcement of the list of KPIs, particularly the 
KPIs which emphasised on the process of the jobs. This might lead to output fabrication 
to achieve the targets of KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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The implication of the promulgation of performance evaluation significantly influences 
performance on the KPIs. The data suggest that the delay in introducing PA perhaps 
contributes to fabrication of the outputs.  
 
6.4.3 Factors influencing performance 
This section summarises the factors influencing performance under five categories:  
(1) understanding the standard of the KPIs, (2) transparency to perform the KPIs,  
(3) experience from previous years, (4) meetings-related performance, and  
(5) attributes of the provinces. 
 
(1) Understanding the standard of the KPIs 
The officials responsible for the KPIs require understanding of the standards of the KPIs 
viewed as a prior element to performing the KPIs. The officials illustrated that: 
 
“A clear standard of the KPIs could contribute to the practitioners’ satisfaction. The 
KPIs were viewed as a plan for working.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 29 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“We found that our staff had a problem of the understanding of the standard of KPIs. The 
practitioners sometimes could not understand what they were expected to do through the 
KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
A clear standard in the KPIs was seen to be essential, particularly for the practitioners. 
The data suggested that an unclear standard of the KPIs led to diversity of interpretation 
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among people. The attributes of the KPIs perceived by the individuals influenced 
attainment of the KPIs. For example, over-challenging targets may contribute to 
operational problems, lower motivation and fabrication of evidence: 
 
“The targets of KPIs were sometimes too challenging and not achievable. If we could 
not get the highest score at 5, we might be blamed by the leaders. So, we had to find any 
possible ways to achieve high KPI scores.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
This suggests that setting targets of the KPIs that are too challenging can influence 
performance of people and use of techniques in achieving high KPI scores. However, 
there were some officials who argued that performing the KPIs did not seem to be 
difficult, especially some KPIs implemented for many fiscal years as the following 
account: 
 
“When working with the same KPIs for several years, the problems have been resolved. 
The KPIs for food safety, for example, have been done for many years and it is not too 
difficult anymore.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Public Health Office, 
Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
(2) Transparency to perform the KPIs 
The data suggested that using the same standard of the KPIs – changing only KPI targets – 
for several fiscal years might contribute to resolving some problems with public 
services. On the contrary, the practitioners may learn to employ techniques in achieving 
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high scores from these KPIs. This may create a challenge to transparency as the 
following statement suggests: 
 
“There were several methods approaching maximum score at 5… Some KPIs were not 
much different from the previous year. The responsible persons have learned the 
techniques of how to achieve high scores.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office 
of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
Transparency performing the KPIs is perhaps a challenge of PA in the provinces. Some 
respondents revealed that the problem of transparency could be seen throughout the 
process of PA such as selection of the tasks to assess as KPIs, collecting data and 
evidences for the KPIs, and reporting information to the assessors. These issues are 
illustrated by the following accounts: 
 
“A number of provinces selected only tasks they knew they could achieve the high scores 
of KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
“It was possible that some provinces chose not to include certain information if it made 
the scores lower.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“Some provinces hired consultants, the educational institutions, to do the KPIs because 
they had the budget to do so.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Governor’s Office, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
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“We learned from the other provinces how they received high scores of the KPIs and 
also studied the standard of the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Public Health Office, 
28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
The officials in the low KPI scoring provinces seem to provide much evidence regarding 
the problem of transparency performing the KPIs. It implies that the officials in the low 
KPI scoring provinces perhaps attempt to use some shortcut techniques to achieving 
high KPI scores, but not with success.  
 
(3) Experience from previous years 
Some provinces claimed that they achieved the high KPI scores by drawing on 
experience from previous years. They pointed out that they learned information 
regarding the KPIs in the previous fiscal year, especially the problems of the KPIs and 
the targets of the KPIs. The respondents stated that: 
 
“We used last year’s information to compare and improve our performance. We used 
the KPI to improve our agency and our team.” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The targets of the KPIs in the last year were compared with the present one.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
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“Reviewing the result of performance and then the plans were designed for working of 
the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 
August 2014: PH1) 
 
“We reviewed information of the KPIs by documents and discussion. The team of 
responsible persons and chiefs of the agencies would be invited to participate through 
the meetings.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
(4) Meetings-related performance 
The meetings appear to be an important opportunity for discussing and planning the 
targets of the KPIs in the current year. The respondents perceived that achieving the 
KPIs derived from the meetings because it was a stage for exchanging ideas and 
monitoring progress of the KPIs, enabling understanding, and generating participation 
and accountability. Furthermore, the meetings were an opportunity to strengthen morale 
by informing the result of performance appraisal of the provinces. These factors are 
elucidated below: 
 
“The meetings could enhance understanding, accountability, and participation for the 
officials in order to achieve the KPIs.” (Senior Manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock 
Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 29 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“An advantage of the meetings was to emphasise the officials’ duties to the KPIs. The 
responsibilities would be created and then they had to perform their best.” (Senior 
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Manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial 
Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“The Provincial Governor’s Office hosted regular meetings to exchange ideas. The 
results of the meetings could encourage the officials to improve and solve problems 
related to the KPIs.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“The meetings were important in terms of monitoring the progress of the KPIs in the 
period of 6, 9, and 12 months.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“We would report the result of performance evaluation of the province by the monthly 
meetings. The KPI host agencies were recognized.” (Senior Manager, Chief of 
Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
(5) Attributes of the provinces 
A number of respondents revealed that the attributes of the provinces such as size of 
area and number of districts were significant in determining performance of the 
agencies:  
 
“One of the factors contributing to getting a high score in the provinces was the size of 
provincial area. It was easier and quicker to collect data in smaller provinces.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
24 July 2014: PH2) 
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“It might be easier to achieve KPIs in smaller provinces. However, if a smaller amount 
of budget was allocated to those provinces, they might not be able to do a good job.” 
(Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“Each province has a different characteristic…. A large province consists of 25 districts 
while a small one consists of 8 districts. It might be more difficult for the large 
province.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: 
PH1) 
 
These statements imply that a small provincial area and a small number of districts may 
be advantages in terms of time management such as quicker data collection and saving 
time in communication between the agencies. On the contrary, it can be noticed that the 
larger provinces probably receive a higher rate of budget allocation than the smaller 
provinces.  
 
Moreover, the respondents declared that specific characteristics of the provinces such 
as tourist and non-tourist provinces, diversity of cultures for working and diversity of 
demography might influence performance in the KPIs. These ideas are illustrated by the 
KPI host agencies responsible for reducing the number of accidents on the roads as 
follows: 
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“Some provinces with less tourist attractions could achieve high KPI scores without 
having to do anything much as the number of accidents was low anyway. On the 
contrary, a province with many tourist attractions would have a higher number of 
accidents, especially during the holidays.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office 
of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“The culture of working in each province was different. I had the experience working 
in a province where I had an add-on task to organize the meetings, welcome the guests, 
and look after important delegates. So, I did not have much time to generate the new 
ideas about how to improve the jobs. In the current province, I had more time to create 
my jobs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: 
PH1) 
 
In addition, the interviewees revealed that they had to confront external factors such as 
the government’s policies and a delayed budget allocation from the central government. 
For example, the government provided the policy of buying the first new car with the 
government’s support in taxes. This conflicted with the target of the KPI that required 
reducing the number of accidents on the roads. These ideas are illustrated by the 
following examples: 
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“The allocation of the budget from the central government was sometimes delayed. It 
might affect the provinces to do the jobs.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“In 2011-2012, the number of accidents was increased due to the policy of the first new 
car...The government policy conversed with practice and also decreasing budget.” 
(Practitioner and senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: 
PH1) 
 
6.4.4 Advantages and disadvantages in achieving high and low KPI scores 
The respondents perceived that achieving high or low KPI scores had advantages and 
disadvantages to the officials at three levels: provinces, agencies and individuals. These 
results tended to lead to various effects in terms of feeling, reward and effectiveness of 
tasks. Meanwhile, some argued that these scores did not have any influence.  
 
Advantages in achieving high KPI scores 
The majority of interviewees declared that achieving high KPI scores seemed to bring 
many benefits for them such as a good feeling (e.g. self-esteem, proud, trust and 
prestige), and a high level of reward. The effective upon the individuals’ feelings was 
commonly mentioned by the respondents, particularly self-esteem as follows: 
 
“The agencies gained trust between each other. The practitioners gained self-esteem 
and were proud to maintain the targets of the KPIs.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
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Provincial Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development 
Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“Admittedly, we compared our results of the KPIs with other provinces’ performance. 
We were held in high esteem when we managed to achieve higher scores.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“The province was developed due to the KPIs, I was proud of working for the KPIs 
because this province was my hometown. Furthermore, the team of Provincial 
Governor’s Office also created an environment of collaboration.” (Practitioner, 
Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“I don’t think receiving a financial reward is the main focus these days, but getting high 
scores seemed to acquire prestige from other provinces because it reflected the result 
of collaboration in the provinces.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Some officials were intrinsically motivated regarding the KPIs. While others might be 
motivated by the financial reward linked to the result of the KPI scores:  
 
“The financial reward was calculated based on the KPI scores of the provinces. If we 
got the high scores, we could get a large amount of money.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
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Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“When the annual bonus budget from the central government was cut, the officials lost 
their interest in performing KPIs as they were not motivated by the incentive.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Disadvantages in getting low KPI scores 
Achieving a low KPI score was reported by officials as having an emotional impact 
(disappointment, self-respect), a financial impact (loss of anticipated reward) and (for 
senior managers) loss of professional reputation. 
 
“If the agency gained the low score, it might be viewed that the agency did not pay 
attention to the KPIs. This could lead to a loss of reputation of the agency, reduction of 
collaboration between the agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Community 
Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“Getting the low score could influence the feeling of the staff and the allocation of the 
financial reward because amount of reward was linked with the scores of the KPIs.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
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“If we received a low score, it reflected the competency of the organization’s executive. 
It implied that the leaders could not manage the subordinates.” (Senior manager, Chief 
of Provincial Public Health Office, Provincial Public Health Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
“Getting the low score could reflect several aspects of the organization such as 
teamwork, the actual problems on the tasks, and competency of solving the problems. 
The organization might be closely scrutinised.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
Achieving low KPI scores seemed to reflect the degree of collaboration and teamwork 
(participation) and competencies of HRM and solving the problems (effectiveness). The 
respondents also revealed that achieving low KPI scores could produce both positive 
and negative effects as indicated in the following statement: 
 
“Getting the low score could have two effects. Firstly, it could stimulate the officials’ 
enthusiasm to work. Secondly, moral support of the officials could be decreased.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Meanwhile, there were some respondents that tended to believe that getting high or low 
KPI scores was not likely to affect them: 
 
“I think that getting a low score did not affect the agency.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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“If we gained a low score of the KPIs, there was no punishment. So, it was only the 
recognition of getting a low score.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Administration Office, Provincial Administration Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Such lack of concern might reflect weak promotion of the KPIs by management or may 
just be a symptom of traditional bureaucratic culture in which work is done only because 
policy, command or the possibility of sanction requires it, or both.  
 
6.4.5 Outputs and outcomes of PA 
Agreement with outputs and outcomes of PA 
The majority of respondents perceived that having the KPIs contributed to performance 
by setting targets, encouraging collaboration between agencies or individuals, 
encouraging readiness for change, and responding to citizens’ needs, all of which meant 
that work was different from before:  
 
“Performance evaluation and KPIs were very useful. In the past, we did not have any 
targets or objectives. The KPIs helped us set a clear focus in our work.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“In the past, each agency worked independently. Now, several agencies are accountable 
for the same KPIs. Thus, we learned to collaborate.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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“There were a lot of changes in the public service from 2003 when we had the principle 
of good governance. The officials were to respond to the changes and the needs of the 
public more quickly.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development 
Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
As stated earlier, the respondents appear to agree that PA can contribute several 
advantages, for example pursuing targets of achievement (market culture), generating 
collaboration (clan culture), and responding to needs of citizens (adhocracy culture), 
and in particular, improvement of many agencies who directly deliver public services to 
citizens. One of the respondents explained as follows: 
 
“There were several types of public services that distinctly improved. For example, 
services of land transport office, revenue office, and public health hospitals.”(Senior 
manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
A number of interviewees revealed that one advantage of PA appeared to be its use of a 
concrete and transparent criteria of performance measurement:  
 
“The use of KPI scores was concrete, transparent, and fair to measure the performance 
and outcomes.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial 
Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
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Furthermore, high KPI scores seemed to confirm that the administration was achieving 
development objectives:  
 
“The high score could reflect that the tasks were well done. If the tasks were efficient, 
our province would be developed although we might not gain the reward.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“Basically, getting high scores reflected that we could perform the tasks with efficiency 
and effectiveness. This might contribute to better allocation of budget for development 
of the provinces, solving problems, and responding to the local citizens’ needs.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 
2014: PL1) 
 
Disagreement with outputs and outcomes of PA 
On the contrary, others disagreed with outputs and outcomes of PA. They argued that 
the results of the KPIs might not accurately reflect the performance or efficiency of the 
civil service. For example, not all the tasks of the provinces were selected to be the KPIs 
which meant there were some officials not related to the KPIs. Meanwhile, the result of 
any assessment had to consider the process of achieving scores and transparency as 
illustrated below: 
 
“I believed that the KPIs demonstrated around 5-10% of the actual performance 
because the rest of the performance indicated in the KPI report was fabricated to get 
 
 
247 
 
high scores.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The tasks selected for the KPIs did not reflect all the mission statements of the 
province.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, 
Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
One of these officials nonetheless accepted that the KPI score could reflect the outputs 
and outcomes of performance:  
 
“The KPI score might reflect efficiency of work. Although we primarily did it to keep 
ourselves in the job, the work we did was based on the actual tasks.” (Practitioner, 
Provincial Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Another official provided additional information, that PA may reflect outputs and 
outcomes of performance if there were standards of assessment: 
 
“The performance evaluation could reflect the efficiency of the organisation if the 
information obtained in the evaluation was correct.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Provincial Governor’s Office, Provincial Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
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6.4.6 Recommendations for PA 
Respondents suggested that PA should be improved in terms of the service provide by 
the central government, specially the OPDC, particularly in terms of setting the KPIs 
and the criteria of incentive allocation: 
 
“The performance evaluation should be prepared at least a year in advance to be in 
accordance with the budget proposal.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
This may decrease pressure on the provinces regarding the timeframe for performance 
of the KPIs. Furthermore, the OPDC was likely required to provide opportunities for 
sharing ideas and more supporting factors (e.g. manual books of the KPIs) as follows: 
 
“There should be a face-to-face discussion between host agencies and the OPDC 
instead of the existing time consuming telephone or memo correspondence.” 
(Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
“I would like to have more manuals on how to do the KPIs.  There is a lot of information 
and I don’t think I have a great depth of understanding yet.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
 
Significantly, a number of officials indicated that the pattern of setting the KPIs should 
shift from top-down to bottom-up: 
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“The KPIs were established in a top-down manner. Consequently, the KPIs were not 
viewed as a part of the officials’ tasks. Thus, these KPIs should be characterised in a 
bottom-up process and linked with the provincial developing plan.”(Senior manager, 
Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
 
Here, the officials appear to perceive that they work in a controlled system or chain of 
command. They tend to require change from hierarchy (e.g. policies, and commands) to 
participation (e.g. a voice to generate the KPIs). In addition, some officials suggested 
that the PA scheme should be abolished. This idea is elucidated below: 
 
“The reason why performance evaluation should be abolished was that the officials were 
required to comply with government policies as well as the superiors’ command. They 
were not likely to have freedom of thought.”(Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
This implies that some officials disagreed with performing the KPIs because it involved 
excessive control. Other officials argued that PA scheme should be maintained further, 
but that the methods should be revised as follows: 
 
“Performance evaluation should be maintained, but a new method is required. The KPIs 
need to be in accordance with the regular tasks. It should be better than working without 
any KPIs at all.” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock Office, 28 July 2014: PL1) 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter reports the results of the qualitative data analysis divided into three 
categories: (1) leadership; (2) human resources and reward; and (3) performance, 
outputs and outcomes. 
 
The data suggested that leadership was one of the most significant elements influencing 
the system of PA. The attentiveness of the leaders to the KPIs tended to bring clear 
policy and supports, including the use of the executives’ authority encouraging the 
employees. The leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to pay more attention to 
the KPIs as well as more support for the practitioners than the low KPI scoring 
provinces. The evidence suggested that the ways in which the executives use authority 
are different between the high and low KPI scoring provinces. The participative 
leadership style – people focused – was found in the high KPI scoring provinces, whilst 
the authoritarian leadership style – control focused – was seen in the low KPI scoring 
provinces. Regarding leadership-related reward allocation, the leaders in the high KPI 
scoring provinces appeared to be concerned with fairness of reward (equity) and clear 
criteria of the incentive allocation (rule of law) rather than the low KPI scoring 
provinces. In this respect, it is possible that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tend to have greater job satisfaction and more flexibility. The mixed cultures 
can be observed in the context of PA, such as a combination of hierarchy and clan 
culture, and a combination of hierarchy and market culture. It can be noted that some 
leaders, particularly in the high KPI scoring provinces, tend to slightly shift management 
style from the hierarchy culture to the market or clan culture. 
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Human resources and reward were viewed as significant determinants influencing 
attainment of PA. The characteristics of personnel who were responsible for the KPIs 
played a crucial impact on performance. The appropriate characteristics required were 
good knowledge and skills, experience and accountability, including positive attitudes 
to the KPIs and participation. Reward is a crucial element that can enable or inhibit 
success in achieving the KPIs. This appeared to be more characteristic in the low KPI 
scoring provinces where people tended to focus on receiving a reward more than those 
in the high KPI scoring provinces. This implies that intrinsic motivation among officials 
in the low KPI scoring provinces appears to be lower than the high KPI scoring 
provinces.  
 
In terms of performance, outputs and outcomes, the evidence suggested that 
collaboration among agencies and individuals is a key determinant in achieving high 
KPI scores. It seemed that the low KPI scoring provinces had a lower level of 
cooperation than the high KPI scoring provinces or a higher degree of individualism. 
This reflects that collectivism or a clan culture is required for accomplishing PA. For 
outputs and outcomes of PA, a diversity of opinion was found among the officials. The 
majority of people agreed that performing the KPIs contributed to focusing on goal 
achievement (efficiency and effectiveness), generated integrated collaboration 
(participation), and delivered concrete results of performance (transparency), although 
there were some doubts about design and assessment in practice. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE  
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical findings acquired from the results of the 
quantitative data (Chapter 5) and the qualitative data (Chapter 6). The chapter is 
structured into four main sections. The first section is cultural determinants of 
performance, for which the variables (e.g. behaviour, attitudes, knowledge and practice 
of the civil servants) in the system of performance agreement (PA) are viewed through 
four cultural types – hierarchy, clan, market, and adhocracy cultures. The discussion of 
each culture type is based around three aspects: key themes of the culture types from the 
CVF, different attributes of performance between the low and high KPI scoring 
provinces, and relevant components of good governance. The second section focuses on 
crosscutting themes as stated in the previous topic, namely what are the important 
features that make differences between the low and high KPI scoring provinces. The 
third section draws the different sets of findings together to highlight typical 
characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces.  
 
7.2 Cultural determinants of performance 
Whilst the quantitative data, based on the OCAI provided a profile of the organizational 
culture of the Thai civil service, the differences in the cultural profiles of high and low 
KPI scoring provinces were not so different as to make the OCAI profile a reliable 
predictor of performance in PA. The qualitative data has, therefore, been used to 
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illuminate important variables in the PA system in-depth and in detail. The discussion 
of this section is considered based on four culture types: hierarchy, clan, market, and 
adhocracy respectively. In each case it emerges that it is not the degree to which an 
organization is characterised by the attributes of each of these cultural types that 
determines performance, but how it enacts these cultural types.  
 
7.2.1 The hierarchy culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44 The hierarchy culture and performance delivering good governance 
Note: 1) L and H mean the low and high KPI scoring provinces respectively  
2) GG means good governance 
 
Figure 44 shows the hierarchy culture, similar and different attributes of performance 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces in the PA scheme. That is to say, both 
high and low KPI scoring provinces demonstrated hierarchical culture, but in different 
ways – a hierarchical culture does not preclude promotion of good governance, such as 
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participation, efficiency and effectiveness through the PA scheme. The implication is 
that within a given culture there is still managerial discretion as to how that culture will 
be enacted in terms of management style. 
 
Formalization (Rules and formal policies) 
The data suggested that the civil servants at the provincial level tended to perform their 
work based upon formal policies and the superiors’ command, particularly the Governor 
or Vice Governor and the chiefs of the agencies. This is because the Governor is the top 
executive in the provinces with centralized power, which this power is viewed as the 
leaders’ position power to control over policy and rules (Williams and Huber, 1986).  
 
The findings of the quantitative and qualitative data analysis suggested that formalization 
was differently applied in high and low KPI scoring provinces. The quantitative data 
showed that of the four culture types, the hierarchy culture has the highest mean score 
in all 16 provinces but was significantly different between both provincial groups in 
relation to management style and the importance given to the KPIs. The background of 
the leaders significantly determines characteristics of leadership, especially attention to 
the KPIs. For example, one of respondents indicated that: 
 
“Different Governors give different levels of attentiveness. If we had the Governor from 
the field of politics, he might not pay much attention to the KPIs. On the other hand, the 
Governor from the field of bureaucracy perhaps paid more attention to the KPIs due to 
pressure from the leaders.” (Senior manager, Chief of human resource management 
group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
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This implies that a Governor from the political sphere was seen to  pay less attention to 
the KPIs than those from a background as career officials, reflecting the degree to which 
the relationship between politics and bureaucracy, politics and political environment are 
crucial dilemmas for public sector management (Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003), 
i.e. influence in relocation and promotion of the executives of the provinces, as 
explained in Chapter 3. 
 
The practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces seemed to focus on the policy rather 
than the low KPI scoring provinces. People in the high KPI scoring provinces frequently 
mentioned term ‘clear policy’ from Governor, as the following example: 
 
“Having a clear policy enabled us to do our job properly.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Governor’s Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
This reflects that the degree to which Thai civil servants tend towards uncertainty 
avoidance (Hofstede, 2001) as noted in Chapter Three, and therefore appropriate clear 
instructions, rules and policies from their superiors, aligning with what Cameron and 
Quinn (2011) refer to as a control orientation, focusing on efficiency. The difference 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces regarding control appears to lie not  
in any difference in policies or underlying values but in the degree to which individual 
senior managers chose to focus on control and efficiency as well as individual 
practitioners. 
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Stability of operation (organizational maintenance) 
Although the results of quantitative data analysis revealed that the hierarchy culture in 
the high KPI scoring provinces was higher than the low KPI scoring provinces. This 
might have been expected to negatively affect performance, whereas the reverse has 
occurred. The previous section has emphasised that hierarchical culture in the form of 
clear directives from above may be suited to the Thai administrative culture of high 
uncertainty avoidance. However the data also shows that hierarchical culture may be 
enacted via different leadership styles.  
 
The qualitative data suggested that there were different leadership styles between the 
low and high KPI scoring provinces. The leadership style in the high KPI scoring 
province seemed to be characterised by participative style. This can be observed through 
regularly attending meetings and paying more attention of leaders – meetings are seen 
as the opportunities to aligning support and discussing problems between leaders and 
staff. One of senior managers in the high KPI scoring province stated that: 
 
“In the meetings, the Governor or Vice Governor played an important role. If they paid 
attention to the KPIs, they could support the team, drive the resource requirements, and 
solve the problems. Most importantly, the meetings must take place regularly.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
13 August 2014: PH1) 
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On the other hand, a more authoritarian style was found in the low KPI scoring 
provinces, where the attributes of sharing ideas between leaders and staff appeared to 
be limited. This can be seen from one of senior managers indicated that: 
 
“The support we required from the Governor was an opportunity to share ideas. If he 
ran the office solely by his own opinion and he did not listen to anyone, his subordinates 
might be scared to share ideas.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 22 
July 2014: PL2) 
 
In this respect, leaders in the hierarchy culture can influence organizational performance 
through using participative and authoritarian ways. The different leadership styles 
contribute to different results of performance. A participative style that is people-
focused can bring social stability to the organization through staff motivation and 
willingness to take responsibility; reduces turnover; and delivers a high level of 
achievement (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986). 
Participative leadership is associated with improved performance through both 
motivational (e.g. increasing intrinsic motivation) and exchanged-based (e.g. treating 
fairness for employees) mechanisms (Huang et al., 2010). The idea that attributes of 
good governance such as accountability, participation, efficiency and effectiveness are 
generated by a participative style is not necessarily new, for example Bratton et al. 
(2007) and Jackson (1989) agree that a participative style is more effective than the 
authoritarian style. The authoritarian style – task focused – relies on authority, rules, 
regulations, command and centralization (Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Dooren, 
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Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015; Jackson, 1989) that usually assign tasks while neglecting 
the needs of staff in order to create controlling and centralized orientation (Williams and 
Huber, 1986). People in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to work in a less flexible 
organizational. 
 
The findings suggested that some executives, particularly the leaders in the high KPI 
scoring provinces, were able to move from directive style – asking the staff members to 
follow rules and procedures (Francesco and Gold, 1998) – to participative style – 
making decisions based on discussion and collective analysis of problems between the 
managers and staff (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). This is despite the more 
usual view, for example, that of Gill (2006) that managers in Southeast Asian incline 
towards a directive style30 rather than participative style.  
 
The importance of leadership style for performance may be seen in the survey responses 
regarding job satisfaction (question 9: You have no concerns about the style of 
management) suggested that the practitioners in the 16 provinces tended to be concerned 
with leadership style. For example, one of respondents stated that: 
 
“I think that leadership was important in terms of management of the limited resources 
such as human, materials, equipment. The Governor’s authority assisted partnership 
work and resource sharing between agencies.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
                                                          
30 Directive style refers to managers provide specific guidance, set deadlines for completion of work, 
and ask staff to follow rule and procedure (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006). 
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Rewards based on rank 
One priority for provinces implementing PA was to provide financial incentives to those 
directly responsible for attaining the KPI outputs, seen as rewards based on performance 
rather than rewards based on rank (seniority). In the context of PA, rewarding in the 
hierarchy culture is associated with leaders’ management of rewards and the criteria of 
reward allocation.    
 
The qualitative data showed that senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces 
tended to put more effort into the management of reward than did their equivalents in 
the low KPI scoring provinces, for example, generating understanding about the criteria 
of reward and voting for the appropriate criteria of reward. These ideas are indicated by 
respondents that: 
 
“...I had to call for a meeting to explain how the reward was allocated...” (Senior 
manager, Chief of Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 
2014: PH2) 
 
“... The leaders proposed different formulas to the officials to consider and voted for 
the best one. The officials took part in the process.” (Practitioner, Provincial 
Employment Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Although rewards are important for motivation towards achieving goals (Gill, 2006; 
Williams and Huber, 1986), the leaders’ management of the reward system has a greater 
motivational significance than the actual reward itself. Besides the importance of leader 
 
 
260 
 
for rewarding, the criterion of reward is crucial in determining performance of civil 
servants, which should be under the rule of law. As it was, the majority of respondents 
appeared to be in favour of reconsideration of the criteria of reward allocation. This is 
because, for example, a strong monetary reward may incentivise distortion of evidence 
(transparency) about the attainment of high KPI scores while a weak monetary reward 
may lead to a low level of motivation (participation). 
 
7.2.2 The clan culture 
The findings from both quantitative and qualitative data suggested that the clan culture 
has a significant impact on the civil service’s performance. The quantitative data 
revealed that the clan and market cultures were where the most significant differences 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces were located. This is compatible with 
the qualitative data that there are three major elements of clan culture – personnel issues, 
cohesion and teamwork, and equity of rewards that influenced performance of the 
provinces. Figure 45 shows the relationship between the clan culture and performance, 
similar and different attributes of performance between the low and high KPI scoring 
provinces, and performance in terms of KPIs (good governance). 
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Figure 45 The clan culture and performance delivering good governance 
Note: 1) L means the low KPI scoring provinces and H means the high KPI scoring provinces 
          2) GG means good governance 
 
Personnel issues  
Many respondents mentioned human resource (HR) issues as a factor that influenced 
performance in getting high KPI score at the levels of the provinces and agencies. This 
is because the clan culture comprises cohesion, commitment and capability of the 
employees (Zammuto and Krakower, 1991) that enable high performance in the PA 
system. However, there were several challenges relevant to individuals’ performance, 
particularly the senior managers’ concern in the individuals’ assumptions about the 
KPIs, relocation of the responsible persons for the KPIs, and trust in the team of 
Provincial Governor’s Office.  
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For the individuals’ assumptions regarding the KPIs, the data suggested that the leaders 
in the high KPI scoring provinces referred extensively to staff’s views about the KPIs 
and about their communication about this with staff. This reflects how the managers in 
the high KPI scoring provinces tended to be participative or people focused in style – 
which may lead to have a greater confidence in staff motivation, responsibility and 
involvement and a reduced rate of turnover (Williams and Huber, 1986). This is consistent 
with the views of a respondent in the high KPI scoring provinces who said that: 
 
“Fortunately, the officials within our province do not relocate very often. They had been 
here for a long time, so they had a good relationship to each other. Consequently, our 
province had good collaboration.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial Office of 
Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Such characteristics as a low rate of staff turnover, high commitment, and high loyalty 
of the employees are associated with organizations that have a strong culture (Gay, 1997 
and Legge, 1989 cited in McKenna and Beech, 2002, p.16; Robbins, 2005). Overall it 
seems reasonable to conclude that a strong culture was found in the high KPI scoring 
provinces rather than the low KPI scoring provinces and that it was attributed to better 
leadership.  
 
Another personnel-related issue was degree of trust in the team of Provincial Governor’s 
Office. The data suggested that the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office in the high 
KPI scoring provinces appeared to gain more trust by the agencies and staff in the 
provinces than the low KPI scoring provinces through, for example, taking 
responsibility, demonstrating professionalism (e.g. having and introducing knowledge 
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of the KPIs) and transparency of reward allocation. The team of Governor’s Office is 
the central agency in the provinces who leads other agencies, viewed as group leadership 
(Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003). A lack of trust in this team may lead to loss of 
collaboration in the provinces. The individuals’ trust is the basis of developing an 
organizational culture (Price, 2011) such the clan culture. 
 
There were other personal issues such as limitation of number of the officials, over 
pressure of work, relocation of the responsible persons for the KPIs, and a lack of 
training. The issue of pressure of work seems to be a particular concern of many 
respondents. The result of assessment of job satisfaction (question 4: The amount of 
responsibility given you is not excessive) acquired from the quantitative data analysis 
showed that there were not significantly different views on pressure of work between 
senior managers in the low and high KPI scoring provinces. However, it was clearly 
observed that the low KPI scoring provinces had higher mean scores than the high KPI 
scoring provinces. It is possible that senior managers in the low KPI scoring provinces 
tended not to be concerned with pressure of work or they perhaps did not pay so much 
attention to the KPI. On the other hand, there were significantly different views on 
pressure of work between practitioners in the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 
0.010). The qualitative data suggested that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tended to perform their work with commitment, even though they had to cope 
with overwhelming work in a tight timeframe or pressure from superiors. It is possible 
that a higher commitment of the practitioners contributes to achieving higher KPI scores 
in an agency and in a province respectively. Here, the clan culture may derive from 
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internal accountability – accountability of bureaucrats to superiors who have assigned 
jobs for them (Drüke, 2007; Moynihan, 2008) or the hierarchy culture.  
 
The data suggested that several problems relevant to HR were perhaps resolved by the 
ways senior managers played their role. For example, overwhelming work pressure and 
declining the problems can be resolved by managers through the allocation of 
appropriate responsibilities or through strengthening the culture (e.g. inspiring and 
building teams).  
 
Cohesion and teamwork 
The overall achievement in PA of the provinces derives from various sectors, 
particularly the KPI host agencies in the provinces and their staff members. The majority 
of respondents perceived that collaboration or teamwork is a crucial factor in achieving 
high KPI scores. This can be seen from many respondents who broadly mentioned terms 
‘collaboration’, ‘teamwork’, and ‘potential of team of Provincial Governor’s Office’.  
 
The quantitative data suggested that the high KPI scoring provinces had a higher mean 
score of the clan culture than the other ones. In other words, a higher commitment, that 
is a characteristic of stronger clan culture (Deal and Kennedy, 1988), appeared to be 
seen in the high KPI scoring province than the low KPI scoring provinces. The different 
degree of strength of the clan culture seemed to derive from meetings with the leaders, 
with the meetings perhaps glue that held the organizations together.    
Furthermore, the individuals’ positive assumptions on the KPIs or the PA scheme were 
a key indicator in determining a degree of collaboration or strong (clan) culture in the 
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provinces. Brown (1998) and Davis (1984) state that strong or shared beliefs and values 
among staff of an organization make for strong cultures. This implies that individuals’ 
assumptions are important for creating strong culture in order to generate high 
performance (Brown, 1998). The qualitative data suggested that people in the high KPI 
scoring provinces tended to have more positive assumptions performing the KPIs than 
the low KPI scoring provinces. They perceived the advantages of the KPIs, for example 
in enhancing the integrated coordination between the agencies in the provinces. 
Similarly, the research finding of Sathornkich (2010) revealed that coordination among 
the agencies and participation among the executives at the provincial level in Thailand 
have been enhanced in the PA system. By contrast, some officials in the low KPI scoring 
provinces appeared to have negative attitudes in implementing the KPIs.  
 
Thus, in the context of PA, the clan culture (collaboration and teamwork) is perhaps a 
key element in achieving high KPI scores because high collaboration can contribute to 
strong culture – sharing the same basic assumptions e.g. goal alignment (Brown, 1998). 
This is perhaps surprising given that many scholars (e.g. Benedict, 1943; Embree, 1950; 
Klausner, 1997; Phillips, 1966) argue that Thais are characterized as individualistic, for 
example they seem to prefer working alone.  
 
Equity of the rewards 
Equity of the reward focuses on individuals’ views on rewards in terms of fairness and 
impartiality. The qualitative data suggested that respondents in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tended to perceive a higher degree of fairness in the KPI-related reward 
allocation than the low KPI scoring provinces. This is consistent with the quantitative 
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data acquired from assessment of job satisfaction (question 6: Your supervisor supports 
your career development), which revealed that the staff in the high KPI scoring 
provinces had a higher mean score of job satisfaction in terms of promotion and reward 
allocation than the low KPI scoring provinces. People in the high KPI scoring provinces 
may be more satisfied in benefiting from the reward scheme rather than people in the 
low KPI scoring provinces.  
 
The qualitative data showed that less reward satisfaction among people in the low KPI 
scoring provinces may derive from emphasizing more on external motivator such as 
financial reward more than being task focused. This can be seen from a senior manager 
in a low KPI scoring province who stated that: 
 
“...If we did not have the incentive, the officials’ morale for working might be decreased 
and they might perform the tasks with unhappiness... These days, the reward was less. 
Therefore, the officials were less motivated.” (Senior manager, Chief of Provincial 
Community Development Office, Provincial Community Development Office, 22 July 
2014: PL2) 
 
This reflects that people in the low KPI scoring provinces tend to focus on their own 
benefits, known as individualism, than being task focused. People are concerned with 
external motivation, which may lead to lose motivation for working when they do not 
receive rewards. Here, it is consistent with Stringer, Didham and Theivananthampillai 
(2011) who found that extrinsic motivators are negatively associated with job 
satisfaction, especially some people who are concerned with fairness and who often 
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compare their rewards with others or feel that their pay is not appropriate for their 
attempt. This can be seen below: 
 
“We had less incentive in comparison with the local government agencies... In contrast, 
the provincial agencies received much less reward.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy 
for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
On the other hand, people in the high KPI scoring provinces appeared to be more task 
focused and people focused, as stated by the senior managers in the high KPI scoring 
provinces that: 
 
“The financial reward was a motivation for the officials in working on the KPIs. 
Although they were not rewarded, they still performed their tasks...” (Senior manager, 
Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
 
“The provinces could achieve in the KPIs by cooperation of the central government 
agencies in the region. However, these agencies could not get the incentive from the 
provinces as the OPDC indicated...” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province 
Development Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
This reflects that the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to focus on 
task achievement even though they do not receive the rewards, whilst the practitioners 
in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to lose their motivation for working in the year 
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without annual bonus. The senior managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to 
be concerned with fairness among the eligible persons and the practitioners’ motivation 
performing the KPIs.  
 
As stated earlier, the data suggest at least three main aspects. Firstly, fairness of rewards 
is associated with individuals’ job satisfaction, but not motivation. Unfairness of reward 
allocation between those responsible for the KPIs might generate disharmony at the 
level of provinces, agencies, and individuals. Price (2011) stated that high commitment 
of people occurs when they feel that they are impartially rewarded (equity). Secondly, 
extrinsic motivation appears to be negatively associated with people’s performance, for 
example, people may lose morale when they are rewarded less than their expectation; it 
may lead to a problem of equity, and distortion of appraisal results or the objective of 
overall performance (Fletcher, 1993; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). As a result of monetary 
reward being a sensitive issue (Price, 2011), many scholars (e.g. Armstrong, 1990; 
McKenna and Beech, 2002; Moon, 2000) suggest that intrinsic motivation factors 
provide a greater positive impact on performance than extrinsic motivation. Hence, 
using intrinsic reward seems to be a more sustainable source of motivation than extrinsic 
reward because it is associated with individuals’ feeling, such as pride, satisfaction of 
social needs and opportunities to increase skills (Armstrong, 1990; Fletcher, 1993; 
Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, 2003; McKenna and Beech, 2002). Thirdly, leadership 
is important to manage reward in terms of fairness because leaders are associated with 
reward power to motivate people for achieving goals as well as punishments 
(Armstrong, 1990; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986).  
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7.2.3 The market culture 
The quantitative data suggested that the market culture was the most significantly 
different between the high and low KPI scoring provinces at the same level as clan 
culture. The high KPI scoring provinces tended to have a greater mean score than the low 
KPI scoring provinces. The qualitative data revealed that there are three different 
characteristics of the market-oriented value between both groups: pursuit of goals, 
competition and achievement, and rewards based on achievement as shown in Figure 46. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46 The market culture and performance delivering good governance 
Note: 1) L means the low KPI scoring provinces and H means the high KPI scoring provinces 
2) GG means good governance 
 
Pursuit of goals 
The qualitative data suggested that the market culture in the provinces was generated 
through three key elements: pursuit of the KPI targets by the meetings, pressure from 
the superiors, and the individuals’ consciousness. The high KPI scoring provinces 
tended to have a higher degree of pursuing the KPI targets than the low KPI scoring 
provinces. One practitioner in a high KPI scoring province stated that: 
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“The meetings were important in terms of monitoring the progress of the KPIs in the 
period of 6, 9, and 12 months.” (Practitioner, Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Many respondents perceived that the meetings with the executives were important 
opportunities to monitor progress of the KPIs whether at the level of provinces or 
agencies. Some provinces and agencies attempted to compare their results with others, 
while other provinces and agencies attempted to pursue goal achievement. In addition, 
the KPIs appeared to improve several types of public service, particularly a quick 
response to the needs of citizens. This corresponds to the idea that the market culture 
can bring customer focused orientation (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). These data reflect 
that responsiveness and efficiency can be generated in the context of PA. In other words, 
PA or performance management can contribute to being focused on outputs and 
outcomes focused.  
 
Some respondents took the view that there was excessive pressure from superiors to 
pursue the goals and objectives of the KPIs. The quantitative data – question 10 ‘The 
pursuit of organizational targets does not put you under excessive pressure’ – revealed 
a wide variation between the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.006). The 
high KPI scoring provinces had higher mean score than the low KPI scoring provinces. 
The implication is that people in the high KPI scoring provinces perhaps worked in a 
more flexible environment than did in the low KPI scoring provinces, perhaps reflecting 
the more participative or people focused leadership style found in the higher scoring 
provinces.  
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Regarding individuals’ conscientiousness, the qualitative data revealed that the senior 
managers and practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to perform their 
work with more conscientiousness than the low KPI scoring provinces. For instance, 
one senior manager in a high KPI scoring province stated that: 
 
“...the accomplishment of the KPIs might derive from the officials’ conscience.” (Senior 
manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 
24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
Competition and achievement 
The quantitative data revealed that the market culture between the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces were significantly different (Sig.= 0.001) with the highest different 
mean scores (0.24). Only the market culture had significant differences between the 
senior manager in both groups (Sig.= 0.042), whilst the market culture was the most 
significantly different (Sig.= 0.002) between the practitioners in both groups as well as 
the clan culture. This is compatible with the qualitative data that a tendency of 
competitive-orientated model seemed to characterise the high KPI scoring provinces. 
One of the practitioners in the high KPI scoring provinces stated that: 
 
“The chiefs of the agencies were the main people who introduced the clear policy to the 
subordinates. For example, the leaders required the subordinates to compete the KPI 
results with others agencies.” (Practitioner, Provincial Governor’s Office, 13 August 
2014: PH1) 
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Here the practitioners perceived that leaders are important in generating the market 
culture through decisions and management practices. In this context, the leaders are 
viewed as competitive and hard drivers (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The senior 
managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to do more than the others to 
‘accelerate’ staff enthusiasm. One senior manager in the high KPI scoring provinces 
stated that: 
 
“I informed the subordinates by the monthly meetings... If the result of the KPIs was not 
close to the targets, we had to accelerate our team performance.” (Senior manager, 
Chief of Provincial Employment Service Office, Provincial Employment Service Office, 
23 July 2014: PH2) 
 
It is possible that people in the high ones tended to perform their work based on 
competitive-oriented models in order to receive efficiency and effectiveness. The 
implication is that the PA scheme can generate a market culture in public organizations. 
This in consistent with the view of Kennedy (2000 cited in Radnor and McGuire, 2004) 
that public organizations perform their tasks without market competition, therefore 
performance measurement is often employed as a substitute for market pressures. 
However, it is important to note that the market culture in the context of PA is supported 
by hierarchy culture. In other words, strength of the market culture seems to be 
generated by leadership, although a degree of the market culture between the low and 
high KPI scoring provinces are not much different in the PA scheme. Similarly, the 
results of previous studies on organizational culture in the Thai public sector revealed 
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that the market culture is slightly increased in overview of post-reform in the Thai public 
sector (Jingjit, 2008; Phookpan, 2012). 
 
Rewards based on achievement 
The results of PA are linked with the annual bonus allocation from the central 
government. This criteria is compatible with the principle of the market culture that 
reward is based on achievement or payment by result (McKenna and Beech, 2002; 
Zammuto and Krakower, 1991). McKenna and Beech (2002) state that the reward 
system is used as a change mechanism to generate a more pronounced performance-
oriented culture. However, the findings of this study appeared to show little influence 
of result-based rewards. This can be seen from different views of people on 
performance-related pay (PRP) in the PA scheme. 
 
Some officials agreed with PRP due to enhancing motivation of staff in performing the 
KPIs. This can be observed through views of some respondents in the high KPI scoring 
provinces indicated that: 
 
“I agreed to maintain the criteria of reward based on result of the KPIs because the 
financial incentive was a motivation for people...” (Practitioner, Provincial Livestock 
Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
“The financial reward was a motivation for the officials in working on the KPIs...” 
(Senior manager, Chief of human resource management group, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
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This implies that monetary reward can contribute to motivation; Helmke and Levitsky 
(2004) state that motivation is crucial to shape organizational culture to pursue their goal 
accomplishment. On the contrary, other officials disagreed with PRP, for example, the 
limited number of people related to the KPIs, small amount of financial reward, and 
distortion of evidence in achieving high KPI score, as the following example: 
 
“I disagreed with the criteria of incentive allocation...there were various tasks of the 
provinces, but some tasks were selected as the KPIs...” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Provincial Livestock Office, Provincial Livestock Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
In this respect, providing financial rewards based on achievement in high performance 
evaluation appears to remain ambiguous either in the high or low KPI scoring provinces. 
Using financial reward or PRP in the context of PMS remains a controversial issue as 
the relationship between PRP and high organizational performance cannot be proved 
(Bevan and Thompson, 1991 cited in Fletcher, 1993; Institute of Personnel 
Management, 1992). Although Fletcher (1993) and Murphy and Denisi (2008) claim 
that there are several challenges of PRP, Moynihan and Pandey (2005) and Price (2011) 
point out that at least it motivates and retains high performing people. Armstrong (1990) 
suggests that the incentives can lead to achieving performance when the pay system 
provides appropriate incentives and the value of the rewards is consistent with the 
individuals’ needs. It is possible that the appropriate incentive with relevance to the 
officials’ needs may lead to enhanced performance such as in participation and 
accountability of the individuals performing the KPIs as well as the appropriate ways of 
management of reward by the leaders. 
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7.2.4 The adhocracy culture 
The quantitative data suggests that the adhocracy culture was significantly different 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.003) although it had not much 
different comparing with other culture types. Similarly, the results of assessment of job 
satisfaction (question 2 ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of 
working’) revealed that the adhocracy culture between the 16 provinces had significant 
differences (Sig.= 0.042). The presence of the characteristics of adhocracy culture were 
not reflected in the qualitative data analysis. However, they can be observed through 
three main aspects: dynamic (response to external change), risk taker (decision of 
solving problem-related the KPIs), and the reward individual initiative issue as shown 
in Figure 47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47 The adhocracy culture and performance delivering good governance 
Note: 1) L means the low KPI scoring provinces and H means the high KPI scoring provinces 
  2) GG means good governance 
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Dynamic (Response to external change) 
The provinces appeared to be confronted by several external changes from the central 
government such as changing standard of the KPIs, announcing the government policy 
with contradictory criteria of some KPIs, and variant allocation of the budget for the 
financial reward by the government. These suggest that PA can enhance a characteristic 
of response to external change among people. Some respondents perceived that 
implementing the KPIs could lead to quicker responses to citizens’ needs, as some 
officials stated that: 
 
“There were a lot of changes in the public service from 2003 when we had the principle 
of good governance. The officials were to respond to the changes and the needs of the 
public more quickly.” (Senior manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development 
Group, Provincial Governor’s Office, 22 July 2014: PL2) 
 
“There were several types of public services that distinctly improved. For example, 
services of land transport office, revenue office, and public health hospitals.”(Senior 
manager, Chief of Strategy for Province Development Group, Provincial Governor’s 
Office, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
Reducing time in delivering public services to citizens implies that the KPIs of the PA 
scheme can increase responsiveness – a quick response for the needs of the citizens 
within reasonable timeframe (UNESCAP, 2003). Moreover, enhancing the attribute of 
response to external change can be observed through strategic planning in short-term 
period (one year), which all government agencies have to indicate after the public sector 
 
 
277 
 
reform in 2002 as well as the scheme of PA. These data suggest that the attribute of 
responsiveness to external change can be generated through the PA scheme. This may 
lead the civil service to have greater efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of 
public service delivery. However, the previous studies investigated about organizational 
culture of the Thai public sector revealed that the adhocracy culture has been slightly 
increased after the public sector reform in Thailand (Jingjit, 2008; Phookpan, 2012). A 
weak attribute of the adhocracy culture may derive from traditional concepts in Thailand  
‘Cha Cha Dai Pla Lem Ngam’ (Do things slowly and make sure you get a beautiful big 
knife) (Pimpa, 2012, p. 37). This national culture probably determines leadership style 
and individuals’ characteristics in the Thai public sector. Furthermore, the limited 
number of civil servants coming from younger generation who are familiar with the 
concept of organizational change (Pimpa, 2012) may contribute to a low level of the 
adhocracy culture in the Thai civil service. 
 
However, some leaders appear to shift their style and management from administration 
to management on variety of unexpected challenges related to the KPIs. Likewise, the 
research findings discovered by Sathornkich (2010) revealed that the PMS creates a shift 
in working culture of the executives at the provincial level from bureaucratic 
administration to managerial one. Nevertheless, Hofstede (2001) claimed that the 
characteristics of response to external change or taking risks are not much observed 
among Thais due to their characteristic of uncertainty avoidance. This feature is 
reasonable in that Thais held the limited values of tolerance of ambiguity and acceptance 
of risk in order to minimize uncertainty by strict rules, regulations, laws and policies for 
implementation (Pimpa, 2012).  
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Risk taker (Decision of solving problem-related the KPIs) 
Although the attribute of risk taker is not widely seen in Thai society, the qualitative 
data suggested that the PA scheme seemed to generate the characteristic of risk taker in 
the Thai public organizations. Particularly, the chiefs of the agencies and the front line 
managers had to take action as a risk taker for solving problems related to the KPIs such 
as relocation of the responsible persons for the KPIs. The data suggested that the senior 
managers in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to express a higher degree of 
response to the problems relevant to the KPIs than the low KPI scoring provinces. The 
implication is that PA probably changes the leadership style from traditional 
bureaucracy to business sector such as a risk taker. Although the characteristic of risk 
taker – advice and problem-solving – is important for maintaining smooth operations 
and organizational maintenance through advice and problem-solving.  
 
Reward individual initiative issue 
Some may consider that it is difficult to find the attribute of innovation in the public 
sector, because it is a characteristic found in the private sector (Kimberly and 
Pouvoueville, 1993 cited in Talbot, 2010). The quantitative data suggested a factor that 
influenced creativity of people is a control focus, namely a lack of flexibility for 
working. The result of assessment of job satisfaction obtained from the quantitative data 
analysis – question 2 ‘Your job gives you the freedom to choose your own method of 
working’– suggested that there was significant difference between the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces (Sig.= 0.001). The high KPI scoring provinces had higher mean score 
than the low KPI scoring provinces. This implies that people in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tend to have more flexible circumstances for performing the KPIs. This is 
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consistent with the qualitative data that leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces incline 
towards participative style; in contrast leaders in the low KPI scoring provinces appear 
to have an authoritarian style. It is therefore possible that people in the low ones tend to 
have a lower degree of creativity, whilst staff in the high KPI scoring provinces perhaps 
have more of a climate of creativity. McKenna and Beech (2002) point out that a climate 
of creativity is one aspect of organizational functioning derived from a strong culture. 
The PA scheme probably helps to increase innovation in the public organization because 
performance measurement can encourage innovation in the public sector (Williams, 
1933; Williams, 1998). 
 
7.3 Crosscutting themes 
According to the previous section, ‘effectiveness’ was the most extensively mentioned 
characteristic by respondents who performed the KPIs and then ‘participation’, 
‘efficiency’ and ‘accountability and responsiveness’ respectively. These views seem to 
be consistent with Greiling (2005) that performance measurement is a crucial instrument 
increasing effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of the public organizations. 
Moreover, it is also consistent with the purpose indicated in the performance evaluation 
framework for the fiscal year 2007-2011 in four key dimensions: effectiveness of 
mission, service quality, efficiency of performance and organizational development.  
 
(1) Effectiveness 
The performance evaluation framework stated that the aspect of effectiveness is the 
main purpose of PA, the highest weight (%) of 50 comparing with the other three 
dimensions. It was stated as the first dimension of the performance evaluation 
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framework (see Table 3 in Chapter Three) – the effective mission, namely the goal of 
achieving in the KPIs relevant to the action plans of the agencies. The qualitative data 
suggested that effectiveness was generated from implementing the KPIs or performance 
evaluation. There were four major factors influencing effectiveness in the Thai civil 
service: the reward system, leadership, the individuals’ characteristics and the meetings. 
 
The reward system 
In the context of PMS, performance-related pay (PRP) has a significant impact on the 
motivation of individuals (Hatry, 2007). As stated earlier, PRP may influence 
performance of some people in pursuing goals of the KPIs. Measurement of goal 
achievement is one of the indicators to present effectiveness (Osborne et al., 1993). This 
implies that the reward system may influence effectiveness. However, using rewards for 
generating effectiveness of performance is concerned with misinterpretation on the 
incentives’ objectives by officials. Some officials tend to focus on making benefit as a 
business rather than producing outputs and outcomes of the public services. In other 
words, people being measured tend to manage the measure rather than the performance, 
viewed as ‘measurement dysfunction’ (Neely, 1998 cited in Houldsworth and 
Jirasinghe, 2006, p. 27). Thus, the reconsideration of the incentive system in the PA 
scheme was recommended by a number of respondents, particularly pay format and 
fairness of reward. Peters and Savoie (1995) stated that effectiveness can be created 
when a clear set of reward is identified and satisfactory to civil servants.  
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Leadership 
Leadership is a key feature influencing high performance in order to achieve 
effectiveness in the organizations. The evidence suggested that three main dimensions 
related to leadership were involved: task management, HRM and reward management. 
The executives who led the organizations by a participative leadership style tended to 
focus on people in order to achieve tasks. The managers who focused on task management 
tended to manage organizations based on task and goal-oriented achievement and solving 
problems related to the KPIs. Here, Blake and Mouton (1981) state that leadership style 
as either ‘concern for people’ or ‘concern for task’ can be simultaneously interrelated. 
For HRM, the leaders played a crucial role on the issues of HR, such as solving problems 
of staff members’ relocation and being concerned with people’s morale. Poor leadership 
may contribute to many problems such as lack of trust, high rate of staff turnover and 
deficient morale (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). Moreover, the leaders who could 
produce effectiveness in the organizations tended to have strategies for reward 
management and enable fairness and equity of the reward allocation among the officials. 
In this respect, it implies that management style and approach (e.g. task, human 
resource, and reward) are important for achieving effectiveness.  
 
The individuals’ characteristics 
The data suggested that the effectiveness of civil service is perhaps dominated  
by individuals’ characteristics, for instance assumptions, coordination, competitive-
orientation, response to external change and initiative. Particularly, the individuals’ 
assumptions seemed to be a crucial element leading to effectiveness, including 
assumptions on the KPIs and on the rewards. People who had positive attitudes or beliefs 
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in performing the KPIs tended to express conscientiousness and attention to the tasks 
related to the KPIs in order to create strong culture. On the other hand, wrong 
assumptions, such as beliefs that the KPIs are not their responsibility, of the staff 
members can lead to an inappropriate culture (weak culture) that negatively affects 
performance (Armstrong, 1990).  
 
The meetings 
The meetings seemed to be the other essential factor that significantly influenced the 
staff members’ performance (effectiveness). Performance review meetings with leaders 
can build effective team and manage the team (Moores, 1994; Platt, 1999). The findings 
suggested that the communication between the executives and officials through the 
meetings had a significant impact on, for example, aligning provincial orientation, 
enhancing understanding related to the KPIs, generating collaboration, encouraging 
resources, monitoring progress of the KPIs, pursuing goals and increasing morale. Here, 
it suggests that a meeting is an important technique to manage team (Moores, 1994), 
particularly formal meetings with the executives, and teamwork enables people to 
accomplish tasks together (Armstrong and Baron, 1998).  
 
2) Participation 
Participation was extensively mentioned by the respondents as the second aspect of 
good governance. The attribute of participation is one of the important elements under 
the second dimension of performance evaluation framework – the quality of public 
sector service delivery, which it is concerned with improvement of public service 
delivery as well as public participation. The evidence suggested that three main 
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categories led to participation in the provinces: leadership and reward system, loyalty 
or warm and caring, and the individuals’ characteristics. 
 
Leadership and reward system 
Leadership is a major force to create commitment to and involvement with productivity 
of organizations (Blake and Mouton, 1981). A team builder is a leadership type in the clan 
culture (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Building a team is viewed as generating 
participation through sharing their ideas for the formulation of a policy or course of 
action (Williams and Huber, 1986). Thus, participative leadership style tend to generate 
participation. Besides leadership style, rewarding is a technique from the private sector 
that is used to create participation in the public sector (Peters and Savoie, 1995). 
However, rewards appear to be a sensitive issue for maintaining organizational 
performance when fairness is not assured as stated earlier sections. This is because 
motivation of the officials, particularly in performance appraisal, may be destroyed due 
to unfair discrimination (Fletcher, 1993; Ryan and Pointon, 2007).  
 
Loyalty or warm and caring 
A high level of participation appears to be created when organizations (the provinces) 
encourage loyalty or warmth and caring of staff (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). In the 
context of PA, loyalty of officials in a province is viewed through rate of relocation. As 
stated earlier that the high KPI scoring provinces tend to have a higher degree of loyalty 
as a result of the low rate of relocation. The high rate of turnover not only derives from 
the officials themselves, such as moving to their hometown, but also from leadership.  
A cause of high rate of staff turnover and lack of trust may derive from poor leadership 
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(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010), in the PA scheme, either the executives or the team 
of Provincial Governor’ Office.  
 
The data suggest that some people still work in a province because it is their hometown, 
as a practitioner indicated that: 
 
“The province was developed due to the KPIs, I was proud of working for the KPIs 
because this province was my hometown...” (Practitioner, Provincial Employment 
Service Office, 24 July 2014: PH2) 
 
In addition, the KPIs perhaps generate sense of unity in the provinces regarding 
integrated collaboration in the provinces for achieving the overall result of PA, as one 
of senior managers stated that: 
 
“In the past, each agency worked independently. Now, several agencies are accountable 
for the same KPIs. Thus, we learned to collaborate.” (Senior manager, Chief of 
Provincial Office of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Provincial Office of Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation, 13 August 2014: PH1) 
 
In this context, it implies that the PA scheme can generate sense of ownership among 
the agencies within a province or participation. Participation (e.g. sharing opinions and 
making decision) can be created when people feel part of an organization, which is 
viewed as an important element of strong culture (Brown, 1998; Christiensen et al., 
2007). 
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The individuals’ characteristics 
The findings of this study also suggested that participation in the provinces seemed to 
be generated by the individuals’ attentiveness and conscientiousness in implementing 
the KPIs. This implies that participation in the provinces is generated by the individuals’ 
characteristics. On the contrary, participation of people in the provinces is probably 
created by the process of PA itself as stated earlier.  
 
3) Efficiency 
Efficiency of public organizations was often referred to through the evidence with 
reference to leadership and control system, reward system and other factors (e.g. the 
meetings, competitive-oriented, and response to external change). Efficiency of 
performance was under the third dimension of performance evaluation framework 
focused on the standardization of process improvement. For example, the agencies are 
anticipated to improve budget management process, reduce costs, maximize the usage 
of energy, and achieve a reducing process time of services.  
 
Leadership and control system 
Bratton et al. (2007) suggest that a participative leadership style is more effective than 
an autocratic leadership style. Participative leadership tends to be people focused and 
encourage participation among people, which may lead to improvement in efficiency 
because officials at lower levels have greater participation, viewed as decentralization 
(World Bank, 1992). Regarding control system, it is seen as hierarchical and market 
orientations in the CVF. Although Cameron and Quinn (2011) state that the leaders who 
focus on hierarchical values are often to be a monitor in order to generate efficiency, 
 
 
286 
 
Armstrong and Baron (1998) claim that control orientation may inhibit performance 
rather than facilitate performance. For market values, leaders are viewed as a hard driver 
in order to generate productivity and efficiency of organizations (Cameron and Quinn, 
2011). In this respect, it implies that participative and authoritarian styles can be 
simultaneously created for achieving high performance. 
 
The reward system 
The majority of respondents perceived that fairness of reward allocation can lead to 
efficiency of performance regarding job satisfaction, but in terms of motivation there 
are different views between officials. Although the use of rewards system is ambiguous 
about can financial reward motivate people in performing the KPIs, some respondents 
stated that receiving financial reward contributed to morale for achieving the KPIs such 
as reducing process time of services. This may lead to achieve good services reflects 
that efficiency is generated (Jackson, 1995).  
 
Other factors 
Efficiency of performance appears to be generated through the meetings because they 
provide the opportunities to accelerate staff in pursuing goal achievement. The 
competitive-orientation is sometimes emphasized by some executives, in fact, the purpose 
of the PA scheme emphasizes on target achievement rather than competitive-orientation. 
This is because each province has different provincial strategies in order to have 
different the KPIs in the first dimension, although other dimensions are compulsory (see 
Chapter Three, section 3.4.2). Thus, the overall result of PA of each province cannot be 
compared, but some provinces seem to desire comparison with other provinces. In the 
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context of PA, the market culture regarding goal achievement is perhaps generated in 
order to create efficiency of the Thai civil service, as in the idea of Cameron and Quinn 
(2011) that efficiency is the end of the market culture.  
 
4) Accountability and Responsiveness 
Accountability – a sense of responsibility on the part of staff – in the context of PA was 
often mentioned in relation to internal accountability such as responsibilities on job 
assigned by the leaders (e.g. being the responsible persons as the KPI host), and on the 
results anticipated (e.g. achieving goals of the KPIs). Internal accountability is important 
for responsibilities of a certain job and for achieving results desired (Ryan and Pointon, 
2007). Meanwhile, responsiveness was found in the agencies who deliver public services 
in terms of responding to needs of the citizens within reasonable timeframe (UNESCAP, 
2009). Moreover, low level of responsiveness was found when the leaders tend to lack a 
characteristic of taking action on the problems related to the KPIs. This can be seen as a 
lack of response to vital need of stakeholders (Dooren, Bouckaert and Halligan, 2015) 
such as staff, other agencies and the citizens.  
 
7.4 Typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces 
This section discusses the typical characteristics of the low and high KPI scoring provinces. 
As stated earlier, the typical characteristics of each provincial group can be divided into four 
categories: leadership, individuals’ characteristics, reward system and others (e.g. task and 
goal-oriented, trust of the team of Provincial Governor’s Office, and meetings with the 
executives). Table 30 demonstrates the comparison of the typical characteristics between 
the low and high KPI scoring provinces as in the following explanation. 
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Table 30 Comparison of the typical characteristics between the low and high KPI 
scoring provinces 
Typical 
characteristics 
Low  
KPI scoring provinces 
High  
KPI scoring provinces 
1. Leadership Authoritarian leadership style Participative leadership style 
2. Individuals’ 
characteristics 
 Negative assumptions to the KPIs 
 Low collaboration 
 Slow response to external 
change 
 Positive assumptions to the KPIs 
 High collaboration 
 Quick response to external 
change 
3. Reward system  Extrinsic motivation 
 Management of rewards based 
individualistic view 
 Intrinsic motivation 
 Management of rewards based 
collective view 
4. Others  Low degree of the market-
oriented cultural model 
 Low trust of the team of 
Provincial Governor’s Office 
 Informal meetings without  
the executives 
 High degree of the market-
oriented cultural model 
 High trust of the team of 
Provincial Governor’s Office 
 Formal meetings with the 
executives 
 
1) Leadership 
Leadership styles significantly dominate performance of the civil service in different 
ways, particularly participative and authoritarian styles. Participative style was found in 
the high KPI scoring provinces, whilst authoritarian style was found in the low KPI 
scoring provinces. Participative style seemed to lead to high performance rather than the 
authoritarian style because of greater concern with the individuals’ needs, greater 
willingness and responsibility, and greater involvement in planning and making 
decisions (Williams and Huber, 1986). Many scholars (e.g. Bratton et al., 2007; Jackson, 
1989) appear to agree that participative style is more effective than authoritarian style. 
This implies that participative leadership style (people focused) can lead to higher 
performance. It is possible that the employees in the high KPI scoring provinces tend to 
have higher job satisfaction and more flexible circumstances. These characteristics refer 
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to strong culture in terms of high consistency and employees’ motivation (Brown, 1998; 
Christiensen et al., 2007).  
 
On the one hand, people in the low KPI scoring provinces who performed tasks under 
the authoritarian style tended to have less flexibility because they worked based on the 
executives’ command and policies. The implication of high performance would be 
generated when the control system – the hierarchical-oriented value – is perhaps shifted 
to greater flexibility or external focus such as clan or adhocracy or market orientations. 
Brown (1998, p. 229) suggests that ‘strong culture equals high performance’. 
 
2) The individuals’ characteristics 
Three typical characteristics of the individuals in the low and high KPI scoring 
provinces were different: assumptions, collaboration and response to external change. 
The data suggested that the staff members in the high KPI scoring provinces tended to 
have positive assumptions performing the KPIs in order to work based on attentiveness 
and conscientiousness. Meanwhile, people in the low KPI scoring provinces seemed to 
have negative attitudes to the KPIs. This may lead to a different level of collaboration 
between both groups. In other words, negative or weak culture may demotivate staff to 
perform their work (Ehtesham, Muhammad and Muhammad, 2011). Therefore, higher 
collaboration between the agencies and officials was found in the high KPI scoring 
provinces. This reflects that the high KPI scoring provinces have stronger culture than 
the low KPI scoring provinces because a high degree of staff members commitment is 
seen in strong culture (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013; Robbins, 2005). Moreover, strong 
culture in the high KPI scoring provinces may derive from high cohesion or good 
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relationship due to less relocation among the officials, viewed as high loyalty. These 
imply that strong culture has a significant impact on high performance to deliver good 
governance because strong culture ensures greater commitment, increases behavioural 
consistency, and ensures people point to the same direction (Robbins, 2005; Senior and 
Fleming, 2006). This is different from the idea proposed by some scholars (e.g. Klausner, 
1997; Hofstede, 1999; Phillips, 1966) that Thais are characterized as being individualistic. 
 
In addition, the data suggested that the high KPI scoring provinces tended to have 
quicker response to change such as solving problems related to the KPIs than the low 
ones. This reflects that the high ones demonstrate higher degree of the adhocracy 
culture. However, the adhocracy culture seems to be limited in the Thai civil service. 
This may derive from the national culture such as low level of tolerance for uncertainty, 
attempt to control and eliminate the unexpected achievement (Hofstede, 2001; Pimpa, 
2012). Moreover, the limited presence of the younger generation, who tend to appreciate 
the Western concepts such as organizational change and management (Pimpa, 2012),  
in the Thai public sector is perhaps a significant impact for the limited adhocracy 
culture. It is possible that limited adhocracy culture is a challenge for change, for 
example resistance to the public reform such PA in promoting good governance in the 
Thai public sector.  
 
3) The reward system 
The findings of this study suggested that two major issues of the reward system were 
different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation, and management of reward based collective view or individualistic 
 
 
291 
 
view. The extrinsic motivation seemed to have a significant effect on performance of 
people in the low KPI scoring provinces, particularly perceptions of fairness. 
Meanwhile, the officials in the high KPI scoring provinces appeared to be motivated by 
the intrinsic motivator such as attentiveness and conscientiousness. This reflects a strong 
culture existing in the high KPI scoring provinces rather than the low KPI scoring 
provinces. Furthermore, such intrinsic motivation does not only have a crucial impact 
on performance (Armstrong, 1990; McKenna and Beech, 2002), but also does not create 
the problems related to PRP or merit pay (Fletcher, 1993).   
 
Regarding the management of rewards, the leaders in the high KPI scoring provinces 
tended to manage rewards based on a collective approach, namely involving all eligible 
persons, and being concern with fairness and equity. On the other hand, the leaders in 
the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to be concerned with their own benefits as was 
the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office that seemed to be criticised by other 
agencies in the provinces about transparency of the reward allocation. These reflect the 
management of rewards in the low KPI scoring provinces tending to be based on an 
individualistic approach or their own benefits. In this context, the sustainability of high 
performance of the public organization requires an increase in strong culture – 
behavioral consistency (Robbins, 2005) – such as conscientiousness of people, rather 
than an appeal to individual self-interest, contrary to the argument made by Gill (2006). 
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4) Others (e.g. Task and goal-oriented, trust of the team of the Provincial Governor’s 
Office, and the meetings with the executives)  
Besides characteristics stated earlier, there were other characteristics that were different 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including degree of market-oriented 
cultural model, trust in the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office, and the formal 
meetings with the executives. People in the high ones tended to have higher degree of  
task and goal achievement, viewed as the attribute of the market-oriented value as well 
as strong culture – the employees held values and beliefs together and pointed in the 
same orientation (Robbins, 2005; Senior and Fleming, 2006). On the other hands, the 
officials in the low KPI scoring provinces appeared to have a lower degree of the market 
model or weak culture – no dominant pervasive culture (Senior and Fleming, 2006). The 
leaders seemed to be a key feature stimulating the agencies and the employees approaching 
to the market culture or a strong culture in the context of PA.  
 
Furthermore, it was found that the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office in the high 
KPI scoring provinces seemed to have a higher degree of trust, especially transparency, 
among the other agencies in the provinces than did the low KPI scoring provinces. 
Regarding the meetings with the executives, the high KPI scoring provinces tended to 
have formal meetings with the executives, whilst the low KPI scoring provinces broadly 
mentioned informal contact and informal meetings without the executives. The formal 
meetings with the executives seemed to have a significant effect on civil service 
performance because the meetings are the opportunities for pursuing the KPI targets, 
getting support, and solving problems related to the KPIs.  
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7.5 Summary 
The findings acquired from the quantitative and qualitative data analysis suggested that 
organizational culture is perhaps not the key variable dominating performance in 
the provincial administration. However, leadership (e.g. attentiveness to the KPIs, 
leadership style) and management (e.g. tasks, human resources and reward) were the 
key determinants in influencing performance. The findings of the quantitative data 
analysis suggested that the existence of hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy cultures 
in the 16 provinces does not differ significantly in terms of organizational culture 
profiles. The qualitative data analysis revealed that organizational culture – underlying 
assumptions of people to the KPIs or the PA scheme – influenced high performance at 
the provincial level. These were demonstrated through three key determinants: 
leadership style, individuals’ characteristics, and reward system.  
 
The participative leadership style (people focused) appeared to play a significant role in 
high performance. This tended to ensure willingness to perform the KPIs, low rate of 
relocation of the employees, and high commitment because they have opportunities for 
participation such as sharing ideas, discussing plans and making decisions with superiors. 
For the individuals’ characteristics, the positive assumptions (e.g. attitudes and beliefs) 
of people to the KPIs seemed to have a significant impact in performing the KPIs 
because they tend to work based on high degree of attentiveness, conscientiousness, and 
collaboration. Regarding the reward system, there are two major aspects concerned by 
the officials: the clear criteria of reward allocation and management of reward, 
particularly the issues related to fairness and equity of reward allocation. The evidence 
suggested that leadership and management approaches were important to manage these 
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challenges in order to achieve high performance to deliver good governance at the 
provincial level, especially effectiveness, participation, efficiency and accountability 
and responsiveness.  
 
Achieving high scores of performance evaluation at the provincial level seemed to 
derive from differences between provinces in terms of the strength of culture. The 
indicators were seen through differences of the typical characteristics between the low 
and high KPI scoring provinces, including leadership, individuals’ characteristics and 
reward system. Although the four culture types acquired from the quantitative data 
analysis were significantly different between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, 
they were not much different and seemed to be relatively uniform in terms of culture 
types based on assumptions implementing PA. The differences of four culture types 
between both groups appeared to express the differences of strong culture rather than 
the culture types themselves. 
 
In summary, the types of organizational culture are perhaps not the key variable 
influencing attainment of PA in delivering good governance, but leadership style and 
the ways of management appear to be the significant factors to influence performance 
of the Thai civil service and do so in a way that encourages a stronger culture, rather 
than a culture of a different type (the findings do not, for example, show a shift from 
hierarchical to market culture). The implication is that the CVF is a neutral (i.e. non-
evaluative) device for the study of organizational culture, but it does not bring out the 
characteristics of high as opposed to low performance.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws conclusions and sets out the implications of the overall results found 
in the study. The chapter is organized into seven sections. It begins with Section 8.2, 
conclusions and implications, which focuses on the conclusions of the research, and the 
implications of attainment of good governance in the provincial administration. It follows 
with Section 8.3, contributions to theory, of which there are three aspects: analytical 
framework, particularity of study focus and conclusions of theoretical contribution. 
Section 8.4, reflections on the research, is concerned with the development of the 
analytical framework and research design and methods. In section 8.5, policy implications 
and recommendations are offered, including the recommendations for the incentive 
scheme and for the overall implementation of PA. Then it moves on to Section 8.6, 
limitations of the research. There follow recommendations for future research, which are 
provided in Section 8.7. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter is presented in Section 8.8. 
 
8.2 Conclusions and implications 
8.2.1 Conclusions of the research 
The conclusions of this study are set out based on the research questions of ‘how does 
organizational culture influence civil service performance’ and ‘what other organizational 
factors influence civil service performance’. To answer these questions, the results of the 
quantitative data analysis (Chapter Five) and the qualitative data analysis (Chapter Six) 
are compared for the conclusion of the overall result of the study. 
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How does organizational culture influence civil service performance?  
This study considers performance in two aspects: an action and the result of an act  
of organizations (Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006), namely the civil service 
implementation of the PA scheme (an action) and the outcomes of the programme or 
achieving good governance (the result of an act). Regarding organizational culture, it is 
viewed through the four types of culture (hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy 
cultures) based on the CVF. As stated in Chapter Five, the quantitative data revealed 
that there was a significant difference in the culture scores between the low and high 
KPI scoring provinces. However, there was not much difference in terms of culture 
types between both groups, rather in terms of the strength of each component of the 
culture. This may derive from the fact that the officials had performed the KPIs under 
the same environment (the PA scheme). Furthermore, the embedded root of culture in 
the Thai public sector was acquired from the national culture, because national culture 
is a source of organizational culture (Brown, 1998). It was not so much that the high and 
low scoring provinces had different types of culture, but that the culture was enacted by 
management in different ways. 
 
For example, there are several characteristics in the hierarchy culture that give the 
provinces different degrees of strong culture, including introducing clear policies by  
the leaders, leadership style, and the leaders’ management of the reward system. The 
higher level of strong culture is perhaps seen more in the high KPI scoring provinces 
than in the low KPI scoring provinces. Many officials in the high KPI scoring provinces 
tended to focus on introducing clear policies by leaders to ensure that they work 
properly. This leads to a strong culture where people share the same assumptions and 
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agree what goals to pursue (Brown, 1998). This also reflects that Thais attempt to 
minimize uncertainty by strict rules, regulations and policies (Pimpa, 2012). It may 
derive from Thai value called ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (Hofstede, 2001). Moreover, 
leadership style was one of the most important elements in generating a strong culture  
in terms of a high degree of employee commitment (Luhman and Cunliffe, 2013; 
Robbins, 2005). The data suggested that the participative style was found in the high 
KPI scoring provinces more so than in the low KPI scoring provinces. In particular, 
participative style appeared to positively affect performance by ensuring the 
individuals’ participation in such areas as sharing ideas, discussing problems and 
making decisions (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986).  
 
In addition, the data demonstrated that the leaders’ management of the reward system 
had a significant impact on performance in terms of fairness and equity. Reward is 
important to motivate the staff members to achieve goals (Gill, 2006; Williams and 
Huber, 1986). It is possible that the satisfaction of reward allocation leads to increased 
level of loyalty and reduced rate of turnover, which means a strong culture (Rainey, 
1996). In this respect, a strong hierarchy culture may provide positive effects on 
promoting good governance such as efficiency, effectiveness (achievement of goals), 
participation (high official commitment), accountability, equity (reward allocation to 
eligible officials), being consensus oriented (making decisions based on staff opinions) 
and rule of law (criteria of reward allocation).     
 
Regarding the clan culture, the qualitative data suggested that the positive assumptions 
of the staff performing the KPIs, low rate of relocation of the officials and high 
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commitment of the agencies and people in the provinces tended to influence the 
attainment of high KPI scores. These characteristics are seen as a strong culture, and are 
found in the high KPI scoring provinces rather than the low KPI scoring provinces. This 
is consistent with the quantitative data, which showed that characteristics of a clan 
culture were the most significantly different between the low and high KPI scoring 
provinces. A strong clan culture is perhaps needed in order to achieve high results of 
performance evaluation and deliver good governance such as participation (low rate of 
staff turnover leading to high involvement), accountability (responsibilities based on 
positive assumptions), effectiveness (high commitment), and transparency and equity 
(reward allocation).  
 
The market culture, such as the pursuit of goals and rewards based achievement, is 
important to generate strong culture in the provinces. This is because the achievement 
of goals and level of staff motivation are important elements in order to generate a strong 
culture (Brown, 1998). The data revealed that the characteristics of pursuing goals and 
reward based achievement were based on leaders’ management and conscientiousness 
of staff. In the high KPI scoring provinces, people tended to have a higher propensity of 
pursuing KPI targets by meeting with superiors, and because of the individuals’ 
conscientiousness. This contributes to enhanced efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness 
in the provinces. On the other hand, staff in the low KPI scoring provinces tended to 
have more pressure from leaders to pursue goals, which meant greater inflexibility for 
working. Regarding reward based achievement, the officials in the high KPI scoring 
provinces tended to focus on task achievement rather than reward, in contrast with the 
low KPI scoring provinces. Satisfaction of reward is associated with the participation 
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and accountability of officials to perform the KPIs because the staff feel a greater sense 
of attainment by being rewarded based on their performance (Peters and Pierre, 2007). 
However, Armstrong and Baron (1998) and Bevan and Thompson (1991 cited in Fletcher, 
1993) argue that performance-related pay (PRP) is not a guaranteed motivator associated 
with the high performance of organizations. Organizational effectiveness could be 
improved without PRP (Institution of Personnel Management, 1992). In summary,  
a strong market culture could lead the provinces to achieve good governance such as 
efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness (by pursuing goals); participation and 
accountability (by satisfaction of fair reward).  
 
Although the adhocracy culture is less observed in the context of PA, the data suggested 
that it could be seen through the characteristics of response to external change, decision 
making when solving problems related to the KPIs, and the issue of rewarding individual 
initiative. The evidence demonstrated that people in the high KPI scoring provinces 
tended to have positive assumptions about the KPIs in order to attempt to cope with 
problems related to KPIs and give a quicker response to the needs of the citizens. The 
data also suggested that the PA scheme contributed to a shift of leadership style from 
administration to management (e.g. risk taker and visionary leadership). Moreover, the 
indicator suggested that reward could lead to a reduction of the individuals’ initiatives 
for new products and services, particularly issues of flexibility of working environment. 
In this respect, a strong adhocracy culture could contribute to efficiency, effectiveness 
and responsiveness.    
 
 
 
 
300 
 
In summary, strong culture is important in order to achieve high performance in the civil 
service and deliver good governance because of the ‘strong culture equals high 
performance’ equation (Brown, 1998, p. 229). In the context of the PA scheme, strong 
culture of the four culture types seems to positively impact on the performance of the 
civil service and the delivery of good governance, such as efficiency and effectiveness 
of performance, participation of the agencies and officials, accountability of the 
employees, and responsiveness for delivering public services. However, the data 
suggested that the civil service’s culture was not the key variable influencing 
performance delivering good governance. Beyond a strong culture, leadership and the 
ways of management appear to be the most important key elements in determining 
achievement in the PA scheme and good governance in the provinces. In particular, a 
participative leadership style and the ways of management such as tasks, human 
resources, and rewards, are important. These factors are described in the answer to the 
next research question. 
 
What other organizational factors influence civil service performance? 
Existing literature (e.g. Armstrong and Baron, 1998; Bazeley and Richards, 2000; 
Boyne, 2003 cited in Moynihan and Pandey, 2005; Campbell et al., 1993 cited in 
Williams, 1998) suggests that the performance of organizations is dominated by at least 
seven factors, including personnel, motivated, leadership, management styles and 
strategic management, team, system, and contextual (situational) and organizational 
culture. According to the findings of this study, the individuals’ characteristics 
(assumptions and motivation) and leadership (style and management) are major 
determinants influencing the performance of the civil service. Leadership style, 
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particularly participative style, played a crucial role in the employees’ assumptions and 
behaviour. This is because a participative style focuses on people’s participation, such 
as offering opinions, discussing issues between the managers and staff, planning and 
making decisions (Francesco and Gold, 1998; Gill, 2006; Williams and Huber, 1986). 
Thus, a participative leadership style may lead to stability of operation, job satisfaction 
and a flexible working environment in order to generate efficiency and effectiveness of 
work, participation and the accountability of the officials. The participative leadership 
style is associated with enhancing performance (Huang et al., 2010). However, Gill 
(2006) argued that Southeast Asian countries have a directive leadership style rather 
than a participative style. This implies that authoritarian style is a certain element 
influencing the performance of the civil service, namely a high degree of centralization 
and difficulty for change in the context of performance measurement (Jackson, 1989).    
 
Regarding the ways of management, the way a leader managed things such as tasks, 
human resources and rewards were important in determining achievement in high scores 
of performance evaluation and good governance. The evidence suggested that task 
management, such as monitoring progress of the KPIs and solving problems, was a 
crucial element in order to accomplish tasks and goals. This can lead to efficiency and 
effectiveness of performance. In terms of HRM, the managers’ decisions appeared to be 
the key feature to shape the individuals’ assumptions and motivation regarding the KPIs, 
by maintaining satisfaction and raising morale. Leadership is associated with shaping 
the organizational culture needed for achieving effectiveness in the public sector (Parry 
and Proctor-Thomson, 2003). The issue of rewards appeared to concern various 
officials, particularly fairness and equity of reward allocation. The managers were, 
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therefore, expected to reward the eligible staff with impartiality and equity through the 
clear criteria of reward allocation and management of reward. Participative leadership 
helped to reassure staff regarding fairness (Huang et al., 2010). HRM and reward 
management can lead to the attainment of good governance such as participation and 
accountability. Achieving the good performance of organizations is associated with the 
capacity for managing incentive for their employees (Grindle, 1997).  
 
For the individuals’ characteristics, there were different typical characteristics for the 
officials in the low and high KPI scoring provinces, including the officials’ assumptions 
(e.g. attitudes and beliefs) to the KPIs, a degree of collaboration between agencies and 
officials in the provinces, and response to external change. In addition, the data 
suggested that other factors could influence the performance of the civil service such as 
market-oriented value, trust of the team of the Provincial Governor’s Office and 
meetings with executives.  
 
8.2.2 Implications of attainment of good governance at the provincial administration 
Good governance in this study is viewed through the lens of the PA scheme in the 
provincial cases. The findings suggested that attainment in good governance requires 
changing leadership (e.g. attentiveness and style) and management actions (e.g. tasks, 
human resources and rewards) with the aim of generating and maintaining a strong 
culture.  
 
The evidence showed that a participative leadership style tended to encourage the 
performance of the civil service at the provincial level. A participative style was more 
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often found in the high KPI scoring provinces than the low KPI scoring provinces. In 
addition, an authoritarian leadership style was found in the low KPI scoring provinces. 
This result is consistent with the idea that a participative leadership style is more 
effective than an authoritarian style (Bratton et al., 2007; Jackson, 1989; Williams and 
Huber, 1986). For example, a participative style contributes to improving a managers’ 
ability (e.g. making decisions); facilitating change by participation (e.g. enhancing 
people’s voices on a policy or course of action); and emphasizing the employees’ 
involvement (e.g. planning and decision making). As a consequence, a participative 
style can bring about high performance of the civil service because it enhances the 
confidence of the individuals’ with regards to willingness and responsibility (Williams 
and Huber, 1986). Therefore, the leaders of the government agencies should consider 
shifting leadership style from an authoritarian style to a participative style. This may 
contribute to a high performance that delivers good governance in the civil service, 
particularly in the provincial administration. 
 
The findings also suggested that management actions were important for dominating the 
performance of the public organizations in the context of the PA, especially HRM and 
reward allocation. For HRM, recruitment of people who were responsible for the KPIs 
was essential for achieving PA. The appropriate responsible officials were required to 
have such qualities as knowledge and skills, experience, accountability and positive 
assumptions to the KPIs. Regarding reward, the evidence showed that monetary reward 
did little in terms of effective motivation but that perceived unfairness in rewards was a 
strong de-motivator. 
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In conclusion, the findings of this study suggested that performance can be improved 
through immediate leadership or managerial actions. Performance may not depend on 
underlying cultural characteristics that, by definition, can only be altered in the long 
term. Changing the ways the civil service is managed may be more effective than 
seeking to change the civil service culture as a whole. 
 
8.3 Contributions to theory 
This research was based on the assumption that a fundamental cultural change would be 
needed in the civil service in order to attain high performance on KPIs and deliver the 
government’s good governance objectives. Accordingly it was assumed that those 
provinces which had scored high on KPIs would have a different cultural profile from 
those with low scores. This was part of the rationale for adopting the OCAI as a research 
instrument, in order to measure the anticipated cultural difference between high and low 
scoring provinces.  
 
In terms of the OCAI, and in line with the NPM perspective on which much 
contemporary performance management thinking is based, it was assumed or expected 
that the quantitative results would show that high scoring provinces had a less 
hierarchical and more market-oriented culture than the low-scoring provinces. This 
would then confirm the prevailing assumption that in the public sector hierarchical 
thinking is the old and market thinking is the new.  
 
In practice, the results presented a different picture. Although there were variations 
between the OCAI cultural profiles of high and low scoring provinces, the overall 
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profiles of each group, in terms of the relative proportions of the four cultures, was 
strikingly similar.  The scoring on the OCAI was not on a zero-sum basis and this may 
have meant that differences were understated. However, it was significant that high 
scoring provinces came out higher than low scoring provinces on all four quadrants. 
Therefore, it was true that high scoring provinces had a high score also for market 
culture, but they also scored higher on hierarchy and clan as well.  
 
These results suggest that it was not a transformational cultural shift that was required 
but more effective leadership or management within the culture concerned – engaging 
with and using elements of all four cultural types.  This has been referred to as strong 
culture, by which is meant a culture which has been more effectively mobilised or one 
in which the leadership or management style is working through, rather than in spite of, 
the organizational culture.  The qualitative data brought out the differences between 
high and low scoring provinces in terms of management or leadership style. It was not 
so much whether the culture was hierarchical or clan or market oriented but how the 
leaders or managers engaged with and balanced these characteristics. Thus the high KPI 
scoring provinces were hierarchical in terms of making clear top-down decisions about 
the approach to be adopted, but then followed this us with participatory implementation 
with considerable investment of management effort, so that employees felt involved. 
This tends to reject the implied contradiction between hierarchy and participation and 
suggested that, in Thai public sector culture, a combination of these was more effective. 
By contrast, the low KPI scoring provinces tended to be characterised by laissez-faire 
leadership that relied on a combination of targets and financial incentives, the latter 
made ineffective through perceived unfairness of distribution.  
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To some extent the findings confirmed the Blake and Mouton (1981) distinction 
between concern for the task and concern for people – in the high KPI scoring provinces 
the two were balanced whereas in the low KPI scoring provinces the people aspect was 
neglected. Overall the findings suggest that high performing public services are likely 
to be attained through a balanced approach that draws on different elements of the 
culture in a way that is personalised and responsive to staff expectations, rather than  
a wholesale transformation towards a culture exclusively focused on outputs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48 Summary of the research contribution 
Source: The author’s construct 
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organizational culture, performance and governance, which is divided into three major 
dimensions: analytical framework, particularity of study focus, and conclusions of 
theoretical contribution (see Figure 48).  
 
8.3.1 Analytical framework 
A review of the literature suggests that many empirical studies (e.g. Howard, 1998; 
Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000; Ralston et al., 2006) used the 
standard questions of the OCAI. Some of these studies used the OCAI and including the 
issue of reward (Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010) or the OCAI and job satisfaction (Parker and 
Bradley, 2000, 2001). There are not many studies that integrate all the attributes of 
organizational culture together in the questionnaire surveys, including the six key 
dimensions of the OCAI, reward and job satisfaction in a single study. However, the 
analytical framework of this study used a combination of these attributes in both 
questionnaire surveys and also adapted them for interviews. The comprehensive multi-
dimension of organizational culture for the study is not only a potential tool for gathering 
more potential information and answering the research questions, but also for creating 
a new analytical framework for studying organizational culture. The results of this study 
may provide new knowledge and a greater understanding of the relationship between 
organizational culture and good governance in the public sector.  
 
8.3.2 Particularity of study focus 
There are two particular aspects of this study. Firstly, many studies explored the 
relationship between organizational culture and various variables such as performance, 
effectiveness and management (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Nevertheless, there are  
not many empirical studies which examine the relationship between organizational 
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culture and good governance. The previous studies tend to examine organizational 
culture and some components of good governance, such as effectiveness, but not all 
components of good governance. In contrast, this study not only investigates the 
relationship between organizational culture and good governance, but also focuses on 
the comprehensive components of good governance.  
 
Secondly, several empirical studies on organizational culture in the Thai public sector 
(e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Phookpan, 2012) focused on the central government 
agencies rather than the provincial administration. There are a few studies  
(e.g. Sathornkich, 2010; Srimai, 2015; Srimai, Damsaman and Bangchokdee, 2011) that 
highlighted the provincial administration in Thailand, but they explored other aspects 
such as PMS and PA. Therefore, the findings of this study may offer a new knowledge 
on theories and concepts relevant to organizational culture, performance and 
governance. The findings of this study propose new knowledge on the relationship 
between organizational culture and good governance, particularly in the public sector in 
a developing country. 
 
8.3.3 Conclusions of theoretical contribution 
The findings of this study suggested that organizational culture was not the key variable 
influencing performance delivering good governance in the civil service, but leadership 
and the ways of management. This is different from the implication of the previous 
studies’ findings (e.g. Jingjit and Fotaki, 2010; Parker and Bradley, 2000) that 
organizational culture can either enable or inhibit the possibility of improving the 
performance or effectiveness of the organizations, especially the public organizations.  
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Moreover, the findings of the study offer an answer to the existing debate regarding ‘can 
organizational culture be managed and changed?’ (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008, 
p. 40). There are a number of scholars (e.g. Kotter and Heskett, 1992; McKenna and 
Beech, 2002; Schein, 2004; Schwartz and Davis, 1981) who have suggested that 
organizational culture is difficult to change. Contrary to this, other scholars (e.g. Brown, 
1998; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Lorsch, 1986) seem to agree that top management can 
change organizational culture, namely by the backing of the top managers in the 
organizations. Alvesson and Sveningsson (2008) stated that cultural change is very 
difficult, but cultural change can be accomplished by a combination of many ingredients 
such as leadership and performance appraisal, particularly top management (e.g. 
planning, allocating resources, making decisions, and paying attention). In this context, 
the findings of this study suggested that achieving high performance and delivering 
good governance may not depend on change in organizational culture as a whole, 
because it may be difficult to change and take a long time for change to occur. In fact, 
organizational culture can be improved by an immediate change of leadership style and 
the ways of management, which may take time for change in the short term.  
 
In addition, many scholars (e.g. Brown, 1998; Christiensen et al., 2007; Robbins, 2005) 
seem to agree that strong culture has a significant impact on the performance of 
organizations. Nevertheless, there are not many existing studies that make suggestions 
about the relationship between strong cultures in the particular context of PA (good 
governance) in the public sector. The findings of this study may provide new evidence 
about the correlation between strong culture and good governance that is viewed through 
PA. The results of the study suggested that strong culture was influential in getting high 
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KPI scores as well as delivering good governance. The evidence also revealed that 
strong culture was generated under appropriated leadership style and ways of 
management. Thus, leadership style and the style or strategies of management were the 
key factors to creating strong culture in the organizations. In summary, strong culture 
can influence high performance delivering good governance, and the creation and 
maintenance of a strong culture requires continual support in terms of leadership style 
and managerial decisions.  
 
8.4 Reflections on the research 
This section discusses the reflections of the study. Reflection refers to ‘the process of 
internally examining and exploring an issues of concern, triggered by an experience, 
which creates and clarifies meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed 
conceptual perspective’ (Boyd and Fales, 1983, p.100). Therefore, the reflections in this 
section focus on the processes and issues that the study is concerned with, particularly 
development of analytical framework, research design and methods.  
 
8.4.1 Development of analytical framework 
At the start the research topic focused on only two key variables: organizational culture 
and good governance. After reviewing the existing literature on performance 
management, ‘performance’ was added as the other crucial variable. In particular, 
performance measurement system (PMS) was focused on because good governance in 
this study was viewed through the lens of PA, which is based on PMS. A review of  
the literature on ‘performance’ refers to many concepts such as performance appraisal, 
performance assessment, performance evaluation, and performance management 
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(Vallance and Fellow, 1999). These terms may be used as synonyms in this research, in 
particular performance evaluation is often used for PA.  
 
I began with developing an understanding of the term ‘good governance’, regarding 
definition, components of good governance and research on good governance. After a 
review of the literature, I found that the extent of good governance should be addressed 
through the topic of ‘pursuing good governance’, including initiative, interpretation and 
importance of good governance. Regarding the variables of performance, my intention 
was to focus on three aspects of performance: definition of performance management 
system (PMS); nature of performance management; and determinants affecting 
performance in delivering good governance. In terms of organizational culture, this step 
was complicated because it was related to seeking a theory for developing the theoretical 
framework of the study.  
 
Identification of a theory on organizational culture was not straightforward. I spent a lot 
of time looking at matching theories, i.e. Competing Values Framework (CVF) and 
Denison’s organizational culture model, and then attempted to develop a theoretical 
framework for the study. However, a combination of theories appeared to be too 
complex and not suitable for answering the research questions. Thereafter, each theory 
was cautiously considered by comparing its advantages and disadvantages, which is in 
accordance with the supervisors’ recommendations. Finally, the CVF was selected 
because it provided many advantages, as discussed in Chapter Two.  
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In summary, developing the analytical framework of the study was carefully viewed 
throughout the process based upon self-directed academic research (e.g. a review of 
literature and analytical thinking), learning from practice (e.g. comparing and matching 
theories), and facilitating professionals (e.g. suggestions of the researchers’ supervisors). 
I am, therefore, confident that the development of the analytical framework of the study 
based on the three key aspects can contribute to answering the research questions with 
validity and reliability of the research findings. 
 
8.4.2 Research design and methods  
Regarding research design, I started with only a case study approach. This is because  
I viewed Thailand as a case study, which may help to identify appropriate cases for the 
sample in the levels of provinces, agencies, and individuals. After an in-depth review of 
the literature on comparative study, I recognized that a comparative study was necessary 
for examining the differences of organizational culture between the high and low KPI 
scoring provinces. Consequently, the research design of the study employed a 
combination of the case study and comparative study, as explained in detail in Chapter 
Four. 
 
When developing the research methods of this study, I began with a review of the 
existing literature, including quantitative methods, qualitative methods, mixed methods, 
triangulation and previous studies with relevance to the relationships between 
organizational culture and a variety of factors. As a consequence of a review of the 
literature, I had a clear opinion on research methods (see details in Chapter Four). This 
contributed to the use of mixed methods in the study, for two main reasons. Firstly, each 
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method has strengths and weaknesses in itself. Secondly, examining organizational 
culture is viewed as a study of the underlying assumptions of staff members in the 
organizations. Thus, qualitative methods such as interviews are required because they 
can provide in-depth details of social life, such as values, beliefs and perceptions 
(Kumar, 2011). Meanwhile, using quantitative method such as questionnaire surveys 
can facilitate the study of the wider population (Gill and Johnson, 2002), which is 
suitable for this study as it studied a wide geographical area. 
 
Working with research design and methods in this study was not simple because of using 
multiple research designs and mixed methods. Therefore, I attempted to explain research 
design and methodology through flowcharts with descriptions, as showed in Chapter 
Four. The most difficult area of research design and methods seemed to be the use of 
the findings acquired from the quantitative data analysis for selecting the potential cases 
for the interviews. The researcher had to analyze the data collected from the 
questionnaire surveys in the field immediately after it was gathered31. The selection of 
cases for the interviews was carried out after the results of the questionnaire survey were 
completed.  
 
8.5 Policy implication and recommendations 
The findings of the study suggested two major aspects for policy implication and 
recommendations: recommendations for the incentive scheme and recommendations for 
the overall implementation of PA.  
                                                          
31 The analysis of questionnaire survey in the fieldwork was concerned about validity. Thus, the results 
of data analysis was approved by the professional of statistics such SPSS for recommendations.  
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8.5.1 Recommendations for the incentive scheme 
The majority of respondents extensively mentioned about the criteria of incentive 
allocation. Many challenges were found in the linkage between PA results and reward, 
such as fairness and equity of reward allocation; limited amounts of monetary reward; 
limitations of the central government in the regions in getting rewards;  
and different numbers of officials in the provinces and agencies leading to inequity  
of reward allocation. Improvements to the criteria of the incentive allocation were 
suggested by some respondents as follows: 
1) Reconsidering the criteria of reward allocation by the central government to 
improve it and make it clearer  
2) Increasing the amount of the financial reward  
3) Generating new forms of incentive  
4) Other suggestions such as cancellation of the monetary reward system and 
maintaining the reward system 
 
Monetary reward, which is recognized as performance-related pay (PRP), is the most 
popular of motivational approaches (Hatry, 2007). However, PRP has various 
limitations, such as disappointment, a problem of equity and fabrication of appraisal 
evidence (Fletcher, 1993; Murphy and Denisi, 2008). In this respect, the policy maker, 
both at the level of central government and in the provinces, should be concerned  
with how to use appropriate incentive allocation for reaching the ultimate goals of 
performance.   
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8.5.2 Recommendations for the overall implementation of the PA scheme 
The respondents also recommended how to improve many aspects of the PA scheme, 
such as suggestions for the OPDC, setting the KPIs, and other suggestions. These can 
be explained as follows: 
1) The OPDC seemed to be expected by the civil servants to do such things as revising 
the policy and time frame of PA, opening communication for sharing ideas, 
choosing a team of advisers for the KPIs from the OPDC staff, and building an 
assessment team from the OPDC staff. This reflects the view that the central 
government is seen as the policy maker and needs to be concerned about making 
clear policies, being open for participation, and consulting. 
2) Some respondents suggested that pattern of setting the KPIs should be changed 
from top-down to bottom-up management. This implies that the officials’ 
participation – taking part in making decisions on setting criteria of the KPIs with 
the OPDC – is required in the process of setting KPIs.  
3) Other recommendations on PA were found, for example some officials suggested 
that the PA scheme should be cancelled because it seemed to be a control system 
based on command and policy. However, other people claimed that the PA scheme 
should be maintained further but the management needed reconsideration. 
 
In summary, there are a variety of perspectives on the overall picture of the PA scheme. 
However, the evidence suggested that a significant number of civil servants tended to 
require reconsideration of the PA scheme. Thus, the recommendations as stated earlier 
should be considered because these might influence the attainment of performance in 
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delivering good governance in the civil service, especially at the provincial 
administration. 
 
8.6 Limitations of the research 
There are some challenges in this study regarding the effect on reliability and validity. 
It can be considered in three dimensions: surveys, interviews and overall. 
 
8.6.1 Survey limitations 
The use of questionnaire surveys in this study found two major challenges. Firstly, using 
the five-point scale of the OCAI questionnaire may lead to a difficulty of interpretation 
by the researcher regarding a close range of scores of the four culture types. However, 
using the five-point scale of the Likert scales provides validity and reliability as follows: 
1) Having validity in terms of generating a significant correlation of the scale scores 
from the same quadrant rather than hundred-scale (Quinn and Spreitzer, 1991)  
2) Offering information about opinions, attitudes, and assumptions within a set of 
questions and providing  reliable indicators (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009; De 
Vaus, 2002)  
3) Facilitating respondents in answering questions due to it being easier than hundred-
scale (Vanderstoep and Johnson, 2009).  
 
Secondly, the other challenge is answering the questionnaire, which comprises two 
crucial problems as follows: 
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1) Getting access to the proposed respondents is difficult, especially senior managers 
who may make decisions by passing on the questionnaires for completion (Gray, 
2004) 
2) Inadequate attention may have been paid by some in answering the questionnaires, 
for example questions on some questionnaires were found to be in the same hand 
writing and seemed to be written by only one individual (e.g. continuously ticked on 
the same scale in many questions by using the single pen); and some questions on a 
questionnaire had missing data (e.g. did not tick on the questions in the section of 
assessment of organization). The number of such questionnaires and action take 
were discussed in Section 4.7.1. 
 
A lack of attention to answering the questionnaires may derive from an idea that the 
respondents might not recognize the benefits of the research. For example, some 
participants put a note on the questionnaire, saying that they did not see any results  
of research brought to adaptation in practice. This may lead to getting incomplete 
questionnaires. Nevertheless, the incomplete questionnaires were carefully considered 
for the potential quantitative data analysis. For example, the incomplete answers of  
the questions in the assessment of organizational culture section were cautiously 
considered.  
 
8.6.2 Interview limitations  
The limitations of the interviews comprise two main challenges. Firstly, the study aimed 
to investigate the relationship between organizational culture and good governance at 
the provincial level, which is viewed through the PA scheme between 2007 and 2011. 
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It was not a longitudinal study that was examined over this period. The participants 
were, therefore, asked to recall their experiences of PA in previous years. This is seen 
as retrospective study and may influence the recall process of the respondents about the 
details of implementing PA. However, the culture is something that has accumulated for 
a long time based on the history and traditions of the organization (McKenna and Beech, 
2002). It is also difficult to change (Hofstede et al., 1990; Rong and Hongwei, 2012; 
Schein, 2004). Moreover, the PA scheme was ongoing during the field work process 
(2014) and to the present day. Thus, the civil servants are familiar with implementing 
PA and could answer the questions. 
 
Secondly, a limitation of translation, which was time-consuming. The interviews were 
conducted in the Thai language because the interviewees were Thais. Thus, it took a lot 
of time for the process of translation, although only some important sections were 
translated. For accuracy of translation from Thai to English, it was cautiously 
undertaken to ensure validity of the findings. Therefore, the interview data was 
summarized in Thai and then sent to the participants for confirmation or correction. 
Moreover, translation of the interview data – particularly the important information in 
quotations in Chapter Six – was reviewed by a professional in both Thai and English in 
order to ensure the validity of the translation. 
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8.6.3 Overall limitations 
The overall study consisted of three challenges. Firstly, during the process of the study, 
there was a nation-wide political movement32, which provided some problems for the 
study. For example, it was difficult to process correspondence, namely the OPDC who 
issued the official letters changed their workplace. The other problem was  
getting limited attentiveness from some officials when answering questionnaires and 
participating in the interviews. For example, some provincial agencies had to have  
a meeting with the new government. This may have had an effect on getting responses 
to the questionnaires, although this was helped by using a technique suggested by 
Vanderstoep and Johnson (2009) of putting a specific date in bold for when to return the 
questionnaire survey. As well as the surveys, the responses of the interviews also 
seemed to be affected.  
 
Secondly, the other limitation was the researcher. The researcher is one of the staff 
members of the OPDC, which is the central government agency and responsible for the 
PA scheme. Some participants may have been careful to provide information that could 
cause either favour or disfavour from the OPDC. Contrary to this, being a staff member 
of the OPDC may be of merit in getting access to the information sources.  
 
Thirdly, the study was a piece of research focused on the relationship between 
organizational culture and good governance in the particular context of the Thai public 
sector. Therefore, the findings are not representative of the relationship between 
                                                          
32 The study processed collecting data in the fieldwork in the same time of the political movement, The 
Thai military coup declared a coup on 24 May 2014. 
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organizational culture and good governance in all countries. The culture of public 
sectors in each country has a particular context. For example, the same management 
actions in the civil service of a neighbouring country to Thailand with a different civil 
service culture might attain different results.  
 
8.7 Recommendations for future research 
1) Replication of research with other provincial case studies and study on central 
government agencies 
The provincial cases of this study were selected by stratified sampling based on the 
scores of PA between 2007 and 2011. This is because this information was complete  
and updated during the period of study (2014). After this period, the performance 
evaluation frame and number of provinces were changed. It is possible that some 
variables were changed in the context of PA. This would be interesting for future  
studies in replicating research.  
 
Moreover, this study does not interview central government agencies that have been 
committed to PA due to the focus on the provincial agencies. It would be interesting to 
study the central agencies’ perspectives. This may lead to receiving more understanding 
on the relationship between organizational culture and good governance in the Thai civil 
service. 
 
2) The relationship between leadership style and/or management and strong culture 
According to the findings of this study, the evidence suggested that leadership style and 
management actions were the key variables to influencing performance delivering good 
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governance in the Thai civil service. Furthermore, a strong culture was the other 
important element dominating high performance, which was encouraged by leadership 
and management. For further research, it would be interesting to examine the 
relationship between leadership style and/or management and strong culture.   
 
3) Incentive scheme: how to improve incentives to be more appropriate? 
From the findings, it was obviously observed that many civil servants were concerned 
with monetary incentive, especially the fairness of reward allocation. Therefore, there 
would be opportunities for future studies to build upon the research results. The future 
research may examine how to improve incentives in a more appropriate manner. This 
may provide many merits such as getting a greater understanding of the officials’ needs; 
getting information about which kinds of motivations should be used – intrinsic or 
extrinsic motivators; and achieving good governance in the civil service.  
 
4) Study corporate governance in the private sector 
This study focused on good governance in the public sector, which does not highlight 
good corporate governance in the private sector. However, a study on good corporate 
governance in the private sector would be interesting for future research. For example, 
the issues are related to regulations of institutions, the framework of laws and relevant 
conditions required by the corporate sector (World Bank, 1994). This is because the 
private sector is important to the nation’s affairs, such as implementation of the public 
sector.  
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5) Impacts and consequences of implementing good governance on the national citizens 
This study focused on the organizational culture of the civil service as a consequence of 
the civil services’ perspectives on PA or good governance. The study appears to explore 
only the dimensions of the public sector that deliver services to citizens. However, it 
does not study the results of implementing good governance in the civil service. It would 
be interesting for future research to study the impacts and consequences of implementing 
good governance. In this respect, the citizens’ perspectives may lead to more 
understanding on the outcomes or actual results of PA or implementing performance 
based good governance. This would not only improve or find more appropriate policies 
related to good governance, but also help to meet the ultimate goals of citizens’ needs.  
 
8.8 Summary 
This study aimed to examine the relationship between organizational culture and 
performance or good governance in the provincial administration in Thailand. There were 
two research questions: how does organizational culture influence civil service 
performance; and what other organizational factors influence civil service performance. 
In the study, performance or good governance was viewed through perspectives of the 
civil service’ implementation of the PA scheme and attainment of good governance. 
Meanwhile, organizational culture was considered through eight key themes:  
1) Dominant characteristic of the organization, 2) Leadership style, 3) Management of 
employees, 4) Organizational cohesion (glue), 5) Organizational strategic emphasis,  
6) Organizational success criteria, 7) Organizational reward in the form of promotion, and 
8) Job satisfaction. These are viewed through perspectives of the civil servants who have 
committed PA between 2007 and 2011 with at least one year of experience. These 
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perspectives are interpreted through the CVF, including the four types of culture – 
hierarchy, clan, market and adhocracy. 
 
The findings of the study suggest that there are not much different types of culture 
between the low and high KPI scoring provinces, but different strength of culture types. 
A strong culture is generated by participative leadership style and management 
approach. Therefore, leadership and the ways of management are the key variable 
influencing performance in order to achieve good governance. This is different from the 
previous studies showing that organizational culture is a crucial factor in facilitating or 
obstructing attempts to improve organizational effectiveness or performance. However, 
the findings of the study are from just one piece of work, which examined in particular 
the public sector in the provincial administration of Thailand. It is, therefore, not 
representative of the relationship between organizational culture and good governance 
in the public sector of all countries. This is because each country has its own particular 
context of the public sector’s culture along with other different factors.  
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Appendix 1: The definitions of governance and good governance 
 
Administrative Economic  Political  Social  Organizational   Other contexts 
1.1 Definitions of Governance 
Organizations 
Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
World Bank (1989) ‘Governance is meant the exercise of political 
power to manage a nation’s affairs.’ (p.60) 
- Political - Accountability - Management of public 
affairs 
World Bank (1992) Governance is defined as ‘the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources 
for development.’ (p.3) 
- Economic 
- Social 
- Accountability - Management of a country’s 
economic and social 
resources for development 
World Bank (1994) ‘Epitomized by predictable, open and 
enlightened policymaking; a bureaucracy 
imbued with a professional ethos; an executive 
arm of government accountable for its actions; 
and a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs; and all behaving under the rule 
of law’ ( p.vii) 
- Political 
- Economic  
- Social 
- Accountability 
- Participation 
- Rule of law 
- Management of a country’s 
political, economic and 
social resources for 
development 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
Governance as ‘the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s 
political, economic and social resources for 
development.’ (p.xiv) 
United Nation (UN, 2006) ‘Governance is an organizing concept that 
guides administrators as administrative 
practices shift from the bureaucratic State to 
what is called the “hollow State”.’ (p. 2) 
- Organizational 
- Administrative 
 Shifting public administration 
for development 
United Nation (UN, 2015) ‘….governance is considered “good” and 
“democratic” to the degree in which a 
country’s institutions and processes are 
transparent...’ (website, p.1) 
- Organizational 
 
- Transparency - Democracy 
- Transparency of a country’s 
institutions and processes 
United Nations 
Development Program 
(UNDP, 1994b) 
‘Governance can be seen as ‘the exercise of 
economic, political, and administrative 
authority to manage a country’s affairs at all 
levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes, 
and institutions, through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their 
- Economic 
- Political 
- Administrative 
- Rule of law 
- Accountability 
- Management of a country’s 
affairs 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
legal rights, meet their obligations, and 
mediate their differences.’ (p.2-3) 
United Nations 
Development Programme 
(UNDP, 1997) 
‘UNDP believes that building the capacity for 
governance is central to sustainable human 
development. We aim to be an impartial 
partner to governments, to civil society and to 
the private sector - creating opportunities for 
interacting to find people - centered solutions 
for the long term.’ (website, p.1) 
- Social  - Participation  
- Transparency 
- Accountability  
- Effectiveness 
- Equity  
- Rule of law 
- Sustainable human 
development 
- Partiality of partners 
United States Government 
Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2005)  
‘Governance as ‘the collective policies and 
oversight mechanisms in place to establish and 
maintain sustainable and accountable 
organizations that achieve their missions while 
demonstrating stewardship over 
resources.’(p.11) 
- Organizational - Accountability - Collective policies 
- Oversight mechanisms 
- Sustainable and accountable 
organizations 
Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (UNESCAP, 
2009) 
‘The process of decision-making and the 
process by which decisions are implemented 
(or not implemented). Governance can be used 
in several contexts such as corporate 
- Corporate 
governance 
- International 
governance 
- Accountability - Process of decision-making 
- Process of implementation 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
governance, international governance, 
national governance and local governance.’ 
(p.1) 
- National 
governance 
(Administrative) 
- Local governance 
Institute On Governance 
(Canada) (2015) 
‘Governance determines who has power, who 
makes decisions, how other players make their 
voice heard and how account is 
rendered....Governance in the public sector 
needs to take into account legal and 
constitutional accountability and 
responsibilities.’ (p.1) 
- Administrative - Accountability 
- Rule of law 
- Who has power 
- Who make decisions 
- How other players make 
their voice heard 
- How account is rendered 
- Taking account legal 
- Constituting accountability 
and responsibility  
The Commission on 
Global Governance (cited 
in Weiss, 2000) 
‘Governance as the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs.’ (The 
Commission on Global Governance cited in 
Weiss, 2000, p.795-6) 
- Organizational 
- Individual 
- Public 
(Administrative) 
- Private 
 Management of affairs of 
individual, institutions, public, 
and private 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
Commonwealth 
Secretariat (2010) 
‘Governance as the exercise of economic, 
political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels.’ (p.12) 
- Political,  
- Economic 
- Administrative 
- Accountability Management of a country’s 
affairs. 
Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
(OECD, 2001) 
‘…governance has become a central 
component in any explanation of economic 
and social development…sometime used in a 
wider sense to cover steering and control 
activities in different spheres of society… it 
refers principally to the exercise of authority 
in government and the political arena..’ 
(OECD, 2001, p.28) 
- Economic  
- Social 
- Administrative 
- Political 
 - Steering and controlling 
activities in different 
spheres of society 
- Exercise of authority in 
government and political 
arena 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD, 
2010) 
‘Good corporate governance is at the core of 
the EBRD’s activities. All operations, 
programmes, strategies and policies are 
scrutinised by independent evaluation, which 
ensures accountability and allows lessons to 
be learned.’ (EBRD, 2010, p.64) 
 
- Private 
- Organizational 
-  Accountability 
- Transparency 
 
- Integrity and transparency 
of business’ conduct 
- Strengthen key policies and 
mechanism 
- High level of accountability 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
‘The EBRD is committed to achieving the 
highest standards of governance, integrity and 
transparency in the conduct of its business and 
continues to strengthen key policies and 
mechanism in support of these goals. ..ensure 
a high level of accountability of staff and 
management of the Bank.’ (EBRD, 2010, 
p.65) 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(IADB, 2010) 
‘…five institutional priorities to sharpen our 
effectiveness as a development partner in the 
region: (1) Social Policy for equity and 
Productivity, (2) Infrastructure for 
Competitiveness and Social Welfare, (3) 
Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare, 
(4) Competitive Regional and Global 
International Integration, and (5) Protecting 
the Environment,…’ (IADB, 2010, p.xxv) 
- Social 
- Organizational 
- Regional, Global, 
and International 
 
- Effectiveness 
- Equity 
 
- Social Policy for equity and 
Productivity 
- Infrastructure for 
Competitiveness and Social 
Welfare 
- Institutions for Growth and 
Social Welfare 
- Competitive Regional and 
Global International 
Integration,  
- Protecting the Environment 
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Scholars 
Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
Graham, Amos and 
Plumptre  (2003b) 
‘Governance is the interactions among 
structures, processes and traditions that 
determine how power and 
responsibilities are exercised, how 
decisions are taken, and how citizens or 
other stakeholders have their say.’  
(p.2-3) 
- Administrative - Accountability 
- Participation 
Structure, processes and 
traditions of using power, 
making decisions, and 
hearing stakeholders’ 
voice 
Rhodes (1997) ‘The term 'governance' refers to a 
change in the meaning of government 
referring to a new process of 
governing....contribute to the analysis 
of change in British 
government…Governance refers to 
self-organizing, inter-organizational 
networks characterized by 
interdependence, resource exchange, 
-Administrative 
- Organizational 
- Inter-
organizational 
network 
- Social 
 A new process of 
governing 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
rules of the game and significant 
autonomy from the state.' (Rhodes, 
1997, p.15) 
‘Governance signifies a change in the 
meaning of government, referring to a 
new process of governing; or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new 
method by which society is governed.’ 
(p.46) 
Stoker (1998) ‘Governance is ultimately concerned 
with creating the conditions for ordered 
rule and collective action.’ (Stoker, 
1998, p.17) 
- Administrative - Rule of law 
- Participation 
Creating the conditions 
for ordered rule and 
collective action 
Pierre and Peters (2000) ‘Governance as structure and 
process….four common governance 
arrangements that have existed 
historically as well as at present: 
- Administrative - Participation - Structure and process 
   of steering and 
coordination 
 
 
332 
 
Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
hierarchies, markets, networks and 
communities….governance as the 
process of steering and coordination…’ 
(p.14) 
- Arrangement of 
hierarchies, markets, 
networks and 
communities 
Hulme, Savoia and Sen 
(2015) 
‘Governance is the effectiveness of 
rules, policies and the functioning of 
public bodies that affect the lives of the 
members of a community.’ (p.86) 
- Administrative - Effectiveness The effectiveness of rules, 
policies and the 
functioning of public 
bodies 
Frederickson and Smith. 
(2003) 
‘Governance refers to the lateral and 
inter-institutional relations in 
administration in the context of the 
decline of sovereignty, the decreasing 
importance of jurisdictional borders and 
a general institutional fragmentation.’ 
(p.222) 
- Organizational 
-  Administrative 
 The lateral and inter-
institutional relations in 
administration 
Fukuyama (2013) ‘Governance is about the performance 
of agents in carrying out the wishes of 
- Administrative  The performance of 
agents 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
principals, and not about the goals that 
principals set.’ (Fukuyama ,2013, 
p.350) 
Kjær (2004) ‘Governance is the act or manner of 
governing; the office or function of 
governing….to govern is ‘to rule or 
control with authority….to be 
government (p.3)…..In the field of 
public administration and public policy, 
it involves the public sector functioned 
best when it was apolitical, structured 
as a hierarchy, and  based on a system 
of merit-recruitment and promotion 
(p.4)…Governance refers to something 
broader than government and it is about 
steering and the rules of the game.’ 
(p.7) 
- Administrative  - Manner of governing 
- Function of governing 
(structure, recruitment, 
promotion) 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
Kooiman (2003) Governance can be seen as the totality 
of theoretical conceptions on 
governing. (p.4) 
- Academic  Theories and concept 
Hirst (2000 cited in UN, 
2006, p.4) 
‘Governance can be generally defined 
as the means by which an activity or 
ensemble of activities is controlled or 
directed, such that it delivers an 
acceptable range of outcomes according 
to some established standard.’ (p.4) 
- Administrative  Controlling activities for 
acceptable outcomes 
Lee (2003) ‘Governance refers to changes in the 
role, structure and operation process of 
the government, or the way social 
problems are resolved (p.3)…. 
Governance as a mechanism for 
resolving common problems… 
Governance as a mechanism for 
resolving public problems, and 
- Administrative  Changes in the role, 
structure and operation 
process of the government 
for resolving public 
problems 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
governance as the new governance...’ 
(p.5-8) 
Ahrens, Caspers and 
Weingarth (2011) 
‘The quality of a country’s governance 
structure is a key determinant of its 
ability to pursue sustainable economic 
and social development (p.5)…..Public 
governance is frequently limited to 
public sector 
management….Governance is not a 
synonym for government ….. 
Governance focuses on quality of 
public policy and its impact on 
economic performance.’ (p.7) 
- Economic 
- Social 
- Administrative 
 - Pursuing sustainable 
development in 
economic and social 
- Public sector 
management 
- Quality of public policy 
Weiss (2000) ‘Governance for the latter refers to 
characteristics that are generally 
associated with a system of national 
administration……Analysis of 
- Administrative  - A system of national 
administration 
- Analysis of international 
relations and 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
international relations and international 
civil servants, in contrast, now use the 
term almost exclusively to describe 
phenomena that go beyond a synonym 
for ‘government’ and the legal authority 
with which such polities are vested.’ 
(p.795) 
international civil 
servants 
McNeil and Malena 
(2010) 
‘Governance, broadly defined, is the 
means by which the state acquires and 
exercise authority to provide for 
citizens (p. 13)…..Important 
governance benefits, social 
accountability mechanisms have led to 
concrete improvements in government 
policies, programme, service and 
development….Enhanced 
development…better-designed policies 
- Administrative 
- Social 
- Accountability 
- Equity 
- Efficiency 
- Exercising authority 
with accountability 
- Enhancing development 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
budget and plan…increased 
resources…more equitable public 
spending and services…greater 
efficiency, less waste….better 
development result.’ (p. 16) 
Zhenglai and Guo 
(2002) 
‘In political science, ‘governance’ 
refers to the activity and process of 
public authority for the realization of 
public interest….Government focuses 
on itself, while governance focuses on 
society as a whole…. Governance 
could also have good governance and 
bad governance.’ (p.16) 
- Political 
- Administrative 
- Social 
 The activity and process 
of public authority for the 
realization of public 
interest 
Cheema and Popovski 
(2010) 
‘Governance is the process of 
interaction between three sets of actors 
– the state, civil society, and the private 
sector- in making political, 
- Administrative 
- Political 
- Economic 
- Social 
 The process of interaction 
between three sets of 
actors – the state, civil 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance 
components 
Focus 
administrative, economic, and social 
decisions that affect citizens.’ (p. 8) 
- Private sector society, and the private 
sector 
 
Chaudhry et al. (2009) ‘Governance is the instrument of 
political, economic and administrative 
authorities to manage a nation's affairs.’ 
(p.338) 
- Political 
- Economic 
- Administrative 
 The instrument of 
management for politics, 
economic, and 
administration 
Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 
(2000) 
‘Governance generally refers to the 
means for achieving direction, control, 
and coordination of wholly or partially 
autonomous individuals or 
organizations on behalf of interests to 
which they jointly contribute.’ (p. 235) 
- Economic 
- Public sector 
- Social 
- Administrative 
 The means for achieving 
direction, control, and 
coordination 
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1.2 Definitions of Good Governance 
Organizations 
Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
World Bank (1992) ‘Good governance is an essential 
complement to sound economic policies. 
Efficient and accountable management by the 
public sector and a predictable and 
transparent policy framework are critical to 
the efficiency of markets and governments, 
and hence to economic development.’ (p.v) 
- Economic 
- Administration 
- Accountable 
- Transparency 
- Efficiency 
United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP, 1997) 
‘Good governance has many attributes. It is 
participatory, transparent and accountable. It 
is effective in making the best use of 
resources and is equitable. And it promotes 
the rule of law.’ (website, p.1) 
- Administrative - Participation 
- Transparency 
- Accountability 
- Effectiveness 
- Equity 
- Rule of law 
United Nation (UN, 2006) ‘According to the World Bank, good 
governance entails sound public sector 
management (efficiency, effectiveness and 
- Administrative - Efficiency 
- Effectiveness 
- Accountability 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
economy), accountability, exchange and free 
flow of information (transparency), and a 
legal framework for development (justice, 
respect for human rights and liberties).’ (p. 4) 
- Transparency 
- Rule of law 
United Nation (UN, 2015) ‘Good governance promotes equity, 
participation, pluralism, transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law, in a 
manner that is effective, efficient and 
enduring... The greatest threats to good 
governance come from corruption, violence 
and poverty, all of which undermine 
transparency, security, participation and 
fundamental freedoms.’ (website, p.1) 
- Administrative - Equity 
- Participation 
- Transparency 
- Accountability 
- Rule of law 
- Effectiveness 
- efficiency 
Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP, 2009) 
‘Good governance has 8 major 
characteristics. It is participatory, consensus 
oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable 
and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It 
- Social 
- Administration 
- Participation 
- Consensus oriented 
- Accountability 
- Transparency 
- Responsiveness 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
assures that corruption is minimized, the 
views of minorities are taken into account 
and that the voices of the most vulnerable in 
society are heard in decision-making. It is 
also responsive to the present and future 
needs of society.’ (p.1) 
- Effectiveness 
- Efficiency 
- Equity 
- Rule of law 
Commonwealth Secretariat 
(2010) 
‘Good governance enables the development 
of public value by promoting the principles 
of accountability, transparency, 
predictability, capacity and participation 
throughout the institutions and processes that 
regulate the public realm.’ (p. 12) 
- Administration - Accountability 
- Transparency 
- Participation 
 
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development 
(OECD, 2001) 
‘Good governance remains a requisite for many 
different forms of growth, whereas the various 
features of bad governance – corruption, waste, 
abuse of power and exploitation of public 
means for private ends – tend to drive 
- Administration  
 
 
342 
 
Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
unfortunate nations into vicious spirals of 
decline, disruption and destruction.’ (p.40) 
‘Specifically, one of the most important ancient 
features of good governance to be nurtured is 
judgement. For the fears and worries about 
technological risks that lie behind major social 
and political conflicts over technology present 
major challenges to judgement as well as 
opportunities for its exercise.’ (p.70) 
Asian Development Bank 
(AsDB) (1995) 
‘The Bank’s concept of good governance 
focuses essentially on the ingredients for 
effective management... good governance is 
required to ensure that those policies have 
their desired effect…it concerns norms of 
behavior that help ensure that governments 
actually deliver to their citizens what they say 
they will deliver.’ (AsDB, 1995, p.4) 
- Administration - Effectiveness 
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Organizations Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
African Development Bank 
(AfDB) (2008) 
‘Good governance is crucial for inclusive and 
sustained economic growth and its promotion 
is a key element in the Bank Group’s strategy 
to alleviate poverty in regional member 
countries (RMCs).’ (AfDB, 2008, p.15)  
 
‘The New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) identifies good 
governance as a requirement for peace, 
security and sustainable growth and 
development’ (AfDB, 2008, p.19) 
- Economic  
Commission of the European 
Communities  (2001) 
‘Five principles underpin good governance 
and the change proposed in this White Paper: 
openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence. Each principle 
is important for establishing more democratic 
governance.’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001, p.10) 
- Political - Participation 
- Accountability 
- Effectiveness 
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Scholars 
Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
Graham, Amos and 
Plumptre 
(2003) 
‘Good governance principles warrant elaboration. 
First, these principles represent an ideal that no 
society has fully attained or realized. Supporters 
attribute economic success and social stability to 
their governance policies.’ (p.7) 
- Economic 
- Social 
- Administrative 
 
Rhodes (1997) 'Good governance' marries the NPM to the 
advocacy of liberal democracy.’ (p.50) 
-  Administration 
- Political 
 
Leftwich (1993) ‘An efficient public service, an independent 
judicial system and legal framework to enforce 
contracts; the accountable administration of public 
funds; an independent public auditor, responsible 
to a representative legislature; respect for the law 
and human rights at all levels of government; a 
pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press.’ 
(p.610) 
 
 
- Administrative 
- Institution 
(organizational) 
- Systematic 
- Political 
 
- Rule of law 
- Accountability 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
Leftwich identifies three main levels of good 
governance; (p. 611) 
1. Systematic: The systematic use of governance is 
broader than government, covering the distribution 
of both internal and external political and 
economic power 
2. Political: The political use of governance refers 
to a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, 
derive from a democratic mandate. 
3. Administrative: The administrative use refers to 
‘an efficient open accountable and audited public 
service which has the bureaucratic competence to 
help design and implement appropriate policies 
and manage whatever public sector there is.’ 
Munshi and Abraham 
(2004) 
 
‘Good governance signifies a participative manner 
of governing that functions in a responsible, 
accountable and transparent manner based on the 
principles of efficiency, legitimacy and consensus 
- Administrative 
- Political 
- Social 
- Accountability 
- Transparency 
- Efficiency 
- Rule of law 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
for the purpose of promoting the rights of 
individual citizens and the public interest, thus 
indicating the exercise of political will for 
ensuring the material welfare of society 
and sustainable development with social justice.’ 
(p.51-52) 
- Consensus oriented 
- Participation 
Hirst (2000 cited in UN, 
2006, p.4) 
‘Good governance means creating an effective 
political framework conducive to private economic 
action: stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient 
State administration adapted to the roles that 
Governments can actually perform and a strong 
civil society independent of the State.’ (p.4) 
- Political 
- Economic 
- Administration 
- Social 
- Effectiveness 
- Rule of law 
- Efficiency 
 
Grindle (2010) ‘‘....good governance agenda as a condition 
necessary for development....Good governance, in 
fact, may even be a consequence of development. ’  
(p.13) 
- Political 
- Economic 
 
Chaudhry et al. (2009) Good governance can be defined with the 
following features: (Chaudhry et al., 2009, p.339) 
- Administrative 
- Social 
- Participation 
- Transparency 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
- Good governance is mutually supportive and 
cooperative relationships between government, 
society, and the private sector. 
- Good governance is defined as control of all, or 
some combination of, the following elements: 
contribution, transparency of decision-making, 
accountability, rule of law, predictability. 
- Good governance is normative in origin. The 
values that provide the foundation for 
governance are the values postulated by the 
defining characters and institutions. 
- Private sector 
-  Institutional 
(organizational) 
- Accountability 
- Rule of law 
Bowornwathana (2000) ‘The objective of good governance is to strengthen 
the institutions of civil society, and to transform 
government into more open, responsive, 
accountable, and democratic system.’ (p. 401) 
 
- Institutional 
(organizational) 
- Social 
- Administration 
- Political 
- Responsiveness 
- Accountability 
Lartey and Sastry (2010) ‘Good governance as Anti-corruption tool.’ (p.2) - Administrative  
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
Ahrens et al. (2011) ‘Good governance has played a key role regarding 
the success cases in economic transition and 
development, whereas bad governance has often 
been responsible for failure.’ (p.4) 
- Economic  
Agere (2000) ‘The concept of good governance is very much 
interlinked with institutionalised values such as 
democracy, observance of human rights, 
accountability, transparency, and greater 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector (p. 
v)…..Good governance is used both as a means 
and as an end in itself....Good governance as a 
concept will be used in this context of the public 
service reform or NPM paradigm….The concept 
contributes to economic growth, human 
development and social justice….Good 
governance is the highest state of development and 
management of a nation’s affairs.’ (p. 5) 
- Political 
- Administrative 
- Economic 
- Social 
- Rule of law 
- Accountability 
- Transparency 
- Efficiency 
- Effectiveness 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
Zhenglai and Guo (2002) ‘Good governance is the management process that 
maximizes public interest…The essential 
characteristics of good governance are the 
cooperative management of public life by both 
government and citizens, and the new relationship 
between political state and civil society, and the best 
political situation involving public and private actors 
and governmental and civil organizations’ (p.17) 
- Administrative 
- Political 
- Social 
 
Smith, B. C. (2007) ‘Good governance agenda is assessed for its 
contribution to development and the cost to society 
of bad governance (p. x)….The three political 
attributes of good governance that occur in the 
governance agenda of international and agencies 
require changes in political action and organization.’ 
(p. xi) 
 
 
- Social 
- Political 
- Organizational 
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Scholars Definition Context 
Relevant to good 
governance components 
Weiss (2000) ‘…actions to foster good governance concentrate on 
attenuating two undesirable characteristics that had 
been prevalent earlier: the unrepresentative character 
of governments and the inefficiency of non-market 
systems.’ (p.801) 
- Administrative - Efficiency 
Sundaram and 
Chowdhury (2012) 
‘… the good governance agenda has defined 
policy reform goals for developing countries that 
are widely supported in many developing 
countries and, especially, internationally.’ (p. 9) 
- Administrative  
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Appendix 2: The definitions of nine key components of good governance 
 
Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
World Bank 
(1994, 
p.12,29,42) 
  ‘Accountability is at 
the heart of good 
governance and has 
to do with holding 
governments 
responsible for their 
actions.’ (p.12) 
‘Transparency is 
important for 
specific public 
programs, such as 
the divestiture of 
state-owned 
enterprises, which 
will quickly forfeit 
public confidence 
if privatization is 
not seen as an 
open process.’ 
(p.29) 
‘Participation is 
intrinsic to good 
governance…. 
Measures at the 
national level to 
improve the 
effectiveness and 
efficiency of 
government have 
direct parallels at the 
micro level as well. 
Transparency enables 
people affected by 
development plans to 
know the options 
available to them.’ 
(p.42) 
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Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
(UNDP, 1994a, 
p. 5) 
‘Processes and institutions 
produce results that meet needs 
while making the best use of 
resources.’ (p. 5) 
‘Decision-makers in 
government, the 
private sector and 
civil society 
organisations are 
accountable to the 
public, as well as to 
institutional 
stakeholders. This 
accountability 
differs depending 
on the organisation 
and whether the 
decision is internal 
or external to an 
organisation.’ (p. 5) 
‘Transparency is 
built on the free 
flow of 
information. 
Processes, 
institutions and 
information are 
directly accessible 
to those concerned 
with them, and 
enough 
information is 
provided to 
understand and 
monitor them.’  
(p. 5) 
‘All men and women 
should have a voice in 
decision-making, 
either directly or 
through legitimate 
intermediate 
institutions that 
represent their 
interests. Such broad 
participation is built on 
freedom of association 
and speech, as well as 
capacities to 
participate 
constructively.’ (p. 5) 
‘Legal 
frameworks 
should be fair 
and enforced 
impartially, 
particularly the 
laws on human 
rights.’ (p. 5) 
 
‘All men and 
women have 
opportunities 
to improve or 
maintain their 
well-being.’ 
(p. 5) 
‘Institutions and 
processes try to 
serve all 
stakeholders.’  
(p. 5) 
‘Good 
governance 
mediates 
differing 
interests to 
reach a broad 
consensus on 
what is in the 
best interests 
of the group 
and, where 
possible, on 
policies and 
procedures.’ 
(p. 5) 
United Nations 
Economic and 
Social 
Commission for 
Asia and the 
Pacific  
(UNESCAP, 
2009, p. 2-3) 
‘Good governance means that 
processes and institutions 
produce results that meet the 
needs of society while making 
the best use of resources at their 
disposal. The concept of 
efficiency in the context of good 
governance also covers the 
sustainable use of natural 
‘Accountability is a 
key requirement of 
good governance. 
Not only 
governmental 
institutions but also 
the private sector 
and civil society 
organizations must 
 ‘Participation by both 
men and women is a 
key cornerstone of 
good governance. 
Participation could be 
either direct or through 
legitimate intermediate 
institutions or 
representatives. It is 
‘Good 
governance 
requires fair 
legal 
frameworks that 
are enforced 
impartially. It 
‘A society’s 
well being 
depends on 
ensuring 
that all its 
members feel 
that they 
have a stake 
in it and do 
‘Good 
governance 
requires that 
institutions 
and processes 
try to serve all 
stakeholders 
within a 
reasonable 
‘There are 
several actors 
and as many 
view 
points in a 
given society. 
Good 
governance 
 
 
353 
 
Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
resources and the protection of 
the environment.’ (p.3) 
be accountable to 
the public and to 
their institutional 
stakeholders. Who 
is accountable to 
whom varies 
depending on 
whether decisions 
or actions taken are 
internal or external 
to an organization 
or institution. In 
general an 
organization or an 
institution is 
accountable to those 
who will be affected 
by its decisions or 
actions. 
Accountability 
cannot be enforced 
without 
transparency and 
the rule of law.’ 
(p.3) 
important to point out 
that representative 
democracy does not 
necessarily mean that 
the concerns of the 
most vulnerable in 
society would be taken 
into consideration in 
decision making. 
Participation needs to 
be informed and 
organized. This means 
freedom of association 
and expression on the 
one hand and an 
organized civil society 
on the other hand.’ 
(p.2) 
also requires 
full protection 
of human rights, 
particularly 
those of 
minorities. 
Impartial 
enforcement of 
laws requires an 
independent 
judiciary and an 
impartial and 
incorruptible 
police force.’ 
(p.2) 
not feel 
excluded 
from the 
mainstream 
of society. 
This requires 
all 
groups, but 
particularly 
the most 
vulnerable, 
have 
opportunities 
to improve or 
maintain 
their well 
being.’ (p.3) 
timeframe.’ 
(p.2) 
requires 
mediation of 
the different 
interests in 
society to 
reach a broad 
consensus  
in society 
on what is  
in the best 
interest of  
the whole 
community 
and how  
this can be 
achieved. It 
also requires 
a broad and 
long-term 
perspective 
on what is 
needed for 
sustainable 
human 
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Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
development 
and how to 
achieve the 
goals of such 
development. 
This can only 
result from an 
understanding 
of the 
historical, 
cultural and 
social contexts 
of a given 
society or 
community.’ 
(p.3) 
United Nation  
(UN, 2006, 
p.10) 
  ‘Accountability is 
one of the 
prerequisites of 
democratic or good 
governance. It 
entails holding 
elected or appointed 
officials charged 
‘…transparency, 
that is, unfettered  
access to timely 
and reliable 
information on 
decisions and 
performance,…’ 
(p. 10) 
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Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
with a public 
mandate 
responsible and 
answerable for their 
actions, activities 
and decisions.’  
(p. 10) 
Commonwealth 
Secretariat  
(2010, p. 12) 
  ‘Accountability is 
the ability of 
citizens to hold 
elected and 
appointed officials 
responsible for 
specific actions, 
activities or 
decisions.’ (p. 12) 
‘Transparency is 
the public access 
to knowledge of 
the rules, policies 
and strategies of 
government.’ 
(p. 12) 
‘Participation- 
recognizes that people 
are at the heart of 
development, and 
therefore participation 
is a key principle for 
good governance.’ 
 (p. 12) 
    
Zhenglai and 
Guo (2011, p. 
17-18) 
‘Efficiency, 
which mainly 
refers to 
management 
efficiency 
that makes 
the best use 
of resources 
 ‘Accountability, 
which mainly 
means that 
governmental and 
non-governmental 
organizations are 
accountable to the 
public or to those 
whose interests may 
‘Transparency, 
that is, information 
is accessible to all 
citizens.’ 
(p. 18) 
‘Participation, which 
refers to political 
participation but also 
civic participation in 
other areas of social 
life.’ (p. 17) 
 
‘That is, the 
belief that the 
law is the 
highest 
authority in 
public and 
political 
management, 
everyone is 
‘Fairness, 
which refers 
to equality 
with regard 
to political 
rights and 
economic 
rights for 
citizens of 
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Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
for public 
interests.’  
(p. 18) 
 
be affected by their 
decisions.’ (p. 18) 
 
 
equal before the 
law, and 
enforcement of 
laws should be 
impartial.’  
(p. 17) 
 
different 
genders, 
class, races, 
educational 
qualifications, 
and religious 
and political 
beliefs.’  
(p. 18) 
Agere (2000, p. 
7,109 ) 
Good and services have been 
delivered on time with limited 
cost…expenditures have been 
reduced…clients have been 
satisfied with the service….the 
quality of service has improved 
and objectives have been 
achieved at less cost. (p. 109) 
‘Accountability is 
defined as holding 
responsible elected 
or appointed 
individuals and 
organizations 
charged with a 
public mandate to 
account for specific 
actions, activities or 
decisions to the 
public from whom 
they derive their 
authority.’ (p.7) 
‘Transparency is 
broadly defined as 
public knowledge 
of the policies of 
government and 
confidence in its 
intentions.’ (p.7) 
‘Participation is 
defined as a process 
whereby stockholders 
exercise influence 
over public policy 
decisions, and share 
control over resources 
and institutions that 
affect their lives, 
thereby providing a 
check on power of 
government.’ (p.9) 
‘The rule of 
law ensures 
that all 
institutions of 
the nation are 
subjected to the 
laws of the 
country, strict 
code of 
conduct, 
accountability 
and transparent 
procedures...It 
calls for a 
nation to have  
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Sources Efficiency Effectiveness Accountability Transparency Participation Rule of law Equity Responsiveness 
Consensus 
oriented 
clearly define 
laws, starting 
particularly 
with the 
constitution 
which defines 
the powers of 
government 
and the 
elimination of 
any form of 
abuse of 
power’  (p.95) 
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Appendix 3: The definitions of performance, performance management  
and performance measurement 
 
3.1 Definitions of Performance 
Performance = Means and Performance = End 
Sources Definition Interpretation 
Dooren et al. (2015)  ‘Performance as a concept: Performance is conceptualized with attention to 
both the quality of actions and the quality of achievements, it may be 
typified as sustainable results… refers to the productive organization, that 
is, an organization that has the capacity to perform and converts this 
capacity into results- outputs and outcomes. ...performance indicators may 
cover the whole value chain from inputs over outputs to outcomes.’ (p.3-4) 
 ‘Performance as an agenda: The term 'performance' expresses a programme 
of change and improvement, which is promoted by a group of like-minded 
actors that is usually only loosely coupled...these group of actors sharing a 
performance agenda are called performance movement… Measuring 
performance is systematically collecting data by observing and registering 
performance-related issues for some performance purpose.’ (p.5,7) 
Quality of actions and 
achievement  
 
 
 
 
Programme of change and 
improvement 
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Sources Definition Interpretation 
 ‘Performance as outputs and outcomes of activities: Performance is thus 
about maximizing profit for society...A complex and dynamic system of 
political representation, fuelled by interests, power, ideology and political 
judgment, determines what society values… Alternatively, performance is 
seen as the realization of public values. Values and performance are 
distinct concepts, and all public values can lead to performance. Beside 
efficiency and effectiveness, successful practices of for instance 
participation or innovation could also be seen as dimensions of 
performance.’ (p. 22,23,29) 
Maximizing profit for society 
or public values 
 
Kearney and Berman 
(1999) 
‘Performance in this context is defined as managing public programs for 
outcomes. Managers use public resources and mandates to ensure that their 
programs meet public objectives and expectations. The meaning of the term 
performance is similar to that of the term productivity… However, 
performance is broader than some narrow meanings of productivity 
(efficiency, for example).’ (p. 1-2) 
Management for 
achievement/outcomes 
Institute of Personnel 
Management  (1992) 
‘…the cult of ‘performance’ characterised by the search for strategies to 
improve the contribution of individuals to the overall success of 
organizations.’ (p.1) 
Strategies for improvement of 
individuals’ contribution and 
the organizations’ overall 
success 
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Sources Definition Interpretation 
Houldsworth and 
Jirasinghe (2006) 
‘…an act and the result of an act. In recent years, the term has also evolved in 
the direction of referring to an accomplishment of something that is desired or 
intended.’ (p. 16) 
An act and the result of an act, 
and accomplishment of 
something that is desired or 
intended 
Williams (1998) ‘Performance is defined as: The record of outcomes produced on a specified 
job function or activity during a specified time period.’ (Bernadin et al., 1995, 
p. 470-1 cited in Williams, 1998, p.75) 
Outcomes of job or activities 
produced 
Lebas (1995) ‘Performance is about capability and the future.’ (p. 26)  
 
‘Performance is about deploying and managing well the components of the 
causal model(s) that lead to the timely attainment of stated objectives within 
constraints specific to the firm and to the situation. Performance is therefore 
case specific and decision-maker specific.’ (p. 29) 
Capability and the future 
 
Deploying and managing 
components of the causal 
model(s) 
Bernardin (1993) ‘Performance is defined as the record of outcomes produced on a specified 
job function or activity during a specified time period.’ (p. 379) 
The record of outcomes 
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3.2 Definitions of Performance management (PM) 
Performance = Means and Performance = End 
Sources Definition Interpretation 
Armstrong and Baron 
(1998) 
‘Performance management is a strategic and integrated approach to 
delivering sustained success to organizations by improving the performance 
of the people who work in them and by developing the capabilities of teams 
and individual contributors.’ (p. 7) 
A strategic and integrated approach 
to delivering sustained success by 
improving people’s performance and 
developing teams and individual’s 
capabilities   
Fletcher (1993) ‘…an approach to creating a shared vision of the purpose and aims of the 
organization, helping each individual employees to understand and 
recognise their part in contributing to them, and thereby managing and 
enhancing the performance of both individuals and the organization.’ 
(Fletcher and Williams in IPM, 1992 cited in Fletcher, 1993, p. 35) 
An approach to creating a shared 
vision of the purpose and aims of the 
organization 
Varma, Budhwar and 
DeNisi (2008) 
‘Performance management is usually described as the system through 
which organizations set work goals, determine performance standards, 
assign and evaluate work, provide performance feedback, determine 
training and development needs, and distribute rewards.’ (p.15) 
A system to set goals, determine 
performance, evaluate work, provide 
feedback, determine development 
needs 
Pritchard and 
Diazgranados (2008) 
‘Performance management is defined as a range of practices an 
organization engages in to enhance the performance of a target person or 
A range of practices an organization 
engages in to enhance a target person 
or group’s performance 
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Sources Definition Interpretation 
group with the ultimate purpose of improving organizational performance’ 
(DeNisi, 2000 cited in Pritchard and Diazgranados, 2008, p.40) 
Improvement and 
Development Agency 
(2002) 
‘…what an organization does to realise its aspirations draws together the 
dual community leadership and service delivery roles of local 
government….A narrow definition….that performance management is 
what you do to improve and maintain good performance.’ (p.11) 
Improvement and maintain good 
performance 
Moores (1994) ‘…a method of connecting your organization’s objectives to the people 
who are there to carry them out. It makes use of the procedures and 
communication drills you already have, take into account your own culture, 
and establish the key link between individual staff development and 
corporate goals.’ (p.5) 
A method of connecting 
organization’s objectives to the 
people 
Houldsworth and 
Jirasinghe (2006) 
‘A process for establishing a shared understanding about what is to be 
achieved, and how it is to be achieved; an approach to managing people 
which increases the probability of achieving job-related success.’ (Weiss 
and Hartle, 1997 cited in Houldsworth and Jirasinghe, 2006, p. 6) 
A process for sharing understanding, 
and an approach to managing people 
for achieving jobs 
Moynihan (2008) ‘Performance management as a system that generates performance 
information through strategic planning and performance measurement 
routines and that connects this information to decision venues, where, 
ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions.’  (p.5) 
A system that generates performance 
information for making decisions 
 
 
363 
 
Sources Definition Interpretation 
Williams (1998) ‘Performance management is no single thing…focuses on the individual 
and which, for the most part, is essentially an evolutionary extension of 
traditional appraisal practice…’ (p.1) 
Focusing on individual and appraisal 
Cooke (2003) ‘… perspectives on PM: as a system of managing organizational 
performance, as a system of employee performance, and as a system of 
integrating the two.’ (p.90) 
A system of managing organizational 
performance and a system of 
employee performance 
Buchner (2007) ‘PM has been defined as management’s systematic application of processes 
aimed at optimizing human performance in an organization.’ (Warren, 
1982 cited in Buchner, 2007, p. 61) 
 
‘A process for establishing a shared understanding about what is to be 
achieved, and how it is to be achieved, and an approach to managing 
people that increases the probability of achieving success.’ (Weiss and 
Hartle, 1997, p. 3 cited in Buchner, 2007, p. 61) 
A management through systematic 
application 
 
 
A process for establishing a shared 
understanding 
Holloway (1999) ‘PM can be defined as the managerial work needed to ensure that the 
organization’s top-level aims (sometimes expressed as ‘Vision’ and 
‘Mission’ statements) and objectives are attained.’ (p. 240) 
The managerial work to ensure 
attainment of the organization’s aims 
and objectives 
Osborne et al. (1993) ‘Performance management- the process of ensuring that:  The process of ensuring process and 
result of performance assessment 
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Sources Definition Interpretation 
- performance assessment is an integral part of any programme from its 
outset; 
- its component parts are understandable to those gathering the data on 
performance and to those analysing and using it; 
- the results of performance assessment are used to inform all levels of 
programme planning and implementation; and 
- the performance assessment process is oriented toward enabling and 
improving performance in the future.’ (p. 4) 
Busi and Bititci (2006) ‘Performance management is defined as the use of performance 
measurement information to effect positive change in organizational 
culture, systems and processes, by helping to set agreed-upon performance 
goals, allocating and prioritising resources, informing managers to either 
confirm or change current policy or programme directions to meet those 
goals, and sharing results of performance in pursuing those goals.’ 
(Amaratunga and Baldry, 2002 cited in Busi and Bititci, 2006, p. 14) 
The use of performance 
measurement information to meet 
goals 
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3.3 Definitions of Performance Measurement/Performance Appraisal/ Performance Evaluation 
Sources Definition Interpretation 
Williams, (1933) ‘Performance appraisal is an aspect of working relationships that 
emphasizes for both bosses and subordinates their managerial 
accountabilities.’ (p.8) 
An aspect of working relationships 
Osborne et al. (1993) ‘Performance assessment is the evaluative process by which a view is 
reached about the performance of a set of activities against the 
achievement of specified objectives.’ (p. 3) 
 
‘Performance appraisal- the major assessment of the degree to which 
proposed activities are likely to achieve their objectives, and the 
formulation of indicators and targets by which the performance of the 
activity or programme can be monitored and evaluated in the future.’  
(p. 3) 
 
‘Performance (ex-post) evaluation – the retrospective evaluation of a 
programme against its objectives.’ (p. 4) 
The evaluative process 
 
 
 
The assessment of achieving 
objectives 
 
 
 
 
The retrospective evaluation of  
a programme 
Brown (1998) ‘Performance appraisal is a formal, structured system of measuring, 
evaluating and influencing employees in the conduct of their work.’  
(p. 170) 
A formal, structured system of 
measuring, evaluating and 
influencing employees in the 
conduct of their work 
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Sources Definition Interpretation 
Vallance and Fellow 
(1999) 
‘Performance appraisal refers to the process by which an individual’s 
work performance is assessed.’ (p. 79) 
The process of assessment of 
individual’ s work performance 
Bruijn (2007) ‘Performance measurement is a form of output steering and is 
desirable, because input and throughput steering are a disincentive for 
performance.’ (p.10) 
A form of output 
Jackson (1995) ‘Performance measurement are seen as an instrument of control.’ (p.2) An instrument of control 
Brignall (1993) ‘Performance measurement is the spur to appropriate action at the right 
organizational level and stage of the decision-making process- action 
being the link between feedforward and feedback control…’ (Fitzgerald 
et al., 1991 cited in Brignall, 1993, p. 41) 
The spur to appropriate action 
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Appendix 4: The definitions of organizational culture 
 
4.1 Definitions of Culture 
Scholars Definitions Interpretation 
Schein (1990) ‘Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) 
intended, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope 
with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught 
to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems.’ (p. 111) 
Aa pattern of basic assumptions 
Schein (2004) ‘The culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the 
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.’ 
(p.17) 
A pattern of shared basic 
assumptions 
Hofstede (1984) ‘…culture as ‘the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes 
the members of one human group from another.’ (p. 21) 
The programme of mind 
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Scholars Definitions Interpretation 
Brown (1998) ‘Culture is most appropriately regarded as a metaphor for understanding 
organizations…’ (p.8) 
A metaphor for understanding 
organizations 
Jaques (1952) ‘The culture of the factory is its customary and traditional way of thinking 
and of doing things, which is shared to a greater or lesser degree by all its 
members, and which new members must learn, and at least partially accept, 
in order to be accepted into service in the firm. Culture in this sense covers 
a wide range of behaviour: the methods of production; job skills and 
technical knowledge; attitudes towards discipline and punishment; the 
customs and habits of managerial behaviour; the objectives of the concern; 
its way of doing business; the methods of payment; the values placed on 
different types of work; beliefs in democratic living and joint consultation; 
and the less conscious conventions and taboos.’ (p.251) 
A way of thinking and of doing 
things sharing among an 
organization’s members 
Eldridge (1973) ‘The culture of an organization refers to the unique configuration of norms, 
values, beliefs, ways of behaving and so on that characterize the manner in 
which groups and individuals combine to get things done. The 
distinctiveness of a particular organization is intimately bound up with its 
history and the character-building effects of past decisions and past leaders. 
It is manifested in the folkways, mores, and the ideology to which members 
The unique configuration of 
norms, values, beliefs, ways of 
behaving 
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Scholars Definitions Interpretation 
defer, as well as in the strategic choices made by the organizations as a 
whole.’ (p.89) 
Schwartz and Davis 
(1981) 
‘Culture….is a pattern of  beliefs and expectations shared by the 
organizations’ members. These beliefs and expectations produce norms that 
powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups in the 
organization.’ (p.33) 
A pattern of beliefs and 
expectations shared by the 
organizations’ members 
Lorsch (1986) ‘By culture I mean the shared beliefs top managers in a company have 
about how they should manage themselves and other employees, and how 
they should conduct their business(es). These beliefs are often invisible to 
the top managers but have a major impact on their thoughts and actions.’ 
(p.95) 
The shared beliefs top managers 
in a company 
Pheysey (1993) ‘A culture is thus a way of seeing that is common to many people (Usually 
there are sub-cultures, or ways of seeing by minorities also.) Culture itself 
is subject to transformation. Managers may deliberately seek to change it.’  
(p. 3) 
A way of seeing that is common 
to many people 
Pheysey (1993) An organizational culture includes commonly held values, but also 
common beliefs and attitudes. It prescribes ‘the way we do things here’. 
However, it is possible to change the prescription... methods of cultural 
transformation are described as well as types of culture. (p. xiii) 
Common values, beliefs and 
attitudes 
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Scholars Definitions Interpretation 
Christensen et al. 
(2007) 
‘Culture is something an institution is.’ (p.43) Something an institution is 
Dick and Ellis 
(2006) 
‘Culture is therefore concerned with the symbolic aspects of life—that is, it 
is concerned with understanding how certain events and visible signs are 
invested with meaning… Culture is a collective phenomenon, because it is 
shared by people who live in the same social environment.’ (p.185). 
The symbolic aspects of life and 
a collective phenomenon 
Ellis and Dick 
(2003) 
‘Culture takes as its focus those shared aspects of behaviour and thinking 
that bind the members of an organization together.’ (p.175) 
Aspects of behaviour and 
thinking binding an 
organization’s members together 
McEwan (2001) ‘Culture is defined as an integrated system of learned behaviour patterns, 
characteristic of the members of any given society.’ (p.324) 
An integrated system of learned 
behaviour patterns and 
characteristic of the members of 
any given society 
Morgan (1943) Shared values, shared beliefs, shared meaning, shared understanding, and 
shared sense making are all different ways of describing culture. (p.138) 
Sharing beliefs, meaning, 
understanding, and sense making 
Deal and Kennedy 
(1982) 
‘Culture, as Weber’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines it, is the integrated 
pattern of human behaviour that includes thought, speech, action, and 
artefacts and depends on man’s capacity for learning and transmitting 
knowledge to succeeding generations.’ (p.4) 
The integrated pattern of human 
behaviour through speech, 
action, and artefacts 
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Scholars Definitions Interpretation 
Kotter and Heskett 
(1992)  
‘At deeper and less visible level, culture refers to values that are shared by 
the people in a group and that tend to persist over time even when group 
membership changes… At more visible level, culture represents the 
behaviour patterns or style of an organization that new employees are 
automatically encouraged to follow by their fellow employees.’ (p. 4) 
Values sharing among people 
and behaviour patterns or style 
of an organization 
Kotter and Heskett 
(1992) 
‘Culture represents an interdependent set of values and ways of behaving 
that are common in a community and that tend to perpetuate themselves, 
sometimes over long periods of time.’ (p. 141) 
An interdependent set of values 
and ways of behaving in an 
organization 
McKenna and 
Beech (2002) 
‘Culture is a central and important topic HRM. It is concerned with the 
values, attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, actions and procedures that people 
adopt in organizational life. It encompasses the range of thought and action 
as they are reinforced in the corporate setting, and so underlies many of the 
specific issues of people management. It provides the social framework for 
the relationship between managers and employees and as such is an 
influencing factor on the psychological contract, employees’ willingness to 
accept change and the ability of the organization to be open about, and learn 
from, its experience.’ (p.88) 
The values, attitudes, beliefs, 
assumptions, actions and 
procedures 
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4.2 Definitions of Organizational Culture 
Scholars Definitions Interpretation 
Brown (1998) ‘Organizational culture refers to the pattern of beliefs, values and 
learned ways of coping with experience that have developed during the 
course of an organization’s history, and which tend to be manifested in 
its material arrangements and in the behaviours of its members.’ (p.9). 
The pattern of beliefs, values and 
learned ways 
Robbins (2005) ‘Organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning held by 
members that distinguishes the organization from other organizations. 
This system of shared meaning is a set of key characteristics that the 
organization values.’ (p. 485) 
A system of shared meaning by the 
organization’s members 
Elsmore (2001) ‘Those patterns of behaviour, which some or all organization members 
have in common.’ (p. 8) 
Patterns of behaviour 
Hofstede et al. (1990) ‘The organizational/corporate culture construct: it is (1) holistic,  
(2) historically determined, (3) related to anthropological concepts,  
(4) socially constructed, (5) soft, and (6) difficult to change. ’ (p. 286) 
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Appendix 6: The KPIs within each dimension of performance evaluation framework 
between fiscal year B.E. 2550 (2007) and B.E. 2554 (2011) and KPI host agencies 
 
  
B.E. 2550  
(2007) 
B.E. 2551  
(2008) 
B.E. 2552  
(2009) 
B.E. 2553  
(2010) 
B.E. 2554  
(2011) 
KPI host agencies 
Dimension 1 
Effectiveness  
of Mission 
1. Action plans 
(Cluster) 
(select 1-5 KPIs 
from menu e.g. 
quality of tourism, 
and preparation for 
good agricultural 
practice) 
1. Action plans 
(Cluster) 
(select 1-5 KPIs 
from menu e.g. 
quality of tourism, 
and preparation for 
good agricultural 
practice) 
1. Action plans 
(Cluster) 
(select 1-5 KPIs from 
menu e.g. quality of 
tourism, and 
preparation for good 
agricultural practice) 
1. Action plans 
(Cluster) 
(select 1-5 KPIs 
from menu e.g. 
quality of tourism, 
and preparation for 
good agricultural 
practice) 
1. Action plans 
(Cluster) 
(select 1-5 KPIs 
from menu e.g. 
quality of tourism, 
and preparation for 
good agricultural 
practice) 
1) Provincial 
Agricultural and 
Cooperatives 
Office 
2) Provincial 
Livestock Office 
3) Provincial 
Fisheries Office 
 
2. Action plans 
(Province) 
2. Emergency 
policies 
 
2. Emergency policies 2. Emergency 
policies 
2. Emergency 
policies 
1) Provincial 
Community 
Development 
Office 
2) Provincial 
Administration 
Office 
2.1 Gross 
Provincial Product 
(GPP) 
 
2.1 Participation of 
villages 
2.1 Participation of 
villages 
2.1 Participation of 
villages 
2.1 Participation of 
villages 
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B.E. 2550  
(2007) 
B.E. 2551  
(2008) 
B.E. 2552  
(2009) 
B.E. 2553  
(2010) 
B.E. 2554  
(2011) 
KPI host agencies 
2.2 Alleviation of 
poverty 
2.2 Community 
empowerment 
2.2 Monitor 
emergency policies 
2.2 Monitor 
emergency policies 
2.2 Monitor 
emergency policies 
 
2.3 Project on 
provincial strategies 
2.3 Management of 
wellbeing 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Quality of 
wellbeing plan 
2.5 Expenditure of 
wellbeing project 
 
     
 
2.6 Alleviation of 
poverty 
 
    
3. Management of 
natural resources 
and environment   
3. Management of 
natural resources and 
environment   
3. Management of 
natural resources and 
environment   
3. Management of 
natural resources and 
environment   
3. Management of 
natural resources 
and environment   
1) Provincial 
Natural Resources 
and Environment 
Office 
3.1 Problem of drug 3.1 Problem of drug 3.1 Alleviation of 
poverty 
3.1 Alleviation of 
poverty 
3.1Alleviation of 
poverty 
2) Provincial 
Office of Disaster 
Prevention and 
Mitigation 
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B.E. 2550  
(2007) 
B.E. 2551  
(2008) 
B.E. 2552  
(2009) 
B.E. 2553  
(2010) 
B.E. 2554  
(2011) 
KPI host agencies 
3.2 Accomplishment  
of prosecution 
3.2 Accomplishment 
of prosecution 
3.2 Problem of drug 3.2 Problem of drug 3.2 Problem of 
drug 
 
3.3 Plan of security 3.3 Management of 
natural resources and 
environment 
3.3 Accomplishment 
of prosecution 
3.3 Accomplishment  
of prosecution 
3.3 
Accomplishment of 
prosecution 
3.4 Management of 
natural resources  
and environment 
3.4 Reduction of 
traffic accidents 
3.4 Management of 
natural resources and 
environment 
3.4 Management of 
natural resources and 
environment 
3.4 Management of 
natural resources 
and environment 
 
3.5 Food safety 3.5 Plan of security 3.5 Reduction of 
traffic accidents 
3.5 Reduction of 
traffic accidents 
3.5 Reduction of 
traffic accidents 
 
3.6 Reduction of 
traffic accidents 
  3.6 Plan of security 3.6 Plan of security 3.6 Plan of security 
Dimension 2 
Quality of  
Service 
4.1 Satisfaction of 
services 
4. Satisfaction of 
services 
4. Satisfaction of 
services 
4. Satisfaction of 
services 
4. Satisfaction of 
services 
1) Provincial 
Governor’s Office 
2) Provincial 
Administration 
Office 
  
4.2 Single service 
center 
5. Counter service 5. Counter service 5. Satisfaction of 
provincial  
management 
5. Satisfaction of 
policy maker 
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B.E. 2550  
(2007) 
B.E. 2551  
(2008) 
B.E. 2552  
(2009) 
B.E. 2553  
(2010) 
B.E. 2554  
(2011) 
KPI host agencies 
      
 
  
5. Participation for 
opinion 
6. Participation for 
opinion 
6. Participation 6. Counter service 6. Counter service 
  
6.1 Information 
services 
7. Information 
services 
7. Prevention of 
corruption 
7. Satisfaction of 
policy maker 
7. Prevention of 
corruption 
  
6.2 Prevention of 
corruption 
8. Prevention of 
corruption 
8. Information services 8. Prevention of 
corruption 
  
  
 
  
 
9. Citizens' 
complaint 
  
Dimension 3 
Efficiency  
of Performance 
7. Expenditure of 
budget 
9. Energy save 9. Internal audit 10. Reduction of 
process time  
of services 
8. Reduction of 
process time  
of services 
 
 
 
1) Provincial 
Public Health 
Office 
2) Provincial 
Employment 
Service Office 
  
8. Energy save 10. Reduction of 
process time  
of services 
10. Energy save 11. Expenditure of 
budget 
9. Expenditure of 
budget 
3) Provincial Land 
Office 
4) Provincial  
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B.E. 2550  
(2007) 
B.E. 2551  
(2008) 
B.E. 2552  
(2009) 
B.E. 2553  
(2010) 
B.E. 2554  
(2011) 
KPI host agencies 
 
9.1 Reduction of 
process time  
of services 
 
11. Reduction of 
process time  
of services 
12. Energy save 10. Internal control Public Health 
Office 
5) Provincial 
Office of the 
Controller General 
6) Provincial 
Office of Energy 
    
  
9.2 Change of 
procedure of work 
  
 
13. Internal control 
14. Internal audit 
  
Dimension 4 
Organizational  
Development  
10. Knowledge 
management 
11.1 Development 
of HR management 
11.2 Change of HR 
11.3 Organizational 
KPI to individual KPI 
12. Management of 
IT data base 
13. Quality of 
public management 
14. Risk management 
11. Quality of public  
management 
12. Quality of public  
management 
15. Quality of public  
management 
11. Quality of 
public management 
Provincial 
Governor’s Office 
 
Total number of KPIs 
(Main) 
14 11 12 15 11 10 
Note: 10 KPI host agencies highlighted were the main KPI host agencies in the 16 provinces 
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